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Abstract 
During the last decade, donors and the development community have engaged in the promotion 
and implementation of performance-based management and accountability systems in 
developing countries. In particular, it is believed that giving more power to the lay person to 
directly monitor the performance of his government thanks to the use and publication of 
quantified performance indicators could improve the social accountability of government 
organisations and therefore their efficiency. 
As various research conducted in developed countries has shown, there is often a 
disjuncture between the expected and actual impacts of these systems, and their implementation 
often leads to unintended consequences which can make them inefficient. To understand this 
disjuncture, a better understanding of the social mechanisms through which these systems 
operate is required. 
However, little is known of these mechanisms. This research aims at filling this gap, in the 
particular context of developing countries, based on the study of the Community-Based 
Monitoring and Evaluation System initiative (CBMES) in the Iganga District of Uganda. 
The research provides a thorough analysis of the progressive emergence of managerial 
social accountability in the aid sector, of which the CBMES is a representative example. The social 
mechanisms underpinning the CBMES are subsequently identified and explained as the results of 
complex interactions between meanings, norms and power relationships. 
Two significant observations emerge from the research. First, in order to operate, 
community monitors of the CBMES progressively enter into an implicit agreement with local civil 
servants, which simultaneously facilitates and constrains their actions. Second, the CBMES 
gradually drifts away from formal, performance-based monitoring to informal, relation-based 
monitoring. These two elements de facto turn the community monitors into assistants, rather 
than monitors, of local government officials. The research accounts for why and how the 
observed implicit agreement and drift emerge. 
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Chapter I - INTRODUCTION 
1. Research question 
Since the 1990s, key actors in the development community such as donor agencies, International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the governments of developed countries, have increasingly 
focused on issues of ‘good governance’ in developing countries. Part of this new orientation has 
consisted of engaging in a ‘performance movement’ (Radin, 2006) and in largely embracing 
performance-based management practices. This trend can be exemplified, for example, by the 
United Nations Millennium Development Goals, the Management for Development Results 
‘doctrine’ of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the introduction of result-based 
management in IFIs and donor agencies and public sector reform in developing countries, 
including Uganda. 
These practices followed the wave of reforms undertaken by many Western countries in 
the late ‘70s and ‘80s to improve the efficiency, responsiveness and accountability of their own 
public sectors (Hood, 1991; Ketl, 1997). These reforms aimed at modernising public 
administration - re-labelled ‘public management’ for the occasion - through the introduction of 
management practices used in the private sector. This trend of so-called ‘managerialist’ reforms 
(Pollitt, 1993, 1998; Gulrajani, 2011) relied heavily on the belief that the use of modern 
management tools such as performance-based contracting, performance measurement, output 
indicators and targets (see Pollitt, 1986, 1990; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Radin, 2006; 
Frederickson and Frederickson, 2006)1 is required to improve public sector accountability and 
effectiveness. Such practices and tools have progressively infiltrated international development 
practices, in the hope that they will make development aid and government organisations more 
effective and more accountable. However, the actual effect of this ‘performance movement’ on 
accountability and effectiveness of the public sector is the subject of heated debate. Based on 
research conducted in developed countries, opponents of these practices have underlined that 
performance management entails costly processes and management devices, has harmful 
                                                            
1
 Some use of quantified measures to inform policy making or to justify political choices can be found as early as the 
second half of the 17th century (see Cullen, 1975, prelude). The practice of quantified measurement slowly developed 
throughout the 19th century (Frängsmyr et al., 1990, chapters 10-12) before accelerating at the beginning of the 20th 
century (Williams, 2003, 2004). The expressions ‘performance measurement’ and ‘management by objective’ seem to 
appear in the second half of the 20th century (see for example Berliner, 1956, for the use of ‘performance 
measurement’ in the USSR; Rigway, 1956, and Drucker, 1955:104-16; 1964). 
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unintended consequences (Bouckaert and Balk, 1991; Smith, 1995; Hood, 2006; Bevan, 2006; 
Moynihan, 2009; Kelman and Friedman, 2009) and might have, overall, caused more harm than 
good (Bird et al., 2005). On the other hand, to the stauncher supporters of this ‘performance 
movement’ the current reforms have failed to deliver on their promises, either because they have 
not been completely implemented, or because they have suffered from a lack of commitment on 
the part of the governments who have been implementing them. Between these two extremes, 
those who purport that “not enough effort has been made” and those who think that there are 
fundamental flaws in this approach, more nuanced observers tend to believe that these practices 
have the potential to improve the accountability and effectiveness of public services, but are 
more complex to put into practice than they first appear and should be accompanied by more 
modest expectations. 
Within the particular setting of development aid, the most recent trend (on which this 
paper will empirically focus) has consisted of developing managerial approaches to social 
accountability, in the hope that giving more power to the lay person to directly monitor and 
control the performance of his or her government would improve governance and service 
delivery, and, in the end contribute to reducing poverty. The introduction of performance-based 
social accountability has followed the promotion of devolution and democratic local governance 
(Blair, 2001; Faguet, 2014). It is thought that the process of decentralising government by bringing 
government representatives closer to the governed, together with the introduction of democratic 
local governance mechanisms such as participatory budgeting (World Bank, 2003; Shah, 2007), 
would give additional say to the people and thereby would make the government more 
accountable and responsive to the governed. With increased importance being given to 
participation in development, there has emerged a growing recognition that monitoring and 
evaluation activities should also be participatory (Estrella and Gaventa, 1998). Using a randomized 
field experiment on community-based monitoring in Uganda, Björkman and Svensson (2009) 
shows that increased involvement of communities in the delivery of health services at the 
community level has led to significant improvement in terms of the utilization of outpatient 
services2 and health outcomes3. Based on data collected in Uganda, Deininger and Mpuga (2005) 
shows that household knowledge on how and where to report inappropriate behaviour of 
                                                            
2 Increase of 20%. 
3 Reduced child mortality by 30%. 
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bureaucrats or unsatisfactory service quality contributes significantly to reducing the incidence of 
corruption and improving the quality of service. 
In addition to underlining the importance of participation in monitoring and evaluation 
activities, it is often argued that the success of participatory monitoring and evaluation depends 
on the ability of local monitors to hold government representatives accountable, which often 
requires dissemination of performance information to the widest possible audience. Brett (2003), 
reflecting on participatory development projects, emphasizes how difficult it is for participatory 
projects to succeed more often than they fail. The author suggests that the core problem of these 
participatory projects is that they do not go far enough and fail to create real accountability 
mechanisms. The key factor affecting performance is therefore “the nature of the institutional 
constraints that determine how much leverage users can exercise over agencies” (Brett, 2003:18) 
Afridi (2008), based on the study of two community monitoring programmes in India, emphasises 
the difficulty of successfully implementing such programmes, and argues that much of the success 
of these approaches depends on the dissemination of monitoring information to the widest 
possible audience. Reinikka (2001), and Reinikka and Svensson (2004) estimated that in 1993, only 
2% of public non-wage spending on education in Uganda actually reached the schools. This 
proportion progressively increased to 20% by 1995 in the wake of the decentralisation process, 
and 90% by 1999. This latest improvement is due, according to the authors, to the decision by the 
central government to disseminate information, through newspapers and radio, on the amount of 
money transferred to the schools and to compel schools to post data on the funds released to 
them. All these pieces of research and many others have contributed to building faith in the use 
of performance indicators in participatory monitoring and evaluation activities. The ‘performance 
movement’ has progressively invaded international development doctrines and practices, and 
contributed to the emergence of a managerial form of social accountability, seen as a privileged 
way to improve the quality of the public service in developing countries and thereby reduce 
poverty. 
Despite the amount of research conducted in developed countries on the implementation 
process of performance-based management practices and on the use of performance indicators, 
little research has been conducted in the context of developing countries. Reviewing the research 
on the effectiveness of participatory governance, Speer (2012) shows that findings in the 
literature are mixed, and rest only on a few particular cases. In addition, positive findings are 
often due to the presence of well motived and educated public officials and citizens, who are not 
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commonly found in developing country contexts. Of the 35 articles analysed by the author, most 
focused on case-studies in South and Central America, and only four were based on case-studies 
in Africa. Questioning the transferability of modern management practices to developing 
countries, Schick (1998) suggests that there are many preconditions required for modern public 
management practices to be successfully implemented, which are not likely to exist in developing 
countries. In the same vein, Mimba et al. (2007) suggest that developing countries, which are 
characterized by low-institutional capacity, high levels of corruption and informality linked to low 
wages of public servants and limited involvement of stakeholders, are unlikely to meet the 
demand for performance data emanating from external stakeholders like donors and 
development agencies. They recognized, however, that the literature available on the 
mechanisms underpinning the supply and demand of performance data in developing countries, 
on which they have based their approach, is rather general, and they call for additional context-
specific research. 
Recent pieces of research focusing on the unintended consequences of performance-
based management practices in development programmes or projects show that the topic is 
starting to attract the attention of practitioners and academics. Based on findings from a 
malnutrition programme in Bolivia, Hoey (2015) examines the dynamics between monitoring and 
evaluation and government performance in developing countries. He shows that M&E systems 
can lower staff morale, create burdensome paperwork, blind managers to operational problems 
and innovation and lead to self-censorship, thereby contributing to the very problems that M&E 
should solve. In another recent piece of research based on an HIV prevention intervention for sex 
workers in southern India, Biradavolu et al. (2015) shows that quantified monitoring activities of 
the program have had clear adverse effects on the behaviour of the programme staff. Monitoring 
activities became the priority and strategic decisions within the program were made based on 
monitoring requirements rather than on the objective of the programme. The authors show that 
the quantification process required in the monitoring process ended up undermining community 
ownership and discrediting existing and locally-informed practices, as well as being used to 
discipline and judge the educators. 
More than simply identifying whether performance-based management and 
accountability works or not, it is important to identify the contextual factors which allow these 
practices to enhance performance, and on which social mechanisms these practices rest. Hood 
(2012) develops two hypotheses about performance management: the first is that the effect of 
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management by numbers – whether performance-enhancing or performance-obstructing - will 
depend on the intended use of the numbers, whether they are used to assess progress towards 
targets (targets), to rank individuals or organisations (ranking) or to generate additional 
information (intelligence). The second hypothesis is that the effect of these three applications will 
depend on the culture in which they operate. He therefore concludes that “(b)etter understanding 
of the conditions in which management by numbers can act as a performance-enhancing drug is 
as important for the practice of public management as understanding what makes real drugs 
effective in medicine. So identifying the factors that shape the performance effects of 
management by numbers systems is crucial for better practice, not just a matter of academic 
stargazing” (Hood, 2012: s91). 
The present paper adopts a similar stance, and aims at contributing to the understanding 
of the processes by which performance-based management practices influence public service 
delivery. It will answer the research question: “What are the effects of the promotion and 
implementation by donors of performance-based management systems on the accountability of 
local government officials, and how can these be explained?” It will be shown that the 
managerialist beliefs which have led to advocating for performance-based reforms in developing 
countries rest on an over-simplified understanding of the social mechanisms underpinning 
performance-based management and accountability practices. In other words, it is argued that 
the ‘theory of change’ justifying these reforms, namely the succession of causes and 
consequences following their introduction, fails to take into account the main social mechanisms 
triggered by these very reforms. 
2. Research design and methodology 
2.1. Objective of the research 
As Lewis and Mosse (2006: 2) suggest, development aid is characterised by what can be called 
‘order and disjuncture’: “within the technical and managerial framework that defines aid policy, 
‘order’ can be understood as the ‘ideal worlds’ that development actors aim to bring about 
through the execution of proper policy and project design. Disjuncture comes from the gap 
between these ideal worlds and the social reality they have to relate to.” They subsequently 
propose that one of the possible contributions of qualitative research is to ensure that ‘ideal 
worlds’ are consistent with our knowledge of the way societies really work. The present research 
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follows this perspective. If management devices and new institutions are to be designed to 
effectively give more control to the citizens so as to make poverty reduction policies more 
effective, better knowledge of how performance indicators are interpreted and used in local 
social accountability mechanisms is required. 
The notions of ‘order’ and ‘disjuncture’ are very relevant concepts for this research. The 
managerial understanding of performance-based management and accountability systems rests, 
once again, on a simplified set of assumptions, which will be detailed in the course of this paper. 
This set of assumptions fails to give an accurate account of the way communities and 
organisations react and adapt to the introduction of performance-based management and 
accountability systems. This failure accounts for the disjuncture aforementioned, the gap which 
exists between ‘order’ – that is the intended effects of such systems - and their observed effects, 
that is the effects which can be seen on the ground, when such systems have been 
operationalized. This research aims at describing and analysing the effects of the promotion and 
implementation of performance-based management systems on the accountability of 
government officials, and to provide an explanation for these effects. It will investigate how 
quantified performance measurements are understood and used at the community level as well 
as how they contribute to fostering public accountability of government organisations. There are 
therefore two sides to this research: the first focuses on how performance-based management 
systems operate at the community level and why, while the second focuses rather on the 
contribution of such systems to the accountability of government organisations as a whole within 
the wider context of the overall official and formal system of accountability mechanisms 
operating in Uganda. 
To answer the research question, the research is based on a case study - that is to say, in 
observing and providing an in-depth analysis of naturally occurring events in the particular 
context of a project of monitoring and evaluation of public services (the Community Based 
Evaluation and Monitoring System - CBMES) led by a Ugandan Non-Governmental Organisation 
(NGO), the Uganda Debt Network, within the wider framework of the various accountability 
institutions of Uganda. 
The CBMES initiative consists of selecting and training ‘community monitors’, namely 
members of local communities in selected districts in rural Uganda, to monitor the quality of 
public services. These monitoring activities, which lead to the production of written monitoring 
reports informed by quantified performance indicators, are designed to contribute to controlling 
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the expenses of the local government, limiting corruption and providing feedback on what is 
happening on the ground to political leaders in the capital city, Kampala. It will be argued that this 
project is a good example of ‘managerial social accountability’, making it a particularly suitable 
candidate for identifying the social mechanisms underpinning the operationalization of 
performance-based management and accountability systems. 
2.2. Case study justification 
a) The case for the case study approach 
The research question is at the same time exploratory (it aims at describing what is going on at 
the local level and whether or not it has an impact on the accountability of government 
organisations), and explanatory (it tries to make sense of the observations and explain why things 
happen one way and not another). If the literature on performance measurement and 
accountability is plentiful (albeit scarcer when it comes to social accountability), the literature on 
the use of performance measurement for accountability purposes in a non-Western context is at 
best scant, or even non-existent. Moreover, the particular social and political contexts in which 
managerial approaches to social accountability are implemented are of primary importance, since 
existing social hierarchies and informal accountability mechanisms are fundamental to their 
operationalization. 
The purpose of this research is therefore less about testing a particular relationship 
between clearly identified variables than about exploring a real-life situation and providing a first-
hand understanding of the social mechanisms which underpin and constrain social accountability 
relationships. For this purpose the single case study approach is arguably a better method than 
comparative case studies and surveys – which would require a preliminary identification of 
variables on which to focus the research – or experiments, since it allows for exploring a particular 
context of rich social relationships where the representations and interpretations of local actors 
are of primary importance and about which little is known. In order to investigate the question 
“What are the effects of the promotion and implementation by donors of performance-based 
management systems on the accountability of local government officials, and how can these be 
explained?” the research has been based on a ‘representative’ or ‘paradigmatic’ case study, i.e. a 
particular situation which brings together all the characteristic elements to investigate: the 
CBMES initiative in the Iganga district of Uganda. The reasons for this particular choice are 
detailed in the next section. 
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b) Uganda, Uganda Debt Network (UDN) and the CBMES initiative 
Uganda has been developing performance-based management practices for more than a decade, 
under the aegis of the World Bank. The country is often seen as a paradigmatic example of 
performance-based and performance-oriented reform in the public sectors of developing 
countries. It was, at the end of the ‘90s and the beginning of the 2000s, a ‘donor darling’ thanks to 
the commitment of its government to reforms and action towards ‘good governance’ and 
economic stability. 
More specifically, this means that the country has apparently reformed its public 
institutions to make them performance-oriented and to clarify and tighten the link between 
budget expenses and clearly specified and quantified development outcomes. In practice, these 
reforms have rested on the introduction of performance contracting, result-based budgeting, 
performance monitoring and control institutions such as the National Integrated Monitoring and 
Evaluation System (NIMES) and the Budget Monitoring Unit, as well as the systematization of the 
publication of performance data on the public sector. More details about the organisation of the 
public sector of Uganda and its performance-oriented reforms are provided in chapter V of this 
paper.  
Civil society organisations (CSOs) in Uganda have followed this trend of reform and have 
engaged on the path of good governance and improved accountability, including the organisation 
Uganda Debt Network (UDN). UDN was created in 1996 as an association of several NGOs and 
individuals. It was officially registered as an NGO in 1998. Its initial activity consisted in 
campaigning for debt relief, as part of the global Jubilee 2000 movement aiming at cancelling the 
third world debt by the year 2000 (at that time, Uganda was one of the first countries to be 
considered for the Highly Indebted Poor Countries policy of the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)). However, since its inception, the mandate of UDN has been expanded to 
include community participation and empowerment, policy analysis, a socio-economic research 
programme, budget advocacy and the promotion of good governance and rights. Its official 
mission, as stated in its official documents and website, is “*t+o promote and advocate for pro-
poor policies and full participation of poor people in influencing poverty-focused policies, 
monitoring the utilization of public resources and ensuring that borrowed and national resources 
are prudently managed in an open, accountable and transparent manner so as to benefit the 
Uganda [sic] people” (UDN, 2009b:2).  
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Together with the reform of Uganda’s public sector, a decentralisation process has begun, 
the purpose of which is to bring public services closer to the people and make these services more 
responsive to the needs of the poorest. Within the Ugandan decentralisation process, five levels 
of local government have been created4, and local governments have been attributed extended 
budgetary and legislative powers. Around 30% of the national budget is transferred to local 
governments in the form of Conditional Grants, Unconditional Grants and Equalization Grants to 
enable local governments to fund their own development policies. In this context, UDN has made 
its priority monitoring the local budgetary and spending processes through community 
participation and empowerment; the CBMES initiative is its flagship programme.5 
In addition to being present at the local level, UDN is also active at the national level, 
lobbying for pro-poor policies, budget transparency, government accountability and popular 
participation in policy design and implementation. They are therefore unique observers of how 
social accountability mechanisms linking people at the grassroots to high-level policy makers 
operate. Focusing on their work and adopting their perspective will provide unique insight into 
the issue at hand. 
c) The CBMES initiative in Iganga District 
The CBMES initiative aims at selecting and training local community members (unpaid volunteers, 
henceforth referred to as ‘community monitors’) to monitor and evaluate the government’s 
actions and policies at the local level (the village to sub-county level). Its objective is “to promote 
the interests of poor and marginalized people at the grassroots at all levels of policy formulation 
and implementation so that poverty reduction strategies effectively target and benefit them. 
Specific objectives include: 1) Increasing citizens’ participation in public expenditure planning, 
management and implementation; 2) Involving citizens in decision-making processes at all levels; 
3) Improving service delivery through transparent and accountable management systems at local 
level.”6 
                                                            
4 The structure of local government in Uganda is divided into five levels (three administrative levels and two levels 
where local representatives are elected): the village level, parish level, sub-county level (the first level where local 
representatives are elected), county level and district level (the second level where local representatives are elected). 
See annex 3 for further details. 
5 UDN’s current activities revolve around five thematic areas, namely: community participation and empowerment (to 
which belongs the CBMES initiative and which is the most important thematic area); policy analysis and socio-economic 
research; budget advocacy; governance and rights; and capacity building. 
6 http://udn.or.ug/?page_id=263, last access in March 2013. 
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On paper the CBMES initiative has – as will be shown in chapter V of this paper - adopted 
most of the main elements of the managerialist vocabulary and approach to social accountability, 
and considers performance measurement and indicators as powerful tools for community 
monitoring (UDN, 2009a: 56-62). In addition, UDN has resolutely inscribed the CBMES initiative 
within the new performance-oriented organisation of the public service in Uganda: the CBMES 
“works to ensure that the Office of the Prime Minister operates a National Integrated Monitoring 
and Evaluation System (NIMES) to increase the participation of citizens in Monitoring and 
Evaluation of public policies and improve the quality and delivery of services”7, and the UDN’s 
strategy for the years to come is to push one step further the institutionalisation of the CBMES 
initiative and its integration into the official organisation of performance monitoring (UDN, 
2009b). UDN and its CBMES initiative constitute therefore a good case study with which to answer 
the proposed research question. 
The research focuses on one particular district, the district of Iganga, which has been 
selected among the different districts where the CBMES is present according to three criteria: 
1) The experience of the local community monitors in terms of monitoring. The community 
monitors of the selected district should have enough experience in community monitoring 
and should have had time since their initial training to develop their monitoring routines and 
their relationships with local government officials and local communities. At least two years’ 
experience in community monitoring has been deemed the minimum experience required. 
2) The commitment of the monitors operating in the district. The community monitors of the 
selected district should be actively involved in community monitoring. The commitment of 
the community monitors was easily assessed based on the opinions of the UDN staff from the 
headquarters managing the CBMES initiative, who have been interacting with the community 
monitors from the different CBMES since their inception. 
3) The average characteristics of the monitors in terms of age, education and socio-economic 
status. It has been deemed important that the community monitors from the selected district 
be neither too educated nor too uneducated compared with community monitors from the 
other districts, to ensure that the selected district be representative of the CBMES initiative. 
 
                                                            
7 http://www.udn.or.ug/cbmesbriefingpaper.htm, last access in December 2011. Reference to the NIMES was 
withdrawn from the UDN website when it was revamped in 2012. 
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2.3. Unit of analysis and type of knowledge produced 
a) Unit of analysis: community monitors 
The unit of analysis of the research, that is to say the main entity under scrutiny in the research, 
will be the individuals (community monitors and their relationships with other actors) as opposed 
to the organisations. The managerial approach to social accountability focuses on relationships 
between distinct organisations or groups, such as service providers and civil society, neglecting to 
account for the fact that community monitors and civil servants working in public organisations 
are embedded in local social networks. Investigating how managerial approaches to social 
accountability are operationalized at the local level requires research that goes beyond 
relationships between organisations or groups to focus on the relationships that community 
monitors have with local community members, local government officials and local civil servants. 
Individuals, and particularly community monitors, are central to the operationalization of 
social accountability devices in the sense that it is their understanding of concepts such as 
accountability, contracts and performance measurement as well as their expectations of state 
intervention which are most likely to determine how managerial approaches to social 
accountability are operationalized at the local level. Community monitors interact regularly with 
villagers and members of the local government (administrative staff, elected councillors and 
chairmen) at the sub-county and district level. In addition, every now and then – annually in 
theory – a delegation of community monitors presents a review at the central (national) level (the 
Ministry of Public Service (MoPS) and the Ministry of Local Governments (MoLG)). Community 
monitors are therefore the central element of the CBMES initiative, and focusing on them to study 
their relationships with the other actors (see diagram below) will allow us to describe and explain 
how the CBMES is operationalized. However, this does not necessarily mean that ‘organisations’ 
or ‘groups’ are neglected: organisations and their relationships are studied through the 
perceptions of individuals, whose testimonies reveal to what extent organisations constrain or 
enable individual agency. 
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Figure 1  - Web of relationships around community monitors 
b) Type of knowledge produced 
As Lewis et al. (2003) suggests in their study of order and disjuncture in the case of the World 
Bank’s project of ‘empowerment’ of community-based organisations, differences of meaning 
among the different stakeholders and power relationships between them interact to produce 
project outcomes that differ from initial expectations. The research will adopt a similar 
perspective and will essentially be interpretative, meaning that “what is of paramount importance 
is how we order, classify, structure, and interpret our world, and then act upon these 
interpretations” (Prasad, 2005:13). 
In the present research, the perceived meaning of notions such as ‘accountability’ and 
‘public service’, as well as the perception of the role and meanings of quantified performance 
measurements and existing power relationships between community monitors and other actors, 
are fundamental to understanding how managerial approaches to social accountability are 
operationalized, and why. The research therefore provides a ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973) of 
the CBMES initiative at the local level, through the description and understanding of how 
community monitors perceive and relate to the other actors; how they think about their role, the 
state’s mission, accountability relationships and quantified performance data; and how and why, 
subsequently, they act within the framework of these representations, consequently transforming 
of the initial managerial idea of social accountability into a particular set of observable practices 
and relationships. 
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Providing a ‘thick description’, however, does not mean that the research will essentially 
or only be descriptive. As Denzin (1989) has shown, the process of thick description gives an 
important role to interpretation (Denzin, 1989), to the extent that without ‘thick interpretation’, 
thick description is not possible; it is the researcher’s function to describe and give sense to social 
actions so that the thick description of the actions can be made available to a wider audience, can 
appear credible and contributes to our knowledge of the subject matter. Such research is 
therefore not a mere collection or description of facts, but rather a coherent narrative of how and 
why these facts make sense and how they motivate the community of actors under scrutiny. 
This research rests on a set of selected qualitative methods. The first method, semi-
structured interviewing, consists of semi-guided conversations framed following a set of themes 
to explore, allowing new questions to emerge during the interview as a result of the interviewee’s 
answers. The second method is document analysis. The type of documents of interest for this 
research are essentially local newspapers, UDN’s letters and memos, reports written by 
community monitors, reports and notes written by local civil servants, OECD and World Bank 
documents, and evaluation documents of the Ugandan public sector and of various development 
projects and programmes. The third method is direct observation of monitoring activities, training 
and lobbying workshops and meetings between UDN representatives, community monitors and 
government officials. 
It is hoped that this research will be relevant both from an academic and a practitioner 
point of view. From an academic perspective, the concept of social accountability, and more 
specifically its link with the use of quantified performance measurements, has emerged recently, 
and has not been subjected to any in-depth study in the context of developing countries. This 
study, despite the fact that it rests on a single case study (which may be deemed insufficient to 
allow for generalisation), arguably allows for what has been called ‘naturalistic generalisation’ 
(Stake, 1978) or ‘transferability’ (Lincoln and Guba, 1985): 
“It is widely believed that case studies are useful in the study of human affairs because they are down-
to-earth and attention-holding but that they are not a suitable basis for generalization. (…) I claim that 
case studies will often be the preferred method of research because they may be epistemologically in 
harmony with the reader’s experience and thus to that person a natural basis for generalization (…) I 
believe that it is reasonable to conclude that one of the more effective means of adding to 
understanding for all readers will be by approximating, through the words and illustration of our 
reports, the natural experiences acquired in ordinary personal involvement.” (Stake, 1978: 5) 
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The findings presented in this research add to the knowledge of international 
development practitioners of performance management and accountability in the public sector of 
developing countries. One of the main problems linked to managerial approaches to social 
accountability is that whenever their operationalization does not yield the expected results, it is 
often considered that improvements could be made through better implementation, more 
transparency and more complex, accurate, and thorough performance measurement systems. In 
other words, instead of questioning the validity of the model and its underlying assumptions, it is 
often advised to provide more of the same, thus perpetuating misconceptions. However, 
choosing between one of the two options – either persevering in the same direction or changing 
direction and revising the underlying assumption – is not an easy task, as very often programme 
implementation could indeed be made better. It is hoped that this study will help development 
practitioners decide between questioning implementation and questioning design, thereby 
adopting different development practices motivated by a different understanding of the 
contribution of quantified performance indicators to social accountability. 
3. Organisation of the argumentation 
3.1. Step 1: Describing managerial social accountability. 
The goal of this first step, corresponding to chapter II, is to provide a detailed account of what 
managerial social accountability is, of which the CBMES initiative is a representative example. It 
builds on the concepts of ‘managerial accountability’ and ‘social accountability’ already existing in 
the literature, and details how managerial social accountability has emerged within the more 
general ‘performance movement’. This work rests on the analysis of two sets of documents: OECD 
and World Bank documents dealing with good governance, social accountability, public 
management and result-oriented management on the one hand, and the academic literature on 
management and public administration – particularly on accountability, performance 
measurement and managerialism in the public sector – on the other hand. 
Before introducing managerial social accountability, ‘managerialism’ is introduced, and 
more particularly one of its core characteristics: the use of quantified performance measurement 
for management purposes. Chapter II argues that managerialist practices have permeated the aid 
sector and shows, through examples, how they have done so both in development agencies and 
in the public sectors of developing countries. Finally, the concepts of ‘accountability’ and ‘social 
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accountability’ are introduced and discussed to prepare for the identification and definition of a 
particular approach to social accountability which has emerged, profoundly imprinted by 
managerial principles. This managerial approach to social accountability has led to the emergence 
of ‘managerial social accountability’, in which quantified performance measurements should play 
a central role as a vehicle of social accountability between people at the grassroots and the public 
service, from the local civil servant to the highest-ranking public official, and finally from the local 
to the national level. This particular understanding of social accountability rests on a limited set of 
assumptions which, together, define what is expected from management systems based on these 
premises. 
Chapter III subsequently builds on the notion of managerial social accountability to 
introduce what is called in this paper ‘Performance-based Management and Accountability 
Systems’ (PMAS). The notion of ‘system’ is introduced and developed to underline the existence 
of artificial boundaries between what is part of the system (management and accountability tools 
specifically designed to improve social accountability and subsequently the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the public service), and what is not (the complex social mechanisms which drive the 
society or community in which the systems of managerial social accountability are being 
introduced). Introducing PMAS as a generic term for various forms of performance-based 
management practices is necessary to identify the main limitation shared by all these forms, of 
which the CBMES is a representative example. The main limitation is, it is argued, the overly 
simplistic theory of change which, according to the proponents of these practices, links the 
introduction of these systems to the expected outcomes of improved performance and 
accountability. Along with the definition of PMAS, a detailed account of the theoretical processes 
of production and utilisation of performance measurements is provided, and the main goals and 
functions of PMAS as identified in the literature are presented. Finally, based on these main 
functions, various implicit assumptions which accompany the theoretical justification of PMAS are 
revealed, as the first step in our attempt to explain the disjuncture between the expected 
outcomes (intended effects) of PMAS and their actual, observable effects. 
3.2. Step 2: Outside the ‘systems’ of performance-based management and 
accountability 
The purpose of this step, corresponding to chapter IV, is to make evident that what is outside the 
system of performance-based management and accountability cannot be neglected if one hopes 
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to properly understand and anticipate the consequences of such systems, and if ones hope to 
reduce the disjuncture between the ‘ideal worlds’ of development practitioners and our 
knowledge of the way societies really work. 
Following the introduction of Performance-based Management and Accountability 
Systems (PMAS) and the identification of the managerial principles which underpin them, the 
second step of our argumentation consists of reviewing the many limitations of PMAS identified in 
the literature. This part rests essentially on a literature review of existing research in the fields of 
public management, political science and management sciences. These limitations roughly fit into 
two categories: limitations linked to the assumed nature of performance measurement, and 
limitations linked to the intended effects of performance-based management and accountability 
systems on organisations. The latter are of course, to some extent, link to the former and clearly 
based on the fact that the nature of PMAS is predominantly social and therefore more complex 
than initially assumed. The first category of limitations stems from the fact that performance 
measurement is implicitly considered as objective and neutral, meaning that measuring 
performance is considered a mere technical act whose purpose is to reveal the truth as it is “out 
there.” Performance measurements are therefore reified, and assumed to be meaningful without 
preliminary agreement, interpretation or discussion, and consequently do not contain any bias. 
The second category of limitations, regarding the effects of PMAS, is linked to the fact that 
proponents of these systems tend to consider them as mere tools at the service of managers and 
decision-makers, neglecting any of their potentially powerful ‘side effects’. 
Chapter IV provides a detailed account of these different aspects, and subsequently 
introduces the framework which will be used to explain how the social mechanisms unfold to 
constrain and at the same time enable the work of the community monitors of the CBMES 
initiative. This framework is adapted from Vakkuri and Meklin (2006), based on the 
Structurational Model of Technology introduced in Orlikowski (1992). The model is based on the 
dynamic interaction between organizational structures (or institutional properties) and agents. It 
rests on the central hypothesis that agents’ actions are limited and constrained by existing 
structures within this organisation; structures which in turn are slowly modified by the actions of 
the agents. ‘Institutional properties’ refers to the three fundamental elements at the core of 
every social interaction: meaning, power and norms. These three fundamental elements, while 
difficult to separate in practice, are nevertheless important from an analytical point of view to 
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better account for the social mechanisms which underpin human action and interactions within 
organisations and society at large. 
3.3. Step 3: Lessons from the CBMES initiative 
The last step of the argumentation is the analysis of the CBMES case study (chapters V and VI). It 
consists of applying the aforementioned framework to analyse the data collected during fieldwork 
in the Iganga District in Uganda. 
As mentioned in section 2.1, the research question “What are the effects of the promotion 
and implementation by donors of performance-based management systems on the accountability 
of local government officials, and how can these be explained?” has two distinct but 
complementary aspects: the first aspect focuses on how the performance-based management 
systems operate at the community level and for what reasons, while the second focuses rather on 
the contribution of such systems to the accountability of government organisations as a whole, 
within the wider context of the official and formal system of accountability mechanisms operating 
in Uganda. These two aspects are fundamental to understanding how managerial approaches to 
social accountability contribute to improving the accountability of governmental officials. The first 
section of chapter V therefore presents the various institutions contributing to public 
accountability in Uganda, in order to provide the basis for understanding how the CBMES can fit 
into the wider framework of nation-wide accountability institutions. 
The second section of chapter V introduces in detail the CBMES initiative, as well as the 
analytical approach which is used to process the collected data. All the necessary data have been 
collected to build up a detailed picture of what the CBMES initiative is, how it was designed and 
the intentions of those who designed it. This part of the research rests on document analysis, 
interviews with different actors involved in the CBMES initiative, and semi-structured interviews 
with actors who have observed the process (UDN representatives in the head office in Kampala 
and in the districts, as well as other NGO and government representatives). 
Additional data have been collected to account for the CBMES results in practice, which is 
the focus of chapter VI. In addition to describing the effects of the implementation of the CBMES 
initiative in practice, the research aims at understanding how the relationships between 
community monitors and the other stakeholders evolve all along the monitoring process. More 
specifically, each step of the monitoring process has been followed and observed in detail. A 
group of community monitors in the Buyanga sub-county in the Iganga district has been followed 
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over a period of two years in order to observe all the different stages of the monitoring process, 
from the selection of what is monitored to the final stage of lobbying and advocacy. Time has 
been spent getting to know the selected monitors, their communities and their social situations, 
in order to understand how they interact with civil servants and service providers, elected local 
government officials, contractors and villagers at all stages of the monitoring process. During this 
observation process, the role played by performance data and quantified indicators in the 
discussions and negotiations with the different actors have been carefully followed. Participant 
observations have been supplemented  by interviews with a wide range of community level 
actors, NGO staff and central and local government officials (at the sub-county, county and 
district levels), and by direct observation of key events such as meetings of community monitors, 
meetings of monitors with local government officials, and lobbying and training workshops. 
Finally, what the CBMES initiative is in practice is compared with the managerial model of 
social accountability introduced in chapter III. Any identified ‘disjuncture’ (Lewis and Mosse, 2006: 
2) is investigated in order to identify the social mechanisms which are likely to account for it. 
Although the research does not start with any explicit hypothesis to test, it runs along two main 
lines of inquiry: 1) the selection process of the activities to monitor, and 2) the process of building 
a convincing account to support community monitors claims and the use of quantified 
performance data in this account. These two lines of inquiry are further defined in chapter V, and 
structure the description and analysis of what the CBMES initiative is in practice. The data 
collected from the case study is finally analysed in chapter VI, using the framework introduced in 
chapter V. 
4. Contribution of the research and summary of key findings  
The main results of this research are the following: first, the research identifies and introduces the 
original concept of ‘managerial social accountability’ and provides a complete definition of the 
term, building on existing research on managerialism, managerial accountability and social 
accountability. It therefore contributes to the literature on managerialism (public management) 
and social accountability in developing countries (development studies). 
Second, the research develops and operationalizes the Structurational model of 
performance measurement (Vakkuri and Meklin, 2006), thus contributing to current research in 
public management. 
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Third, the research identifies and conceptualizes Performance Management and 
Accountability Systems. It provides important clarifications regarding the main goals of PMAS and 
the sub-functions through which these main goals are expected to be met. It also introduces the 
original notion of ‘implicit assumptions’ which are central to understanding how the sub-functions 
identified are supposed to operate. Implicit assumptions for a set of eight sub-functions identified 
in the literature on public management are provided. 
Finally, the research provides original insights into the effects of the implementation of 
performance-based management systems on the accountability of civil servants in developing 
countries. It also provides detailed explanations as to why such effects are observed, adding to 
the existing knowledge of how and through which social mechanisms PMAS operates. Three main 
original findings emerge: 
First, as community monitors progressively carve out the space required for their 
activities, they enter in an implicit agreement with government officials at the local level. This 
implicit agreement de facto transforms the community monitors into assistants of government 
officials. Through this agreement, community monitors get access to certain information and to 
certain officials, and can monitor the work of teachers, health care workers or contractors. The 
acknowledgement they receive from government officials contributes to building their legitimacy 
among the local communities. However, this support stops when community monitors get too 
close to monitoring the work of these government officials themselves. This implicit agreement 
therefore provides them with the space required to operate, but at the same time constrains 
them and prevents them from monitoring fund management and corruption at the district level. 
Second, some sort of quantified performance indicators were used in the first years of 
operations of the CBO. However, these ‘indicators’ convey a meaning which differs significantly 
from the managerial understanding. ‘Indicators’ progressively evolve towards the vernacular 
meaning of “something that physically shows the quality of the work or service”. ‘Performance 
indicators’ therefore designates the physical aspects of the school, health centre or infrastructure 
which point towards poor or high quality work or service. With time, these performance 
indicators progressively become less important in the monitoring process as the activities of the 
community monitors drift further away from monitoring managerial performance and towards 
case-by-case problem solving and activities of redress. This drift is explained by the need of the 
community monitors to gain legitimacy and develop their identity within the local community. 
They have grown important within the local communities for solving issues between users and 
29 
 
schools and health centre employees, or for intervening when contractors do “shoddy work.” 
These issues are seen as the most pressing issues by members of the local communities, and 
therefore community monitors become known and important when they start contributing to 
solving these issues. Community monitors intervene when local community members identify 
problems, and solve them through negotiation and discussion and, if necessary, by bringing in 
local government officials who can enforce sanctions. The need for performance data in the 
managerial sense being very low or non-existent, the use of performance indicators disappears, 
replaced by more useful pieces of evidence such as photos and individual testimonies. 
The research therefore provides detailed insights into the process through which 
community-based monitoring unfolds, and how quantified performance measurement are 
adapted and modified in the process. It contributes to filling the gaps identified in the literature in 
public management and development studies. 
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Chapter II - THE EMERGENCE OF MANAGERIAL SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY  
The use of performance-based management and accountability practices of various sorts in 
development agencies and donor-led public sector reforms in developing countries has gained 
prominence in the last fifteen years. This trend is part of a more general ‘performance 
movement’, and is central to a growing managerial ideology usually referred to as 
‘managerialism’. The purpose of chapter II is to progressively introduce the notion of ‘managerial 
social accountability’, which has eventually become a corner-stone of development strategies 
promoted by donors and international development institutions. It will do so by building on the 
literature on managerialism, managerial accountability and social accountability and will pave the 
way to the definition of ‘Performance Based Management and Accountability System’ provided in 
chapter III. This definition will subsequently enable a comprehensive analysis of the main 
limitations of these systems and justify the study of the CBMES initiative. 
Chapter II is organized as follows: the first section introduces the term ‘managerialism’ as 
a contemporary ideology which emerged in the 20th century. This ideology and its various trends 
have framed many of the current fashions and management practices, including the use of 
performance-based management practices in the aid sector. 
The second section provides a general overview and various examples of how this 
performance movement has manifested itself in the aid sector. A review is proposed of the recent 
trends within national development agencies and international organisations, within the 
framework of the so-called ‘holistic’ approaches to development and, finally, in the public sector 
reforms of developing countries. 
The third section focuses on the concept of ‘accountability’ and introduces the particular 
type of accountability which is central to this research: ‘managerial social accountability.’ It 
retraces its evolution from social audit to social accountability, before introducing how social 
accountability has been modified and interpreted within the managerial approach. At the end of 
this section a managerial model of social accountability is introduced. 
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1. Introducing managerialism 
The term ‘managerialism’ is often used to refer to the technocratic and management-oriented 
ideology on which the current economic, social and political order is allegedly based. 
Managerialism took root in the beginning of the 20th century with the emergence of 
‘management’ as a field of knowledge and know-how, as an academic discipline, and with the rise 
of ‘managers’ as a class of prominent actors in private and public organisations (Hoopes, 2003). 
Managerialism rests on the idea that the new class of ‘managers’ are the leaders of today’s 
organisations, and are the masters of techniques and tools of management which can be used 
interchangeably in any type of organisation, whether public or private, in any social context or 
industry. 
While managerialism can refer to slightly different trends and fashions within the field of 
public administration f(Pollitt, 1998), three main distinctive and consensual characteristics have 
emerged: 1) the understanding of public sector activity as a production process transforming 
inputs into outputs and outcomes – public services such as education or health care – and the 
importance given to improving effectiveness and efficiency8 to the detriment of other values; 2) 
the faith in the role and expertise of the manager and in tools and techniques of management to 
improve efficiency and effectiveness; and 3) the necessity of bringing public services and their 
managers closer to the people through devolution, and giving leeway to managers in order to 
allow them to innovate so as to be more efficient. 
Managerialism rests firstly on the idea that public sector activity consists of transforming 
inputs (essentially tax payers’ money) into outputs and outcomes, and that managers play a 
prominent part in achieving high levels of efficiency (the ratio of outputs over inputs) and 
effectiveness (the ratio of outcomes over inputs). Part of the managerialist ethos rests on the idea 
that achieving ever-higher levels of efficiency and effectiveness should be the sole value guiding 
the actions and decisions of these managers. This approach perpetuates the dominant and 
traditional view9 of public administration which, in its most stark form, “holds that public agencies 
exist only to carry out programs and policies established by the legislative and executive branches 
of government, and to do so with maximum efficiency” (Edwards, 1998:554). Managerialism 
                                                            
8
 ‘Outputs’ refers to the immediate production of services (for example educating or healing people), which will lead to ‘outcomes’ in 
the long term (higher levels of education and higher life expectancy) via a ‘theory of change’, a chain of causes and consequences 
which is supposed to link outputs to outcomes. ‘Efficiency’ is then defined as the ratio of outputs over inputs and ‘effectiveness’ as the 
ratio of outcomes over inputs. 
9
 This traditional view developed following the famous 1887 essay by Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, which many 
observers consider to be one of the first studies of public administration practices. 
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therefore considers, in the wake of the “old” public administration traditionn, that policy-making 
and policy administration are distinct by nature – policy-making being ‘political’ whereas policy 
administration is ‘technical’ - and should clearly be separated: questions of values such as equity 
and fairness should be dealt with by policy makers, whereas public service bureaucrats or 
managers should focus on implementing policies as efficiently as possible, without being 
concerned by other considerations such as equity and fairness. 
Managerialism is also underpinned by a faith in tools and techniques of management, the 
mastery of which gives the manager a particular expertise in management. This particular 
expertise can be applied to any type of organisation, public or private, in order to improve its 
efficiency and effectiveness. The most common tools and techniques are arguably strategic 
planning, performance-based budgeting, performance measurement and management and 
performance-based pay. This approach, according to many observers of public administration (see 
for example Edwards, 1998: 562-63; Pollitt, 1993), developed in the wake of the early 1900s 
‘scientific management’ of Frederick Winslow Taylor. His work focused on increasing worker 
efficiency through careful scientific study and measurement of the various aspects of work 
practices, and was motivated by a moral belief – still present in the managerial approach to public 
administration – in scientific techniques as tools for creating a better society. 
In addition to the pro-efficiency and pro-technology orientations aforementioned, some 
observers argue that managerialism gives more leeway to public managers so as to allow them to 
innovate and to privilege performance-based rather than procedure-based control of 
organizational activities: managerialism “seek[s] to shift public agencies from an allegiance to the 
bureaucratic (hierarchy and control) paradigm to an acceptance of a post bureaucratic (innovation 
and support) paradigm” (Dixon et al., 1998:170). Whereas earlier forms of managerialism, which 
arose in the wake of Taylor’s scientific management, relied essentially on proper division of work 
and adhesion to carefully and scientifically devised work processes, thus leading to a different 
understanding of managerialism10, the necessity to give more leeway to public managers has 
become a dominant feature of managerialism with the rise of the so-called ‘New Public 
Management’ (NPM). The NPM was developed in the ‘70s and ‘80s as a particular type of 
managerialism. It clearly underlines the need to let managers manage, and for two reasons: in 
order to achieve the best possible performance, and in order to be more citizen-oriented 
                                                            
10
 See for example Edwards, 1998, which considers “Managerialism as Not Leadership”, highlighting that managers are essentially risk-
adverse and reluctant to change, and tend to “focus excessively on controlling the behaviour of their subordinates through rules and 
procedures embedded in the structures of their organisations” (Edwards, 1998:557). 
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(Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Hood, 1991). Although these two reasons partially overlap, a slight 
difference should be mentioned. In the mainstream managerial logic, freedom to manage is 
considered a better way to achieve higher performance, as defined by the manager’s hierarchy. 
According to the NPM logic, freedom to manage is considered, in addition, as a means to bring 
service providers closer to the citizens/customers (through devolution) and to better satisfy their 
needs; in other words, it ensures that performance is defined according to the citizen/customers’ 
needs and not unilaterally by the manager’s hierarchy.11 This approach has led to a wave of 
devolution of responsibility and authority in the public sectors of many OECD and developing 
countries. 
Words ending in ‘-ism’ often carry a negative connotation, and authors mentioning 
managerialism do it in order to criticise whatever this term refers to. For example, Denhardt 
(1993) equates managerialism with the careless importation into public organisations of business 
management practices designed to increase efficiency and profit. Dixon et al., (1998:164) sees 
managerialism as “the private sector ‘solution’ to the public sector ‘problem’” of inefficiency, 
which consists of uncritically introducing and using management practices from the private sector 
in the public sector, which is allegedly inefficient. As Gulrajani (2011) puts it: 
“Managerialism is premised on the inherent inadequacies of traditional public administration and 
advocates the insertion of business logics into public affairs. A characteristic feature of managerialism is 
thus a relatively uncritical [my emphasis] acceptance of corporate management in all administrative 
contexts.” 
Per se, some of the practices referred to here as typical of managerialism probably have 
had and still have a positive influence on the efficiency and effectiveness of public administrations 
of modern economies, although these are outside the scope of this paper. However, like any 
ideology, it becomes dangerous whenever it is applied uncritically and without any precautions, in 
any situation and context. It is therefore important to distinguish the set of practices and believes 
underpinning managerialism from their uncritical use. In this paper, managerialism refers to the 
latter: the uncritical use of management tools, the social consequences of which are 
oversimplified, if not neglected. This means that it is not the practices themselves which are 
criticised in this paper – some performance-based practices can undoubtedly be useful tools 
under certain circumstances – but rather their generalisation and use without proper 
consideration of the complex social mechanisms which determine how these practices will 
                                                            
11
 See for example Osborne and Gaebler, 1992, chapters 2 “Community-owned government: empowering rather than serving” and 6 
“Customer-driven government: meeting the needs of the customer, not the bureaucracy.” 
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actually change the organisations in which they are introduced. The present research aims to 
highlight some of the complex social phenomena triggered by the use of these practices. 
2. Performance-based management practices in the aid sector 
In the aid sector, two different but related managerial trends can be distinguished: the 
introduction and use of performance-based management practices within development agencies 
themselves, in order to improve development projects and programme management (sub-section 
2.1); and the use of performance-based management and monitoring frameworks as coordination 
and accountability mechanisms between the governments of developing countries and 
development agencies, within the framework of comprehensive development approaches12 (sub-
section 2.2). This pressure to develop performance-based frameworks for managing general 
budget support and sector-wide approaches in developing countries has ultimately translated into 
performance-oriented reforms of the public sector in these countries (sub-section 2.3). 
2.1. Performance-based management practices within development 
institutions 
Towards the end of the ‘80s and beginning of the ‘90s, the impact of development aid on the 
economic growth of developing countries has been widely criticized (Mosley et al., 1987 et 1992; 
Boone, 1995, 1996). In the wake of the reforms undertaken by some OECD countries in the name 
of the NPM, national aid agencies, IFIs and multinational organisations have been under 
increasing pressure to be “productive” and show tangible proof of their effectiveness. This trend 
has led an increasing number of them to implement some sort of performance-based 
management practices at different organizational levels (the project level, country level or 
corporate level) for budget and activity planning and monitoring, thus generalising the use of 
logical frameworks in use at the project level since the ‘70s. This section aims to provide the 
reader with a few (necessarily limited) examples that exemplify this trend. A more detailed 
analysis is provided in Annex 11, a summary of which is presented here. 
USAID, the American aid agency, was the first national development agency to implement 
a result-based management framework in 1994, following the US Government Results and 
                                                            
12
 “Comprehensive development approaches” refers to approaches which integrate social issues and poverty reduction policies with 
financial and institutional issues, as opposed to programmes or projects which aim to address only one particular issue. 
35 
 
Performance Act of 1993. This act requires all U.S. agencies to focus their programmes on the 
achievement of intended results. 
In 2005, the Government of Canada introduced a new Management, Resources and 
Results Structure (MRSS, 2005) aiming at developing a “government wide approach to planning 
and managing the relationship between resource expenditures and results”.13 As a direct result of 
these changes, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) introduced a revised 
Result-Based Management policy in 200814 in order to make CIDA more accountable to its 
different stakeholders. 
In the United Kingdom, an extensive system of performance-based management in public 
services was introduced by the New Labour government in 1998 (Hood, 2006), based on Public 
Service Agreements. The system was terminated by the new coalition government in 2010, but 
the new Development Secretary, Andrew Mitchell announced in June 2010 the creation of a new 
independent aid control agency, emphasizing the renewed necessity for DFID to focus on results 
and outcomes and to be more accountable worldwide.15 
The United Nations officially introduced Result-Based Management in 200116. However, a 
few agencies such as United Nations Development Programme introduced it as early as 1999. In 
2010, the 64th General Assembly stressed again the importance of performance-based 
management and accountability, defined as “achieving objectives and high-quality results in a 
timely and cost-effective manner”, as well as conducting “truthful, objective, accurate and timely 
reporting on performance results”17. 
In the European Union, the Council invited EuropeAid - the European body in charge of 
implementing the Commission’s external aid instruments - to strengthen monitoring, evaluation 
and transparency in 1999. Following this recommendation, EuropeAid implemented a Results-
                                                            
13 Web site of the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat: http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rma/mrrs-sgrr_e.asp - last access 
March 2013. 
14 http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/acdi-cida.nsf/eng/ANN-102084042-GVJ (last access March 2013). 
15 Speech on DFID’s web site (November 2010). Part of the speech can now be found on The Guardian website: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/katine/katine-chronicles-blog/2010/jun/03/mitchell-aid-watchdog (last access on March 
2013) 
16 Resolution 55/231 by the General Assembly. 
17 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/ga10931.doc.htm (last access March 2013). 
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Oriented Monitoring system, which was officially launched in January 2002 after a preliminary 
test period.18 
Many others development agencies, such as the Australian (AusAid), Danish (DANIDA), 
Swedish (SIDA) and Japanese development agencies (JICA), as well as GTZ and KfW (the German 
development agencies now merged into GIZ), also introduced performance-based management 
practices in the late ‘90s and early 2000s. This trend towards such management practices has not 
faded away in recent years, echoing the international commitment of the 2005 Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness to Managing for Development Results. 
The examples provided here show the extent to which the ‘performance movement’ has 
reached development organisations, and indicate that most development agencies have 
embraced some sort of performance-based management, at least on paper. The next section 
presents the use of performance-based management practices as a means of coordination 
between developing countries and development agencies in order to manage holistic or 
comprehensive approaches to development. 
2.2. Performance-based management frameworks and holistic approaches to 
development 
In the 1990s, practices of development aid which favoured project implementation through non-
state organisations such as private firms, NGOs or community groups were widely accused of 
creating a structure of public service provision parallel to the state structure. In addition, the 
proliferation of independent projects and programmes made it extremely difficult for the 
governments of developing countries to develop comprehensive and coherent development 
policies and to face all the requirements of donors in terms of control and accountability. As a 
consequence, it was argued that such practices weakened the legitimacy of the state and 
hampered its development into a fully-functional state, and development actors progressively 
realised that more holistic approaches were necessary to allow for better harmonisation of donor 
procedures, accountability requirements and government control. This has led to scaling up 
general budget supports or sector-wide approaches, and the use of performance indicators as a 
tool to monitor and control these new mechanisms of aid. This tendency was further amplified by 
the failure of the World Bank’s structural adjustment programmes and the Bank’s subsequent 
                                                            
18 The European Commission has required that EuropeAid used the logical framework approach since 1993, providing a 
logical framework matrix spelling out a hierarchy of inputs / outputs / outcomes represented by “Objectively Verifiable 
Indicators” which are directly use in the Result-Oriented Monitoring system (UE, 2009). 
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shift towards a Comprehensive Development Framework19 (Pender, 2001) integrating social issues 
and poverty reduction policies with financial and institutional issues. 
The ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy’ (PRS)20 approach supported by the World Bank and the 
IMF can be seen as the cornerstone of this new approach to development aid. Developing 
countries which want to access to World Bank concessional lending or debt relief21 are asked to 
prepare a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) describing “the macroeconomic, structural and 
social policies and programmes that a country will pursue over several years to promote broad-
based growth and reduce poverty, as well as external financing needs and the associated sources 
of financing”22. These policies often explicitly aim to contribute to achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals (Bezemer and Eggen, 2008), which are thus seen as the ultimate purpose of 
contemporary socioeconomic development. With the development of PRSPs, increasing attention 
has been paid to monitoring and evaluation of development policies via performance targets and 
indicators, which are now central elements of second and third generation PRSPs. PRSPs must 
specify which indicators will be used to measure the outcomes of poverty reduction policies (the 
ultimate outcomes often being the Millennium Development Goals), as well as the corresponding 
targets of these development policies. Progress towards the targets should be evaluated on a 
regular basis, based on performance data produced by the statistical apparatus of the partner 
country. 
This new trend has culminated in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005 and 
its ‘Management for Development Result’ (MfDR) approach, which rests on the principles of 
ownership, alignment and harmonisation. ‘Partner countries’23 are expected to design their own 
development policies according to their national priorities, based on a consultative process 
integrating civil society representatives as well as various political bodies (ownership). Donors 
should then align their financial support, development projects and programmes to these 
development policies, and use control and monitoring procedures of partner countries as much as 
possible (alignment). Complementarily, donors should coordinate themselves, harmonise their 
                                                            
19
 The Comprehensive Development Approach consists of considering all the aspects of development (both social and 
economic) thus emphasising the importance of pro-poor policies, as opposed to structural adjustment programmes 
which focused on economic issues and on the correct functioning of the market. 
20
 Following the CDF approach, a more operational version - the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) approach - was 
initiated by the WB and IMF in 1999. 
21
 Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative of the IMF. 
22
 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper factsheet, IMF, April 2008. 
23
 ‘Partner country’ is the denomination used in the Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness to refer to developing 
countries which receive development aid. This denomination will be used all across the present section to respect the 
tone of the official discourse. 
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activities and procedures and increase their use of sector-wide approaches and programme or 
budget support (harmonisation) so as not to overburden partner countries’ administrations. In 
return, partner countries must commit to strengthening their capacity to manage and control 
public finance, national procurement and control systems. Finally, both donors and partner 
countries must commit to Managing for Result, i.e. “managing and implementing aid in a way 
that focuses on the desired results and uses information to improve decision-making” (OECD, 
2005:7). For this purpose, partner countries must “endeavour to establish results-oriented 
reporting and assessment frameworks that monitor progress against key dimensions of the 
national and sector development strategies; (...) these frameworks should track a manageable 
number of indicators for which data are cost-effectively available.” (OECD, 2005:8) 
2.3. Towards the reform of the public sector of developing countries 
The emergence of holistic approaches to development have subsequently led national and 
international development agencies to ask24 partner countries, in the name of ‘good governance’, 
to reform their public service and further develop control and accountability mechanisms through 
the adoption of performance-based budgeting, monitoring and management practices. This 
consists essentially of devising monitoring and evaluation frameworks integrating performance 
targets and indicators for the countries’ various public organisations and policies. Progress 
towards the targets is to be assessed on a regular basis through performance indicators, 
integrated within official and institutionalised Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) frameworks. The 
various targets of the different public organisations should then be disaggregated between the 
different departments of each organisation. If pushed at its extreme, each department’s targets 
should then be decomposed between the different units within the department, before being 
translated into individual performance target linked to clear sanctions and incentives 
(performance-based pay, for example). This pyramidal logic of performance then links all 
organizational levels, from the more general level (Millennium Development Goals) to the 
individual level, via intermediary levels such as national and ministerial level (national 
development plans or poverty reduction strategies) and organizational levels (performance target 
for each public organisation). 
                                                            
24
 See Craig and Porter (2003), and Anders (2005), for a critical approach to the way IFIs’ ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy’ 
approach impact the power relationship between donors and the government of developing countries. 
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As part of this new approach to development, performance-based management practices 
play a prominent role and are seen as a means to improve the capacity of a government to 
translate its development policies into greater poverty reduction (Hauge, 2001). Better efficiency 
and effectiveness is achieved through better policy management (improved planning and 
budgeting practices), improved learning from experience, more transparency and stronger civil 
society involvement (improved accountability). This last element, ‘accountability’, has been the 
subject of growing interest from development organisations, and is studied in more detail in 
section 4. 
Uganda, where the case study of this research is based, can be seen as a case in point. The 
country has engaged since the ‘90s in a succession of performance-oriented reforms which are 
perfect examples of the trend mentioned here. The Ugandan case is studied in detail in chapters V 
and VI of this paper. 
3. The rise of a managerial understanding of social accountability 
In the aid sector, a particular form of accountability – social accountability - has been high on the 
agenda. Development agencies and institutions are increasingly relying on the promotion of ‘good 
governance’ and on the development of popular control over government services and activities 
to improve the performance of the public-sector in developing countries. Performance-based 
management, seen as an important tool to improve accountability, has been put forward as the 
solution to fostering social accountability. Consequently, a tendency towards what can be labelled 
“the managerialisation of social accountability” has emerged. This section is dedicated to the 
analysis of this process of managerialisation of social accountability, and provides the necessary 
conceptual basis for identifying and understanding the social mechanisms underpinning the 
operationalization of performance-based measurement systems aiming at promoting social 
accountability. Sub-section 1 defines accountability and provides a literature review on the 
theme. Sub-section 2 narrows down the focus to social accountability and inscribes it in the older 
and more general trend of social audits. Finally, sub-section 3 describes the managerialisation of 
social accountability. 
3.1. Defining accountability 
‘Accountability’ is probably one of the main contemporary buzzwords of ‘public administration’, 
side by side with concepts like ‘good governance’, ‘performance’ and ‘effectiveness’. Improving 
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accountability is regularly cited as a way to improve efficiency and effectiveness in the public 
service (the “promise of performance”, Dubnick, 2005). New meanings are regularly added to the 
original concept, making it a “cameleon-like concept” (Mulgan, 2000). This fame, however, comes 
at the price of clarity. ‘Accountability’ on its own does not mean much anymore and is most often 
- if not always - used with one of dozens of qualifiers.25 Mulgan (1997, 2000) suggests that the 
term ‘accountability’, which initially only referred to external forms of punctual control consisting 
of calling someone to account for his or her actions, has progressively been extended to all forms 
of control mechanisms within and between organisations: 
“*accountability+ has been applied to internal aspects of official behaviour, beyond the external focus 
implied by being called to account; to institutions that control official behaviour other than through 
calling officials to account; to means of making officials responsive to public wishes other than through 
calling them to account; and to democratic dialogue between citizens where no one is being called to 
account.” (Mulgan, 2000) 
Beyond this fuzziness, there are, however, a few elements which might help define and 
clarify accountability and will be important for structuring the current research. The academic 
literature (see for example Stewart, 1984; Sinclair, 1995; Mulgan, 1997, 2000; Goetz and Jenkins, 
2001; Bovens, 2005) has identified three broad types of accountability that public sector 
managers have to face: accountability towards elected representatives (political or parliamentary 
accountability); direct accountability to the public through various institutional mechanisms 
(public, social or societal accountability), and accountability of subordinates to their superiors 
within public organisations, labelled administrative, managerial, hierarchical or bureaucratic 
accountability. It is, generally speaking, this last type of accountability which is mainly supported 
by performance-based management practices. 
The main literature in public administration and political science usually distinguishes 
horizontal from vertical accountability (Bovens, 2005). Horizontal accountability refers to the 
systems of checks and balances within the framework of governmental institutions. This type of 
accountability is exerted by ombudsman, corruption control agencies, parliamentary 
commissions, administrative courts and the like, which ensure that due administrative process is 
followed in governmental activities. Vertical accountability designates mechanisms such as 
elections, by which citizens control governments. Most of the reforms of the public sectors which 
                                                            
25 These qualifiers of accountability include: political or parliamentary, managerial, programme, process, financial, 
public, professional and personal (Sinclair, 1995); hierarchical, organizational, administrative and legal (Bovens, 1995); 
diagonal and hybrid (Goetz and Jenkins, 2001); relational and procedural (Tilly, 2009); social, societal, horizontal, 
vertical and market. 
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have taken place in developing countries have aimed at improving accountability mechanisms in 
order to “make services work for the poor”, as the 2004 World Development Report puts it (World 
Bank, 2003). At the heart of these reforms lies the implicit assumption that public services can be 
made more effective if there are enough checks and balances exerted by independent agencies 
and bodies within the state apparatus to guarantee that public and aid money will be properly 
spent. In order to work efficiently, these independent agencies and bodies need information on 
the performance of public organisations, information which can – or even should – take the shape 
of performance indicators. The ‘ideal situation’ would then consist of having service providers and 
policy makers regularly controlled and monitored, based on the performance they achieve, by 
audit bodies or watchdog organisations which ultimately report to parliamentary committees, the 
media and the public at large. 
In addition to these classifications of the different types of accountability, attempts have 
been made to define the core meaning of ‘accountability’. Stewart (1984) suggests that the 
accountability relationship links someone who has to account for his or her actions to someone 
who has the authority to hold this person to account and assess the account given. Bovens (2005) 
defines accountability as referring to a specific set of relationships between an accountor and an 
accountee or an accountee forum26: in an accountability relationship, the accountor must feel 
obliged - formally or informally - to provide information about his or her actions; information 
which can subsequently prompt the accountee or accountee forum to interrogate further the 
accountor and can eventually lead to sanctions if necessary. At the heart of the public 
accountability relationship, two different parts are traditionally distinguished: answerability, “the 
obligation of public officials to inform about and to explain what they are doing”, and 
enforceability, “the capacity of accounting agencies to impose sanctions on power holders who 
have violated their public duties” (Schedler, 1999: 14).27 Answerability is linked to the availability 
of data describing, representing or translating the actions of the accountor in a language 
understandable by the accountee forum. Enforceability refers to the ability of the accountee 
forum to actually judge and take action against the accountor, based on the available data. 
Understanding the social mechanisms which underpin answerability and enforceability is of prime 
importance to understand how accountability works and how it can contribute to improving 
                                                            
26 Other similar descriptions of the accountability relationship exist, which differ only in the terminology used. Stewart 
(1984) suggests that the accountability relationship links someone who has to account for his or her actions to someone 
who has the authority to hold to account and assess the account given. 
27 For a similar and anterior formulation see Stewart (1984: 15). 
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public service delivery. However, these mechanisms have at best rarely been studied, the 
discourse on accountability being rhetorical rather than founded on evidence (Dubnick, 2005). 
Among the different forms of accountability aforementioned, ‘social accountability’ has 
gained prominence in recent years, especially in the approach of Western development agencies 
to ‘good governance’. The next sub-section introduces social accountability and its specificities. 
3.2. Social audit and social accountability 
The ‘80s and ‘90s saw the emergence of new forms of public engagement in the control activities 
of private and public organisations (social audit and social accountability mechanisms). The 
common element underlying social audit and social accountability in the private and public sector 
has been the willingness to assess the impact of organizational decisions on the wider society, and 
to take into account the point of view of the different stakeholders who are, to one degree or 
another, impacted by these decisions. This amounts to inciting private and public organisations to 
integrate non-economic dimensions into their decision making process, and to accept that the 
different stakeholders have a right to intervene, at least somewhat, in decision making processes. 
The term ‘social audit’ was initially developed in the ‘70s and applied to initiatives aiming 
at enlarging the notion of corporate responsibility to the society at large, and at integrating social 
elements such as quality of life, employment and environmental preservation into the 
performance of public and private organisations: 
 “*i+n both the public and private sector arenas social audit has been about highlighting the tensions 
between maximizing return on investment and not violating societal trust. Moreover, social audit 
attempts to provide a mechanism for decision-makers to evaluate economic and social planning, 
facilitate popular involvement in economic decisions and identify social need as a primary criterion for 
resource allocation.” (Owen et al., 2000: 83) 
Social audit stands at odds with certain values, such as efficiency and effectiveness, as it 
embraces alternative values such as quality of life, environmental preservation, equity and 
fairness. This trend has subsequently gained popularity in the public sector and has been 
particularly important in the UK and the US, where radical reforms of public services took place in 
the ‘80s, strongly impacting the livelihoods of British and American citizens and thus requiring 
exhaustive assessments of all the consequences of these reforms. In the public sector, social audit 
and social accountability take on a particular shape in the sense that the activities of public 
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organisations are conducted in the name of the public at large, which gives the public a particular 
right to control and intervene. 
Social accountability rests on the very similar idea that citizens can directly act as an 
accountee forum and be an important force in scrutinizing government’s activities and holding 
government officials to account: 
"[s]ocial accountability is defined as an approach toward building accountability that relies on civic 
engagement, i.e., in which it is ordinary citizens and/or civil society organisations that participate 
directly or indirectly in exacting accountability. In a public sector context, social accountability refers to a 
broad range of actions and mechanisms that citizens, communities, independent media and civil society 
organisations can use to hold public officials and public servants accountable. These include, among 
others, participatory budgeting, public expenditure tracking, monitoring of public service delivery, 
investigative journalism, public commissions and citizen advisory boards.” (Malena et al., 2004) 
The differences between social audit and social accountability are tenuous. At first sight, 
it can be argued that some characteristics are clearly distinguishable between the two, but these 
distinctions hardly survive closer analysis. Social audit requires an auditor, who is in charge of the 
evaluation, and an auditee, whose social impact is audited. The auditor and the auditee can be 
the same actor, or can be different actors (civil society representatives or a third party hired for 
the audit, either by the auditee itself or by another organisation) whereas in accountability 
relationships the accountee and the accountor are necessarily different actors. In addition, the 
accountor is often supposed to provide specific information to the accountee (the relationship 
between the accountor and the accountee rests on the fact that the accountor feels obliged, 
formally or informally, to account for his or her actions to the accountee; see the definition of 
accountability aforementioned). A social audit, on the other hand, can be launched, in theory, 
without the cooperation of the auditee. However, if one contemplates the entire web of 
interactions surrounding the auditee or the accountor, a closer analysis makes these distinctions 
irrelevant. Private companies often launch social audits on their own activities in order to 
communicate on their good environmental or social practices. This willingness to communicate is 
often the result of public pressure on private companies to be more socially responsible, and 
social audit could be a response to this pressure. In such a situation, it can be argued that the 
auditee and the public are in an ‘informal’ accountability relationship, in which the public (acting 
as an accountee forum) requests information on the social practices of the auditee (which in this 
case is also the accountor); information is provided by a social audit carried out by an 
independent auditor in order to ensure the validity and reliability of the information published. 
44 
 
The bottom line is that a social audit is rarely launched for its own sake, and most often aims at 
responding to some kind of pressure, making social audit very similar to an informal 
accountability mechanism. The most important distinction between social accountability and 
social audit probably lies in the ‘enforceability’ dimension of the relationship28; in a formal 
accountability relationship, pre-defined sanctions exist in the case the accountor failing to justify 
his actions, whereas a social audit does not trigger pre-defined sanctions. 
Social accountability can be exacted in two ways: indirectly, when civil society 
representatives activate the operation of horizontal accountability agencies, or directly, when civil 
society representatives perform horizontal accountability functions instead of or together with 
dedicated agencies. Firstly, citizens and CSOs can contribute to activating already existing 
horizontal accountability mechanisms through mass mobilisation, media investigations and the 
use of legal mechanisms (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti, 2000), or through social audits. In democratic 
countries, some accountability mechanisms (usually referred to as ‘public accountability’ 
mechanisms or more generally as “conventional horizontal accountability” mechanisms) offer 
citizens the opportunity to express their expectations, concerns or suspicions about 
administrative decisions through dedicated independent bodies such as courts of justice, 
corruption control agencies or ombudsman. This makes these bodies a channel for indirect social 
accountability (this type of accountability mechanism is referred to as ‘societal’ accountability by 
Smulovitz and Peruzzotti and rests to a large extent on already existing horizontal accountability 
mechanisms). Secondly, citizens can also exert social accountability in a more direct way, 
challenging or bypassing traditional horizontal accountability institutions. This happens when 
citizens or CSOs directly perform functions such as audit and control “without the intermediary of 
agencies or through direct involvement into these agencies, thus challenging the ‘old’ public 
management literature that emphasizes the insulation of bureaucracy from societal actors” 
(Ackerman, 2004: 458). This emerging form of ‘co-governance’ or ‘diagonal accountability’29 
(Goetz and Jenkins, 2001:364) implies entrusting civil society representatives with functions which 
have fallen, so far, under the sole purview of appointed civil servants, of which the CBMES 
initiative is an example. 
                                                            
28 As mentioned in the previous section, accountability encompasses answerability and enforceability. 
29 Thus called because these practices “challenge the vertical-horizontal dichotomy on which understandings of 
accountability have been based” and bridge the “vertical-horizontal divide” (Goetz and Jenkins, 2001:364). 
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3.3. The ‘managerialisation’ of social accountability 
a) Managerial accountability 
The introduction of managerialist reforms in the public sector has led to new forms of control and 
accountability. The combined focus on results rather than outputs and on management tools such 
as performance measurement and management systems, along with the necessity to give 
managers the leeway they need to innovate and assume their role as efficiently as they can, has 
led to the emergence of what can be labelled “a managerialist approach to accountability.” As 
Stone puts it “*i+n the managerialist perspective, strategic control over and within administrative 
organisations, accompanied by broad delegations of authority, replaces much of the close or 
detailed control and correction which long characterised modem public services” (Stone, 
1995:513-15). Similarly Sinclair (1995), based on in-depth interviews with chief executives of 
Australian public sector organisations, suggests that whereas administrative, bureaucratic and 
managerial forms of accountability are sometimes construed as the same thing (all of them refer 
to the hierarchical link between a superior and a subordinate who is called to account for the 
performance of his or her duties), administrative and bureaucratic accountability are 
distinguished from managerial accountability, which “focus[es] on monitoring inputs and outputs 
or outcomes (…), while administrative accountability is concerned with monitoring the processes 
by which inputs are transformed.”(p. 226) This focus on outputs or outcomes to the detriment of 
processes often takes the shape of performance contracts between a principal and an agent 
(Stone, 1995; Sinclair, 1995), where the principal translates the objective or mission of the agent 
in allegedly unambiguous performance objectives. In addition, it is often considered that 
outcomes should be privileged over outputs as much as possible, as the former leave more 
managing space to the manager than the latter, which might be too constraining and limit the 
decision-making ability of the manager.  
Together with this particular focus on outcomes comes the faith in quantified 
performance measurement, which manifests itself in “the growing significance of pre-established, 
objective (…) criteria against which the adequacy of an agency’s discharge of its responsibilities is 
assessed” and the increasing importance of “timely formal reporting of performance against pre-
established objectives” based on quantifiable performance indicators (Stone, 1995:513-15). The 
main idea is that the principal, in order to ensure that the agent will provide effective public 
services, has to resort to control and sanction mechanisms based on performance targets and 
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performance indicators, so as to reduce ‘asymmetry of information’ and ensure that the interests 
of the agent are in line with his or her interests. Quantified performance measurement is 
assumed to produce data (performance indicators) which reveal or represent performance in an 
objective way – which is to say, as it really is (“*p+erformance measurement is the process an 
organisation follows to objectively measure how well its stated objectives are being met.” 
Binnendijk, 2000:5) – and an unbiased way – that is, independently of whom is reading these 
performance data (Townley and Kimberly, 2005:569-70). According to this understanding of 
performance measurement, there is little room for subjective interpretation, and the measure 
shows the ‘real’ performance of a public organisation just as a thermometer reads the 
temperature. 
This approach rests largely on theories of rational choice (Miller, 1994; March, 1987) and 
on ‘managerial cybernetics’ (Smith, 1995) where feedbacks make it possible to limit information 
asymmetries, managers make informed (evidence-based) decisions and complex organisations are 
kept under control via mechanisms ensuring that the interests of ‘agents’ are aligned with those 
of ‘principals’ through rewards and sanctions. Based on this approach, Christopher Pollitt, in 1986, 
described a public agency ‘department of the future’: 
“The department of the future will have a clear set of strategic objectives. Within it each 
division and section will have its own objectives, more detailed, of course, but directly related 
to the overall strategy. Each individual manager will work to an annually renegotiated set of 
personal targets, performance against which will figure as an important factor in his/her 
superiors’ decisions about merit pay increases, promotion and training. (…) A sophisticated 
system of activity costing will encourage keen awareness of resource use at all levels in the 
hierarchy. Financial responsibility will be more dispersed than has been common in central or 
local government in the past. ‘Cost centres’ will be widely used, with senior management more 
concerned with maintaining and developing control systems than with approving specific 
decisions. Personnel management responsibility will also have to be decentralized, and line 
management will be expected to seek those combinations of all resources which yield the best 
value for the taxpayer's money. All this would be underpinned by computerized information 
systems.” (Pollitt, 1986:155) 
The managerialist approach to accountability can therefore be defined by three main 
characteristics: 1) a focus on inputs and outcomes, 2) more leeway given to the accountor (how 
things are done – the process – does not matter, since what matters are the results), and 3) a 
relationship between the accountee and the accountor defined in terms of performance 
contracts, targets and indicators. 
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In the field of development assistance, a concrete illustration of this approach can be 
found in the World Bank approach to public management and public sector reforms. In its 2004 
World Development Report – Making services work for the poor, the World Bank conceptualised 
the process of service delivery as a chain of accountability linking four types of actors: 
politicians/policymakers, organizational providers, frontline professionals and citizens/clients 
(World Bank, 2003:47). It considers that this process is inefficient essentially because each actor 
does not have clear objectives, and is not subject to clear performance control or to pressure 
from the citizens to fulfil his or her task properly. In order to solve this problem of inefficiency, 
each actor should have clearly defined roles and be linked to other actors by a compact with clear 
objectives, so as to align the interests of service providers and citizens.30 In this example of the 
managerial model of accountability, the ‘ideal’ would be: 
“provider organisations that have a clear vision and mission of service provision, not ones that are 
internally incoherent and merely process oriented. Frontline providers acting with professional 
autonomy and initiative, not tightly controlled automatons. And empowered citizens who demand 
services, not passive ‘recipients’ who are acted on.” (World Bank, 2003:52).
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In addition, in order to ensure that the chain of service provision which links policymakers 
to frontline professional functions properly, “*g]ood information on the actions of providers and 
the outcomes of those actions must get to the policymaker”, knowing that “just monitoring of the 
performance of contracts requires more and better measures.” (World Bank, 2003:95) The 
principal, in order to ensure that the agent will provide effective public services, has to resort to 
control and sanction mechanisms so as to reduce ‘asymmetry of information’ and make sure that 
the interests of the agent are in line with those of the principal.32 Public service reforms, in this 
case, consist of developing independent public agencies to collect and aggregate performance 
data before publishing it in performance reports, which should then be made available to other 
control agencies and to the Parliament in order to ease the process of horizontal accountability 
and make it more efficient. Performance data are therefore an indispensable medium for 
accountability and public sector effectiveness; they are the lifeblood of the accountability 
machine.33 
                                                            
30 “Failures to reach poor people with effective services can usually be attributed to a misalignment between the 
incentives facing providers and outcomes.” (World Bank, 2003: 96). 
31 For additional elements illustrating MSA in the development field see Shah (2007) Performance accountability and 
combating corruption. 
32 “Failures to reach poor people with effective services can usually be attributed to a misalignment between the 
incentives facing providers and outcomes.” (World Bank, 2003: 96). 
33 For additional elements see Shah (2007) Performance accountability and combating corruption. 
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b) The ‘managerialisation’ of social accountability in developing countries 
As the previous sections have shown, the term ‘accountability’ refers to many different forms of 
accountability. For this research, a particular form of accountability, ‘social accountability’, is our 
main focus. This section now demonstrates how this particular type of accountability has 
undergone a process of managerialisation, particularly in developing countries. 
Many of the reforms of the public sector which have taken place in developing countries 
during the last ten years have aimed at improving conventional vertical and horizontal 
mechanisms of accountability. Such an improvement is supposed to be brought about by the 
development of democratic mechanisms and independent control agencies in order to fight 
corruption and “make service work for poor people”, as the 2004 World Development Report puts 
it (World Bank, 2003). At the heart of these reforms lies the implicit assumption that public 
services can be made more effective if there are enough checks and balances (exerted by 
independent agencies and bodies) within the state apparatus to guarantee that public (and aid) 
money will be properly spent. 
These reforms, however, have rarely born fruit, and the development of diagonal 
accountability mechanisms and co-governance has increasingly emerged as a way to complement 
deficient traditional horizontal and vertical accountability mechanisms34 (World Bank, 2003:58, 
64; Ackerman, 2004:448-449; Goetz and Jenkins, 2001:364; Aakella and Kidambi, 2007). As a 
consequence, some authors suggest that a “new accountability agenda” is in the making 
worldwide, the first manifestations of which are “(1) a more direct role for ordinary people and 
their associations in demanding accountability, across (2) a more diverse set of jurisdictions, using 
(3) an expanded repertoire of methods, and on the basis of (4) a more exacting standard of social 
justice” (Goetz and Jenkins, 2005:4). Whenever reforms of tradition vertical and horizontal 
mechanisms can take place, the actual effectiveness of independent accountability bodies and 
organisations is often hampered by structural and political issues (Goetz and Jenkins, 2001:365-7; 
Ackerman, 2004: 447-49) which are particularly salient in developing countries. These control 
bodies do not have enough resources to control all public expenditures and activities, and 
whenever they do notice irregularities, it can be difficult for them to ensure that sanctions and 
                                                            
34 Although this research proposal focuses on developing countries, social accountability has also emerged in developed 
countries (see for example Caddy et al., 2007). In developed countries, the emergence of social accountability is not so 
much seen as a way to complement deficient traditional accountability mechanisms as a normal evolution of the 
structuration of social and political life, where citizens and civil society representatives want ever more involvement in 
public sector activities. 
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punishments are actually enforced. In this case, citizens – or customers – are “usually in a better 
position to see what is going on than most supervisors in government hierarchies (…)when the 
policymaker-provider link is weak because of scarce or difficult-to-manage supervisory staff, 
clients may be the only ones who regularly interact with providers” (World Bank, 2003:64). 
Entrusting citizens with control and monitoring powers – that is, fostering direct social 
accountability (diagonal accountability) mechanisms – is seen as a viable alternative to 
conventional horizontal and vertical accountability mechanisms. A good example is provided in 
Reinikka (2001). Using data from school surveys in Uganda, the author estimates that only 2% of 
public non-wage spending on education actually reached the schools in 1991. It 1995, this number 
had increased to 20%. The school survey was repeated in 1999, and it shows a dramatic 
improvement, with 90% of the spending actually transferred to schools. Reinikka explains the 
change as the result of a central government decision to disseminate information monthly on the 
transfers made through newspaper and radio, and to compel schools to post data on the funds 
released to them. 
Whereas early initiatives of direct social accountability were not formalised, did not 
follow clearly defined procedures and were essentially one-off events, there has since been a call 
to institutionalise social accountability initiatives so as to ensure their sustainability and allow 
them to be scaled up. For example, Goetz and Jenkins suggest that it “is important that citizens be 
given legal standing within institutions of public sector oversight, a continuous presence within the 
oversight agency’s work, structured access to official documentary information, including 
spending records, and the right to issue dissenting perspectives directly to legislative bodies” 
(Goetz and Jenkins, 2001:363). Agencies such as the World Bank and the Asia Development Bank 
have put the development and institutionalisation of social accountability mechanisms high on 
their agenda (World Bank, 2003; Malena et al., 2004; Ackerman, 2005; McNeil and Malena, 2010). 
The involvement of international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank in attempts to institutionalised diagonal accountability mechanisms has 
arguably favoured the emergence of a managerial approach to social accountability where the use 
of performance indicators and measures is at the core of social accountability processes (Radin, 
2006: 214-233). This trend is part of a wider managerial approach to development, in which the 
tendency to rely on quantified indicators to assess performance has been increasingly prevalent 
(Murphy, 2008; Gulrajani, 2011: 12). 
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The World Bank’s 2004 World Development Report, for example, conceptualises the 
problem of underdevelopment and poverty as one of inefficiency of public service delivery. In this 
document, it is argued that public service delivery is inefficient essentially because the “long route 
of accountability” which links citizens to frontline professionals via politicians/policymakers and 
organizational providers is failing. A solution to this problem is to be found in the “short route of 
accountability” which links citizens directly to frontline professionals via social accountability 
mechanisms,35 so as to allow citizens to demand better services from government officials. This 
approach, in itself, only echoes what has already been mentioned as the reason for the 
emergence of social accountability in developing countries. What is particularly representative of 
the managerial approach to social accountability, however, is the overreliance on contracts or 
compacts and performance measurement as central elements of social accountability 
mechanisms. The 2004 World Development Report clearly suggests that in order to exert social 
accountability, performance information is required, since citizens need “information about how 
bad their neighborhood’s services are relative to others’ and who is responsible for the difference.” 
It therefore encourages donors to contribute to fostering social accountability by “supporting civil 
society organisations that generate and use specific information about service delivery” and 
“supporting civil society organisations that show how to mobilize citizens and be a credible voice 
for public service provision” (World Bank, 2003:89). Other World Bank publications (Andrews and 
Shah, 2005; Shah, 2005; Shah, 2007) make this plain; they clearly favour the emergence of 
performance-based accountability, suggesting, as an alternative to the failing “conventional top-
down, supply-side approach to public sector reform”, a more “citizen-centred governance” based 
on “*p+erformance-based budgeting driven by a strategic agenda developed by a broad base of 
stakeholders” (Shah, 2007: 186-187). Within this approach to social accountability, the different 
stakeholders should agree on common performance measurement and targets for each of the 
expenses in the budget through a “community-based strategic planning process”, and be engaged 
in contracts or compacts including performance indicators and targets which would legally, 
socially and politically bind the different stakeholders. The specified performance indicators and 
targets should subsequently allow for collective monitoring and controlling of public expenses 
(Shah, 2007: 113-118 and 186-187). In this process, performance measurements and indicators 
are considered essential tools to neutrally and objectively reveal the performance of the public 
sector and make it ‘readable’ by all the stakeholders. 
                                                            
35
 Although the 2004 World Development Report does not use this term. 
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c) Defining managerial social accountability 
Based on the previous definitions and analysis, managerial social accountability can be defined as 
follows: 
Managerial social accountability rests on the central idea that performance 
measurements should be at the heart of reforms aimed at improving direct social accountability 
(diagonal accountability) to the principal (the public), who needs performance data to control the 
activities of the agent (civil servants and managers in public organisations) and demand better 
services. This approach implicitly assumes that relationships based on contracts and quantified 
performance indicators and targets can overcome patronage, clientelism and corruption and 
make civil servants, and more generally public services, more accountable to the citizens. 
Performance measures are implicitly seen as unchallenged pieces of evidence (objective and 
neutral) supposed to have a power of persuasion strong enough to overcome other forms of 
incentives and motivate civil servants to act in the interest of the principal (the public). It also 
strongly promotes civil society participation in budget and budget-monitoring processes, which 
are supposed to rely on clearly-identified performance indicators and related expenditures. 
 
Figure 2 – The model of managerial social accountability 
Managerial social accountability therefore rests on the following three core principles: 1) 
direct involvement of the beneficiaries of public services in the accountability process of civil 
servants will lead to better service quality (participation principle); 2) to make this direct 
accountability relationship possible, quantified performance indicators, measurements and 
targets relating to outcomes must be developed (quantification principle); and 3) transparency 
and the dissemination of performance data is required (transparency principle). 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced a set of important concepts which lie at the core of this research. 
‘Managerialism’, ‘accountability’, ‘managerial accountability’ and ‘managerial social 
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accountability’ have successively been introduced. It has also been shown to what extent 
performance-based management practices have permeated the aid sector, and how managerial 
social accountability has progressively emerged as a corner stone of development strategies 
promoted by donors and international development institutions. 
Managerialism has developed gradually throughout the 20th century, together with the 
appearance of a new class of prominent actors within private and public organisations. Despite its 
variances and different trends, managerialism in the field of public administration has three main 
distinctive characteristics: the understanding of public sector activity as a production process 
transforming inputs into outputs and outcomes, and the importance given to improving 
effectiveness and efficiency to the detriment of other values; the faith in the role and expertise of 
the manager, and in tools and techniques of management to improve efficiency and 
effectiveness; and finally, the necessity of bringing public services and their managers closer to 
the people through devolution, and of giving leeway to managers in order to allow them to 
innovate so as to be more efficient. 
Together with managerialism has emerged a particular form of accountability, 
‘managerial accountability’. Accountability can be defined as referring to a specific set of 
relationships between an accountor and an accountee or accountee forum. There are two 
important dimensions to this set of relationships: answerability and enforceability. Answerability 
refers to the link between an accountor, who must feel obliged, either formally or informally, to 
provide information about his actions to an accountee or accountee formum, in the name of 
which he is acting. Enforceability refers to the reciprocal relationship which allows the accountee 
or accountee forum to interrogate the accountor and eventually sanction or reward him. The 
progressive rise of managerialism has led to the emergence of a particular type of accountability, 
‘managerial accountability’, which features three main characteristics: 1) a focus on inputs, 
outputs and outcomes, 2) more leeway given to the accountor (how things are done – the process 
– does not matter, since what matters are the results), and 3) the relationship between the 
accountee and the accountor defined in terms of performance contracts, targets and indicators. 
In the aid sector, this faith in the tools and techniques of management to improve 
efficiency and effectiveness, together with the lack of success of traditional public sector reforms 
to curb corruption and improve the quality of public services, has led donors and the international 
community to promote a particular form of social accountability and, more specifically, a 
managerialist approach. Social accountability, defined as direct accountability between the 
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government and the people considered to be clients in the process of public service delivery, is 
seen as a more direct route of accountability, less subject to corruption and dysfunction than 
other forms of horizontal and vertical accountability. It is suggested that the use of quantified 
performance measurements and their dissemination to the public would help inform the clients 
about the quality of the services they receive, and would encourage them to request better public 
service quality. Managerial social accountability therefore rests on three core principles: 
participation, quantification and transparency. 
As the next chapter will show, however, these beliefs are based on a particular 
understanding of how social accountability mechanisms operate. 
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Chapter III - DEFINING PERFORMANCE-BASED MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
SYSTEMS 
The previous chapter focused on the development of managerial practices in the aid sector, and 
more specifically on the emergence of managerial social accountability in developing countries. 
Chapter III aims to precisely define ‘Performance-based Management and Accountability Systems’ 
(PMAS), a generic term encompassing all forms of performance-based management and 
accountability practices. This definition will subsequently enable a comprehensive analysis of the 
main limitations of these systems (chapter III section 3 and chapter IV) which will justify the 
analysis of the CBMES initiative in chapters V and VI.  
As the previous chapters have shown, many management practices rest on the 
production and use of performance data, and are meant to contribute to greater efficiency, 
effectiveness and accountability. The term ‘Performance-based Management and Accountability 
System’ (PMAS) is used in this paper to refer to the wide set of management practices and ideas 
which have been labelled differently throughout the past fifty years. ‘Zero-based budgeting’, 
‘result-based budgeting’, ‘performance-based budgeting’, ‘result-based management’, 
‘performance-based management’, ‘management by objectives’, ‘management by numbers’ 
(Hood, 2007), ‘management for results’ and ‘governance by targets’ (Bevan and Hood, 2006) are 
some of the labels frequently used to refer to this particular type of management. They are all 
components of what has been called the ‘performance movement’ (Radin, 2006), and all are 
based on the use of performance data. The purpose of this section is to clarify further, beyond the 
general descriptions which have been given in the previous sections, what these management 
practices are and what functions they are designed to fulfil. 
Performance-based management and accountability systems, and in particular systems 
intended to promote social accountability, rely on agents who interact with and react to these 
systems. It is argued in this paper that the social mechanisms underpinning these interactions and 
reactions are neglected in the simplified managerial understanding of social accountability, paving 
the way for the so-called ‘unintended consequences’ detailed in chapter IV and for the disjuncture 
identified in the case study introduced in chapters V and VI. In addition, for such systems to work 
according to the expectations of their proponents, some erroneous implicit assumptions are 
made as to how individuals should interact with these systems in their social and organizational 
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context. This paper intends to identify some of these erroneous implicit assumptions, which can 
account for part of the observed disjuncture in the case of the CBMES initiative. 
The first section of this chapter introduces a few preliminary definitions such as ‘system’, 
‘performance’, ‘performance measurement’ and ‘performance management.’ The notion of 
‘system’ here is particularly important as it is the direct result of the managerial understanding of 
performance measurement and management as a technical tool, and comes with important 
underlying assumptions about what belongs to the system and what does not. As will be show, it 
is this artificial separation between the system and the rest of the world which is the root of many 
of the observed unintended consequences. 
The second section introduces the way the process of producing and using performance 
information should unfold, as well as the intended functions of PMAS. It subsequently clarifies the 
literature on performance measurement systems and introduces an important distinction 
between the main goals of PMAS and their sub-functions, defined as the means through which 
the main goals of PMAS are achieved. Three main goals of PMAS are identified, as well as their 
subordinated sub-functions. It then provides a taxonomy of the different forms of PMAS 
identified in the literature. 
The third section identifies, based on existing literature, a set of implicit assumptions or 
requirements corresponding to each of the sub-functions identified in the second section. These 
implicit assumptions and requirements are fundamental for performance-based management and 
accountability systems to operate the way they are intended to. It is argued that any disjuncture 
would be the result of these assumptions and requirements not being satisfied or met. 
1. Preliminary definitions 
1.1. Introducing the notion of ‘system’ 
The use of the term ‘system’ is not neutral. The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘system’ as “an 
organized or connected group of objects” or as “a set of principles, etc.; a scheme, method.” 
stressing the comprehensive, complex, and ordered aspects of any form of “system”. In physics, a 
system is “a group of bodies moving about one another in space under some particular dynamical 
law, as the law of gravitation; spec. in Astron., a group of heavenly bodies connected by their 
mutual attractive forces and moving in orbits about a centre or central body, as the solar 
system (the sun with its attendant planets, etc.).” In biology, it is “a set of organs or parts in an 
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animal body of the same or similar structure, or subserving the same function, as the nervous, 
muscular, osseous, etc. systems, the digestive, respiratory, reproductive, etc. systems”. More 
generally speaking, as a set of principles, scheme or method, a ‘system’ is one of the following: 
 “A set or assemblage of things connected, associated, or interdependent, so as to form a 
complex unity; a whole composed of parts in orderly arrangement according to some scheme 
or plan; rarely applied to a simple or small assemblage of things.” 
 “[t]he set of correlated principles, ideas, or statements belonging to some department of 
knowledge or belief; a department of knowledge or belief considered as an organized whole; a 
connected and regularly arranged scheme of the whole of some subject; a comprehensive 
body of doctrines, conclusions, speculations, or theses.” 
 “An organized scheme or plan of action, esp. one of a complex or comprehensive kind; an 
orderly or regular method of procedure.” 
In all these definitions, there is a set or group of elements – planets, organs, ideas or 
statement, beliefs, bodies of doctrines or actions – linked to one another or arranged and 
articulated according to a set of laws (the law of gravitation) or rules (a regular method of 
procedure, bodily functions, or the particular logic linked to a specific field of knowledge or 
belief). What recurs is the implicit idea of a finite set, and rules and laws which articulate them. 
For the particular topic of interest to us (Performance-based Management and 
Accountability Systems), this idea of a ‘system’ is particularly relevant. Performance-based 
Management and Accountability systems are usually introduced in order to improve the 
efficiency, effectiveness and accountability of the organisations where they are operationalized. 
This effect (improved efficiency and accountability) is linked to the introduction of the 
performance-based management devices via a chain of causes-consequences that can be labelled 
‘principle of action.’ This principle of action rests on a complex interplay of concepts, devices and 
tools, related practices and associated expected human behaviours which, together, form what is 
defined here as a ‘system.’ 
It is at the frontiers of such systems, where they interact with what is not considered by 
their designers as part of the system, that the present research finds its relevance. Introducing 
PMAS in an organisation or community triggers social mechanisms and human behaviours which 
are usually overlooked in the PMAS principle of action. The purpose of this paper is to highlight 
the oversimplifications which come with the general understanding of PMAS. At the very core of 
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managerialism lies the overriding tendency to “squeeze out complexity as much as possible: 
managers are stimulated to bring clarity, consistency and order. They can do this by gathering and 
using the right information. Things might be unclear, inconsistent or disorderly, but by using the 
right information, such complexities are reduced. Most management textbooks present nice neat 
models and techniques for bringing this about” (Noordegraaf and Abama, 2003:860). Similarly, 
PMAS are oversimplified so as to make them clearly understandable and easily usable for 
management purposes. They are presented as convenient tools in the hands of managers, 
designed to be easily adaptable to all types of contexts when in fact, because PMAS triggers a 
number of complex social mechanisms, these contexts largely determine what happens when 
PMAS are used. 
1.2. Defining performance and performance measurement 
In the mainstream approach to performance-based management, the term ‘performance’ usually 
refers to a clearly-defined entity or unit which is supposed to produce a certain output. This entity 
can be an organisation as a whole, a sub-group within this organisation, a programme, a policy or 
an individual. This unit is supposed to be clearly defined, which means there is little doubt about 
which individuals or sub-units belong to the unit and which do not, and are left outside the unit. 
As will be shown later in this paper, clearly defining the boundaries of the unit is, in practice, quite 
difficult. The usual definition of the ‘performance’ of a unit is the ability of this unit to transform 
inputs – material and human resources – into outputs, which will lead to outcomes in the long 
term. These outcomes are the overall raison d’être of this unit.36 
Outcomes differ from outputs in the sense that they are outside the direct unit’s activity, 
and are linked to the production of outputs via a ‘theory of change’, or a chain of causes and 
consequences, which link the production of outputs to the expected outcomes. There is therefore 
a chain of expectations linking first the inputs to the outputs and then the outputs to the 
outcomes. For example, the inputs of a school are usually its material resources (classrooms, 
furniture and teaching supports) and its human resources (administrative staff and teachers). The 
output of a school can be defined as successfully educated children, whereas the expected 
outcomes would be an increase in literacy. Efficiency is then defined as the ratio of outputs over 
inputs and effectiveness as the ratio of outcomes over inputs. 
                                                            
36
 Other authors also define ‘intermediary outcomes’ or refer to outcomes as ‘impacts’. 
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Neel et al. (1995) defined ‘performance measurement’ simply as the process of 
quantifying the efficiency and effectiveness of an action. More precisely, Halachmi and Bouckaert 
(1996:2) suggest that a ‘measurement system’ “consists of practices, procedures, criteria, and 
standards that govern the collection of data (input), the analysis of the data (throughput), and the 
compilation of the results into quantitative or qualitative forms (output). A measurement system 
may be characterized as simple or complex, temporary or permanent.” Whereas both qualitative 
and quantitative data could be used for performance assessment, the very idea of ‘measurement’ 
conveys the implicit requirement of quantified data. In addition, defining efficiency and 
effectiveness as ratios of inputs, outputs and outcomes requires automatically that these inputs, 
outputs and outcomes be expressed as numbers. 
Behind the use of quantified performance data lies the preconception that numbers are 
fundamentally more objective than words and less subject to interpretation. Qualitative 
performance assessment can easily be deemed to reflect the personal opinions of their authors, 
whereas numbers are more easily considered to be factual, as objective as length, height or 
weight measurements. However, as will be shown in chapter IV, even quantified performance 
assessments are interpretations of the world, and for that very reason are often closer in nature 
to personal opinion than to pure fact. 
1.3. Defining performance management 
Performance information is usually produced with the expectation that this information will 
contribute to improving management, and finally make an organisation more efficient. The UK 
Local Government Improvement and Development agency, in its Glossary of Performance Terms 
(2003),  defines ‘performance management’ as follows: “[a]s well as involving performance 
measurement, systems and processes, performance management is about managing people and 
the way people within an organisation operate and work together.” This view rests largely on the 
idea that performance essentially depends on the quality of the use of the resources, and to a 
much lesser extent on the organizational resources themselves. The management is in charge of 
maximising effectiveness and efficiency, i.e. of maximising the ratio of outputs over inputs and 
outcomes over inputs. 
There is in addition the implicit assumption that management tools, comparisons 
between organisations, benchmarking and scientific analysis are essential to determining ‘good 
practices’ or ‘best practices’ of management (March and Sutton, 1997; Pollitt, 1993:1-27). The 
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underlying assumption is that these good or best practices can be replicated and implemented in 
other contexts or environments (a ‘one size fits all’ approach), with no attention given to 
contextual or environmental variables which could impact organizational performance. 
Performance management is therefore both the management of performance and 
management based on performance. Increasing the value of the performance measured (in an 
allegedly objective manner) is the final aim, and using performance data along the way to take 
decisions about how to use the human and material resources at hand is a means to this end. 
2. Performance data production and utilisation 
2.1. The different steps involved in the production of performance data 
In order to produce performance data and make them available for organizational management, a 
certain number of steps have to be taken. These steps can be considered logical steps as a 
conceptual framework which can help understand how PMAS works (heuristic approach), or as 
actual steps that should be integrated into any good PMAS (normative approach). In the latter 
case, if a PMAS fails, it is usually suggested that it is because the requirements associated with 
one of these steps have not been met in a satisfactory manner. Alternative and more detailed 
cycles of performance measurement and management have been proposed, but they are similar 
to the cycle suggested here (see among others Hatry and Wholey, 1999:32, or Noordegraaf and 
Abma, 2003:858-859). It will be shown, in chapter IV, that these steps are not as straightforward 
as they seem, and that the process detailed here does not necessarily (or even usually) unfold as 
planned. It is these discrepancies between this rational, almost mechanical approach to 
performance measurement and the actual complexity of the social mechanisms operating within 
human organisations which are usually noticed by managerialism’s critics. 
The first requirement of the process of using performance measurements for 
management or accountability purposes is to define what performance is. This step of 
performance definition consists of identifying the goal(s) of the unit, project or policy; in other 
words, what are its expected outputs and outcomes? 
Once these expected outputs and outcomes are clearly identified (but can they be? This 
question will be explored in chapter IV), it is necessary to translate them into a measurable 
quantity. This second step can be labelled proxy definition since it consists of identifying a proxy 
through which the outputs and outcomes will be estimated. The proxy is not the performance per 
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se, but is assumed to be an accurate measurable representation of the performance. Identifying a 
proxy therefore consists of translating a non-measurable performance into a measurable 
characteristic of the organisation. In the aforementioned example of the school, the main goal of 
the school has been identified as increasing literacy (outcomes) and producing educated children 
(outputs). These goals have to be transformed into a measurable quantity, the proxy. The 
production of educated children can be estimated simply by counting the number of children who 
are going through the school and leaving it at the end of the normal curriculum. This, however, 
implies that all the children who leave the school at the end of the normal curriculum are indeed 
educated. Such a proxy therefore relies on the assumption that going through the normal 
curriculum is enough to be educated, which is obviously debatable. In the case of literacy, it 
cannot be measured per se, so it needs to be made measurable via the definition of what it means 
to be literate. There is a need for an agreed upon definition, which would have to contain a set of 
measurable requirements that an individual has to meet in order to be deemed ‘literate’. 
The third step, measurement, consists of defining how the measurement will be done and 
actually measuring the proxy. In the previous example, the number of pupils who are educated 
can be counted every day, once a month, at the beginning of each year or on the last day of the 
last year. Whichever solution is chosen, how is the measurer supposed to deal with pupils who 
change schools in the middle of the curriculum? What about children who simply drop out of 
school? What about pupils who are present in the school but are still illiterate? To avoid such 
situations, surveys based on a set of questions or exercises can be used which are supposed to 
accurately reflect the level of education of the interviewee. These surveys can be applied to the 
school population, or to the population as a whole. However, in the latter case, it is only the 
overall literacy rate which is measured, and not the actual contribution of a particular school to 
literacy. The question of measurement, as this example shows, is complex. 
The last step, performance data utilisation, consists of using performance data for 
management purposes, with the intent to improve the performance of the unit (the organisation, 
project or policy). The performance data can be used for various purposes, which are detailed in 
the next section. 
2.2. Main goals and sub-functions of PMAS 
As has been mentioned, PMAS are usually referred to as tools aimed at improving performance – 
that is, efficiency and effectiveness –as exemplified in this quote from the OECD: “*t+he main 
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objective of performance measurement in public organisations is to support better decision-
making, leading to improved outcomes for the community; all other objectives are derived from 
this” (OECD, 1994:13). But how are PMAS supposed to do so? Once the performance 
measurement is produced, how should it be used to lead to these expected performance 
improvements? On this question, the literature usually provides detailed lists of the sub-functions 
of PMAS, which often include performance improvement and other sub-functions such as 
learning, promoting and evaluating, to mention but a few. A quick survey of the different 
functions mentioned in the literature shows that more than fifteen functions of PMAS are usually 
mentioned. 
These lists, however, lack clarity, as most of them fail to distinguish between the main 
functions of PMAS and their sub-functions – that is, lower-level functions which contribute to the 
main goals of PMAS. In addition, there is also a lack of clarity about what the main goals of 
performance measurements are; performance improvement is often mentioned as their only 
main goal, to which the other sub-functions are subordinate. It is important, however, for the 
sake of clarity and for our attempt to understand how PMAS work, to distinguish the main goals 
of performance measurements from their sub-functions, and to identify clearly these main goals. 
Sub-functions therefore are supposed to contribute to the higher-level functions or main goals of 
PMAS, and identifying these sub-functions is the first step towards a better understanding of how 
PMAS operate. It is shown in this section that other than performance improvement, two other 
goals of PMAS can be identified: accountability and communication. This brings the total number 
of PMAS goals up to three. All other functions identified can be considered sub-functions of these 
three main goals. 
The OECD suggests that five general functions of performance measurement can be 
identified: improving the performance of the organisation (economy, efficiency, effectiveness, 
cost-effectiveness and quality of services); improving control mechanisms for managers and 
ministers, as well as accountability mechanisms for external reviewers such as auditors and 
legislators; informing the budgetary process; and lastly, motivating staff. This is a good example of 
the confusion between the main goals of PMAS and their sub-functions: improving control 
mechanisms and motivating staff are not goals in themselves, but are considered to be part of 
improving performance. 
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Osborne and Gaebler’s widely cited Reinventing government (1992), which is considered 
one of the main references for New Public Management, lists six intended sub-functions of 
performance measurement: 
 to evaluate programmes and allocate tax payer money to programmes which actually 
work (“If you don’t measure results, you can’t tell success from failure”) 
 to improve through error correction (“if you can’t recognize failure, you can’t correct it”) 
 to motivate by rewarding success (“if you can’t see success, you can’t reward it”) 
 to learn (“If you can’t see success, you can’t learn from it”) 
 to promote (“if you can demonstrate results, you can win public support”)37 
Other authors have identified complementary or alternative functions, and describe these 
functions in different ways. Hatry and Wholey (1992:604) highlight that “performance monitoring 
systems are beginning to be used in budget formulation, performance contracting, improving 
government services, and improving communications between citizens and government”, and 
identify two main goals of PMAS: “[p]erformance monitoring is no panacea, nor is it an end in 
itself. It is one important step to help public managers to improve public programs and be 
accountable to elected officials and citizens” (Hatry and Wholey, 1992:609). Hatry (1999), cited in 
Behn (2003:588), identifies ten purposes of performance measurement: accountability, 
communication with the public to build public trust, making budget request, internal budgeting, 
performance problems examination and provision of possible corrections, motivation, 
contracting, evaluating, strategic planning and to improvement. 
In all these examples, the main goals of PMAS and its sub-functions are mixed-up; 
performance improvement, and in some cases accountability, are categorized together with other 
sub-functions of performance measurement. In Osborne and Gaebler’s list (1992), evaluation, 
motivation and learning all aim at the same goal: improving performance. The last function, to 
promote, however, can be considered as a goal in itself since winning public support is not linked 
to the main goal of improving performance, but is an important element of how democratic 
society operates. In Hatry (1999), all the functions identified except two (accountability and 
communication) can be considered as sub-functions of the main goal “to improve performance.” 
In other words, making budget requests, internal budgeting, performance problem examinations 
and all the other sub-functions would not be important if they were not key elements in the 
                                                            
37
 All quotations from Osborne and Gaebler (1992: 146-154) 
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process of providing efficient and effective public services. While Wholey and Hatry (1992) 
implicitly identify performance improvement and accountability as main goals of performance 
monitoring, they do not explicitly distinguish between their contributing and subordinating 
functions. 
To our knowledge, Behn (2003) is one of the few to explicitly mention this distinction, but 
he considers that performance information is always used for a single overarching goal: 
performance improvement. Behn suggests that performance measurement has eight main 
functions. These functions include one main purpose, to improve organizational performance, and 
seven complementary purposes – to evaluate, to control, to budget, to motivate, to promote, to 
celebrate and to learn – which “are all subordinated to improvement. Whenever public managers 
use performance measures to evaluate, control, budget, motivate, promote, celebrate, or learn, 
they do so only because these activities – they believe or hope – will help to improve the 
performance of government” (600). Table 1 below summarises these eight functions and the 
related questions performance information helps to answer. 
The purpose The public manager’s question that the performance measure can help answer 
Evaluate How well is my public agency performing? 
Control How can I ensure that my subordinates are doing the right thing? 
Budget On what programmes, people, or projects should my agency spend the public’s money? 
Motivate How can I motivate line staff, middle managers, non-profit and for-profit collaborators, 
stakeholders and citizens to do the things necessary to improve performance? 
Promote How can I convince political superiors, legislators, stakeholders, journalists and citizens 
that my agency is doing a good job? 
Celebrate What accomplishments are worthy of the important organizational ritual of celebrating 
success? 
Learn What is working or not working and why? 
Improve What exactly should who do differently to improve performance? 
Source: Behn, 2003. 
Table 1 – Eight purposes for measuring performance 
Whereas ‘accountability’ does not appear on Behn’s list, accountability is one of the main 
functions of PMAS (Smith, 1990:53; Hatry and Wholey, 1992; Hatry, 1999), as chapter II has 
shown. Behn argues that accountability is achieved through some of the eight aforementioned 
purposes, namely ‘evaluation’ or ‘control’ of public agencies. This implies that public managers 
64 
 
are accountable as long as they are evaluated or controlled, and that a form of accountability 
exists as soon as performance indicators are published. In addition, in the specific functions of 
‘evaluation’ and ‘control’, public managers are only accountable to their hierarchy or towards the 
organisation which employs them, and this simply makes accountability a means to a more 
important end: effectiveness. More generally speaking, accountability is often seen as a means to 
the greater good of performance improvement. As chapter II has shown, in the aid sector 
accountability in general and social accountability in particular are considered as means to control 
and motivate public servants and public organisations to limit corruption and patronage and 
provide better service quality. 
However, it can be argued that accountability is a right in itself, whether accountability 
contributes or not to organizational performance, and that public managers – and all other 
employees of the public sector – should be accountable to the public at large, and not only to 
their hierarchy. This right is the right of any tax payer to have access to performance information 
about what his or her money is used for: “*t+he argument for publishing ‘performance’ 
information has been made within many governance traditions, including North America, other 
‘Anglo’ countries and large parts of Europe, and is simply axiomatic: the publication of 
performance information is a good thing in and of itself. Indeed some see it as a democratic right” 
(Talbot, 2005: 497). What matters here is that citizens – made customers within the framework of 
NPM – are aware of the quality or characteristics of the service they pay for, in the same way 
anyone is entitled to know the technical specifications of the car they are buying or the nutritional 
value of the food they buy in supermarkets. 
Finally, ‘communication’ is identified in this section as the third main goal of PMAS. Most 
of the time, communication is linked to accountability. Indeed, ‘accountability’ is generally 
considered to be based on the dissemination of performance information from the accountor to 
the accountee or to an accountee forum (Bovens, 2005). However, communication and 
accountability should be kept separate since communication is largely part of a political game. It is 
a tool widely used to make alliances, win support, destabilise political opponents or attract public 
attention through appealing media stories and potential scandals. Therefore ‘communication’ in 
this case clearly aims neither at improving performance nor at satisfying the right of citizens to 
accountability. Rather, it emerges as an independent instrument of power. 
To summarize, it is argued in this section that PMAS have three fundamental and 
independent functions: to satisfy the citizens’ right to information (in which case accountability is 
65 
 
an end in itself), to facilitate efficient and effective public services (in which case accountability is 
means to a greater end) and to communicate, which is a central element of political life but 
contributes neither to the citizens’ right to information nor to more efficient and effective public 
services. The first goal is achieved through the publication of performance data, with no other 
purpose in sight than the satisfaction of this right. The third one is achieved through the 
publication of selected performance data as part as a wider success (or failure) story aimed at 
gaining public support for or against a political leader or organisation. The second can be achieved 
by contributing to either one of the two coordination mechanisms identified in Williamson’s 
transaction-cost theory: market mechanisms or hierarchies.38 In the first case (market 
mechanisms), performance data are necessary for market mechanisms to operate, performance 
data being understood to be what customers get for the price they are asked to pay for the 
related service. In the second case (hierarchies), performance data are necessary for decision 
making or resource allocation (budgeting, planning and evaluation of what works and what does 
not work); for the control of resource utilisation; and for the optimisation of resource utilisation 
(through functions such as to learn, to motivate, to promote and to celebrate). The main 
functions of PMAS are summarized in Figure 3 below. 
 
Figure 3 – Main functions of PMAS (PI: Performance Indicators) 
2.3. Towards a taxonomy of PMAS 
As the previous section has shown, PMAS serve several sub-functions. PMAS can measure the 
performance of different public organisations in order to make them comparable for budgeting 
purposes at the government level or allow the citizen or customer to select a service provider (as 
the New Public Management suggests). They can measure the performance of different 
                                                            
38
 ‘Trust’ is often identified as an alternative mode of coordination between individuals. It can be argued that the recourse to PMAS 
rests on the implicit assumption that there is no such thing as ‘trust.’ 
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programmes or projects within an organisation in order to make them comparable for budgeting 
purposes, for resource allocation or to improve motivation of the staff. They can also measure the 
performance of different units, such as schools or hospitals, in order to give potential customers 
important information to help them choose the school they want to send their children to or the 
hospital where they want to be treated. PMAS can take different forms in order to fulfil their 
functions. According to Hood (2007) three types of PMAS can be distinguished: “intelligence 
systems”, “targets systems” and “ranking systems.” These three types of systems are introduced 
next, and analysed in line with the steps identified in the previous section. 
a) Intelligence systems 
This type of PMAS provides background information without a predefined interpretation of the 
data. At the national level, the provision of the annual growth rate, the GDP or the unemployment 
rate by a statistical agency can be seen as “intelligence systems”; these numbers are not supposed 
to trigger any type of predefined interpretation or reaction. They may appear at first glance to be 
mere performance measurement systems. However, if these numbers are not used in an explicit 
way agreed ex-ante, they can nevertheless be used by control bodies such as parliamentary 
committees, political parties, the media or any type of interest group. These stakeholders can use 
the data produced by these systems in order to hold the government accountable or to foster 
their own interests, gain public support and induce political decision in such a way as to favour 
their own causes. Therefore, such systems are often explicit measurement systems and implicit 
management systems. No measurement is a goal in itself; it always serves a purpose, even if this 
purpose is not or cannot be identified precisely ex-ante. 
b) Target systems 
This type of system relies on the comparison between a quantified measurement of an 
organisation’s performance and a target or threshold. In such a system, a performance goal is set 
and progress towards this goal is assessed. The four-step process presented previously can be 
adapted and refined for ‘target systems’: 
1. Performance definition 
2. Proxy and target definition 
3. Measurement 
4. Comparison of the measured performance with the target 
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In the case of unexpected discrepancies between the measured results and the target, an 
investigation and analysis of the factors impacting the performance can lead to corrective 
measures or sanctions and rewards. 
Such devices can take the form of performance contracts between individuals within the 
same organisation in order to improve overall control in complex organisations. Such contracts 
will integrate performance indicators and performance targets. In this case, the implicit idea is to 
limit asymmetry of information between principals and agents within the organisation, 
understood as a chain of principal-agents relationships. 
c) Ranking systems 
This type of system provides a set of quantitative data allowing for the comparison of the 
individual performance of different units, based on clearly defined indicators. These devices are 
organized around three main steps. The resulting league-table can then be published and used to 
inform user choice. This is the case with university league tables in the UK or United States, for 
example. In ranking systems there are four logical steps: 
1. Performance definition 
2. Proxy definition 
3. Measurement 
4. Inter-unit comparison 
Any given PMAS is likely to be based on at least two of the three mechanisms mentioned. 
Table 2 below summarises the characteristics of the three types of systems. 
Type of system Main steps Particularity Example 
‘Intelligence’ 
systems 
Performance definition 
Proxy definition 
Measurement 
Diffusion of perf. data 
Performance data are 
not used for ex-ante 
defined purposes. 
Financial indicators, GDP, 
unemployment rates. 
Target systems Performance definition 
Proxy definition & target 
setting 
Measurement 
Comparison / target 
Decision-making based 
on comparing the 
measured performance 
with the target. 
Production quotas for a factory or 
a public service, staff reductions 
for a public service. Performance 
contracts between individuals 
within organisations. 
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Ranking systems Performance definition 
Proxy definition 
Measurement 
Inter-unit comparison 
Diffusion of the 
performance of the 
different units assessed 
(league-table). 
Sporting leagues, university 
leagues and ranking (Research 
Assessment Exercise in the UK). 
Source: author, based on the three categories suggested by Hood (2007) 
Table 2 – The three main forms of PMAS 
3. Introducing and identifying implicit assumptions 
Following the two sub-sections dedicated to the analysis of PMAS, this section questions the 
implicit assumptions which underpin PMAS. It is argued that the disjuncture between intended 
effects and observed effects of PMAS could be reduced if these implicit assumptions were 
identified, and if the social mechanisms which involve and articulate these implicit assumptions 
were taken into consideration. 
The introduction of performance-based management practices in an organisation, 
whether private or public, comes with procedures and rules to follow, and tools to use. 
Introducing PMAS requires some sort of data definition and collection. Collecting data in turn 
requires procedures to ensure that these data can be deemed accurate and reliable, and 
adequately represent reality. Subsequently this data is interpreted and analysed by different 
actors within and outside the organisation. This again requires rules of interpretation and rests on 
the assumption that a particular shared understanding exists about why this type of performance 
is relevant and how it is linked to the performance of the corresponding organisation. Depending 
on the results produced by the performance measurement device, a particular type of action is 
required and expected – action which is supposed to lead to improved organizational 
performance. This final result depends in fine on the actions or reactions of other people within 
the organisation. 
All along this chain of events implicit assumptions are made. These assumptions 
constitute a missing link between the tool – the measurement device – and the expected actions 
and results. Several goals of PMAS have been identified, but what is required for PMAS to 
contribute to these goals? In the words of Behn (2003): “What is the logic behind all of this 
performance measurement – the causal link between the measures and the public manager’s 
effort to achieve specific policy purposes?” Writing further about the link between performance 
improvement and the measurement of performance, Behn (2003) asks, “How does the 
measurement of performance beget improvement? Measurement can influence performance in a 
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variety of ways, most of which are hardly direct or apparent. There exist a variety of feedback 
loops, though not all of them may be obvious, and the obvious ones may not function as expected 
or desired.” Behn starts answering this question by identifying the various functions of PMAS. He 
then goes further, suggesting that the link between performance measurement and improvement 
can be made stronger by properly designing performance measurements to fit the particular 
purposes they are supposed to fulfil. For each of the eight functions he identifies, he subsequently 
identifies the requirements for designing efficient performance measurement systems. These 
requirements are summarized in Table 3 below. 
However, it is argued here that this approach does not sufficiently explain how PMAS 
goals are reached, how they operate and why so many unintended consequences appear. In order 
to fill this gap, this section is dedicated to identifying what the aforementioned implicit 
assumptions are, based mainly on the work presented in Behn (2003). 
The purpose To achieve this purpose, managers need 
Evaluate Data pertaining to outcomes and inputs as well as good knowledge of the effects of exogenous 
factors, in order to assess what the agency has achieved given the resources at its disposal. 
Control Inputs that can be regulated. To control, a manager needs to compare the behaviour of public 
officials with input requirements. 
Budget Efficiency measures (specifically outcomes or outputs divided by inputs), in order to determine 
what activities are the most efficient at reaching the political objectives decided by political 
leaders. 
Motivate Almost-real-time outputs compared with production targets, in order to provide timely feedback 
on what people do. 
Promote Easily understood aspects of performance about which citizens really care. 
Celebrate Periodic and significant performance targets that, when achieved, provide people with a real 
sense of personal and collective accomplishment. 
Learn Disaggregated data that can reveal deviancies from the expected. To learn, a large variety of data 
are required which describe in detail the various aspects of the various components of the 
agency. 
Improve Inside-the-black-box relationships that connect changes in operations to changes in outputs and 
outcomes. 
Source: adapted from Behn, 2003. 
Table 3 – Type of performance measures required for different purposes 
The assumption of this paper is that even with properly designed performance measures 
PMAS can fail to lead to the expected improvements because the context in which they are 
implemented does not allow them to operate according to the mainstream logic underpinning 
PMAS. Behn (2003) has clearly identified the main challenge: “there is, however, no guarantee 
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that every use of performance measures to budget or celebrate will automatically enhance 
performance. There is no guarantee that every controlling or motivational strategy will improve 
performance.” But this paper considers that Behn’s answer to the problem identified – which is to 
design particular types of performance measures – is incomplete. 
Let’s take a few examples. When mentioning the function ‘to control’, Behn suggests that 
inputs and regulations are required; the manager can control whether the inputs are processed 
according to the existing rules and regulations. However, what guarantees that managers will 
actually use the input data at their disposal to control their employees? Many other 
considerations can interfere with a manager’s behaviour, such as the nature of the personal 
relationship that the manager has with his or her employees, the confidence he or she has in the 
performance data provided, and his or her own acceptance or non-acceptance of the rules and 
procedures meant to be enforced. In addition, will the manager have the power to sanction 
subordinates if required, or to take any corrective action? 
When mentioning the function ‘to motivate’, Behn writes that “almost-real-time outputs” 
measurements are required so that they can be compared with production targets in order to 
provide timely feedback on what people do. However, why would a worker aware of the 
difference between his or her production targets and actual output be more motivated to 
produce more? Are these not implicit cultural and psychological assumptions about how people 
react when faced with the fact that their own measured performance is below their performance 
target? 
Similarly, when writing about ‘to celebrate’, Behn suggests that “significant performance 
targets” are required which, when reached, “provide people with a real sense of personal and 
collective accomplishment.” However, what is the link between the fact of reaching these 
performance targets and the sense of personal and collective accomplishment? How can we 
create performance targets which are significant enough for the individuals involved to 
experience a sense of personal and collective accomplishment? Here again, what are the 
psychological or cultural requirements for such feelings to be experienced when performance 
targets are reached? 
Similar questions can be asked of each of the goals identified. Table 4 below summarises 
the implicit assumptions which accompany each of the sub-functions of PMAS as identified by 
Behn (2003). 
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The purpose Performance data requirements and implicit assumptions 
Evaluate 
Performance data requirements: data pertaining to outcomes and inputs as well as good 
knowledge of the effects of exogenous factors, in order to assess what the agency has achieved 
given the resources at its disposal. 
Implicit assumptions: it is possible to identify exogenous factors and their impact on 
organizational performance and all these exogenous factors have been identified. There 
is sufficient knowledge and analytical know-how to link outcomes to inputs through a 
reliable and valid theory of change. 
Control 
Performance data requirements: Inputs that can be regulated. To control, a manager needs to 
compare the behaviour of public officials with the rules and procedures of input processing of the 
organisation. 
Implicit assumptions: the manager is willing to use input data to ensure that procedures 
are followed (he or she thinks that the data are reliable and that the procedures are 
worth enforcing). Also, he or she has the ability and willingness to take corrective 
actions, and to sanction subordinates if necessary. 
Budget 
Performance data requirements: Efficiency measures (specifically outcomes or outputs divided 
by inputs), in order to determine what activities are the most efficient at reaching the political 
objectives decided by political leaders. 
Implicit assumptions: the budget-maker is motivated and effectively constrained by 
institutional arrangements to achieve political objectives. He has the necessary leeway 
and willingness to modify the budget when political objectives change. 
Motivate 
Performance data requirements: Almost-real-time outputs compared with production targets, in 
order to provide timely feedback on what people do. 
Implicit assumptions: the individuals whose performance is measured feel motivated 
when they see that their performance is below their target. Being behind target 
motivates them to put in additional effort to reach their targets, and the prospect of 
beating the targets is a source of pride and satisfaction. Individuals believe that the 
targets can be reached and that it is in their interests to actually reach them. 
Promote 
Performance data requirements: Easily understood aspects of performance about which citizens 
really care. 
Implicit assumptions: there exist aspects of performance about which citizens really 
care. In addition, citizens are able to understand what the performance data published 
refer to, and do believe that performance data published are valid.  
Celebrate 
Performance data requirements: Periodic and significant performance targets that, when 
achieved, provide people with a real sense of personal and collective accomplishment. 
Implicit assumptions: Such significant performance targets exist. There is a link – 
whether cultural and / or psychological – between, on the one hand, the perception and 
understanding of performance and of the performance target, and, on the other, the 
sense of personal and collective accomplishment. 
Learn 
Performance data requirements: Disaggregated data that can reveal deviancies from the 
expected. To learn, a large variety of data are required which describe in details the various 
aspects of the various components of the agency. 
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Implicit assumptions: the manager has the analytical know-how and knowledge to 
understand the chain of cause-consequences linking inputs and exogenous factors to 
outputs and outcomes and can make sense of unexpected results by modifying his 
understanding of the chain of cause-consequences if necessary. 
Improve 
Performance data requirements: Inside-the-black-box relationships that connect changes in 
operations to changes in outputs and outcomes. 
Implicit assumptions: the same as above plus the ability to design alternative solutions 
and put them into practice. 
Source: author. 
Table 4 – Implicit assumptions behind each of Behn’s performance measurement functions. 
To make a long story short, PMAS are only tools in the hands of people within 
organisations. They can enhance organizational performance, but like any other tool they can be 
used improperly, or not used at all, either because they are not understood properly (and people 
do not understand why it is important to use these tools) or because the personal interests of the 
individuals having to use them do not coincide with the functions the tools are designed for. This 
section has identified a particular set of behavioral implicit assumptions. They are assumptions 
which linked performance measurements and targets to individual behaviors. This particular type 
of implicit assumptions will be complemented by structural implicit assumptions which are 
introduced and developed in the next chapter. 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter has identified the main steps involved in the production of performance data. These 
steps are performance identification, proxy definition, performance measurement and 
performance utilisation. 
It has subsequently clarified the existing literature on PMAS, which largely missed an 
important distinction between the main goals of PMAS and sub-functions of these systems 
through which the main goals are supposed to be achieved. Three main goals of PMAS have been 
identified, which are improving performance, improving accountability, and communication. 
These three main goals are independent, and can be achieved through sub-functions which are 
subordinate to them. It has been argued that ‘improving accountability’ should be considered to 
be a main goal per se and not only a sub-function of contributing to improving performance, since 
it has become a democratic right. 
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Finally, based on the list of sub-functions provided by Behn (2003), this chapter has 
introduced the notion of ‘implicit assumptions’ and has identified a set of behavioural implicit 
assumptions for each of the eight sub-functions identified in the article. If identifying these sub-
functions is an important step towards a better understanding of how PMAS operate, it is argued 
that further analysis is required to understand the social mechanisms which underpin each of 
these sub-functions. In addition, other implicit assumptions exist, beyond the eight sub-functions 
used in this chapter. The next chapter explores further the nature and importance of these 
implicit assumptions, introducing and defining structural implicit assumptions in order to provide 
an exhaustive overview of the different types of implicit assumptions which can explain why the 
observed effects of PMAS often largely differ from their intended effects. 
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Chapter IV - OUTSIDE THE ‘SYSTEM’ OF PERFORMANCE-BASED MANAGEMENT AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
As chapter III has shown, PMAS fulfil three main goals, and a wide range of sub-functions within 
the public sector. The link between these functions and performance measurement - i.e. the way 
performance measurement can contribute to these functions - is mostly understood within the 
framework of the dominant understanding of PMAS. As has been introduced, behavioural implicit 
assumptions are made which are necessary to link PMAS on the one hand and performance 
improvement in the other, and to explain why such practices should lead to the intended effects 
of PMAS. 
However, the way these systems are conceptualized leaves aside structural implicit 
assumptions which further contribute to unexpected consequences of PMAS. Extensive literature 
in the field of public management has developed underlining the limits of these systems, 
nourishing an intense debate over the relevancy of introducing and using such practices in the 
public sector (see for example Noordegraaf and Abma, 2003:854-858). The purpose of this section 
is to provide a comprehensive overview of this debate. 
Criticism of PMAS roughly fits into two categories, which are largely overlapping: criticism 
of the assumed nature of organizational performance and the very possibility of actually 
measuring in a quantified way, and criticism of the intended effects of PMAS on organisations. 
Criticism of the nature of organizational performance is based on the fact that performance 
measurement is implicitly considered as objective (“Performance measurement is the process an 
organisation follows to objectively measure how well its stated objectives are being met.” 
Binnendijk, 2000:5) and neutral (Townley and Kimberly, 2005:569-70), meaning that measuring 
performance is only a technical act whose purpose is to reveal an objective truth – organizational 
performance – without any bias or subjectivity. This criticism is presented in section 1. 
Criticism of the effects of PMAS is linked to the fact that proponents of PMAS, while 
neglecting the subjectivity and non-neutrality of performance measurement, tend to reify them 
and consider them as mere management tools at the service of managers and decision-makers, 
without what could be termed ‘side effects’ or ‘unintended consequences.’ Section 2 shows that, 
on the contrary, PMAS have far-reaching consequences, most of them unexpected, and can 
deeply modify the organisation in which they are deployed. 
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These developments pave the way for the fieldwork introduced in chapters V and VI of 
this paper, which will provide more insight into the complexity of PMAS. It will be shown that not 
only is the notion of ‘performance’ neither ‘objective’ nor ‘neutral’, but it also carries a meaning 
which is largely context dependent. This accounts largely for the observed difference – the 
disjuncture - between on the one hand the changes expected by proponent of managerial social 
accountability systems and, on the other hand, what can be observed on the ground. 
1. Reflection on the nature of organizational performance 
The first oversimplification which should be corrected is the suggestion, put forth by proponents 
of the managerial approach to performance measurement, that organizational performance can 
be measured in an objective and neutral way and that performance measurement is supposed to 
provide an accurate account of reality. According to the managerial view, the world is assumed to 
be knowable through observation. Organizational performance is considered an objective reality, 
assumed to exist independently from the observer and to be measureable via properly designed 
technical devices. The measurement obtained is considered to be a faithful snapshot of this 
reality. Performance measures thus do not depend, it is assumed, on who provides them, on what 
is measured and on how the measurement is done, provided that the technical device used to 
measure is properly designed. In other words, this understanding of performance measurement 
does not leave room for any subjective assessment or any other kind of ambiguity in the 
performance measurement process. However, public management literature shows that in the 
public sector ambiguities about performance are rife, even though a performance measurement 
process has been properly designed. Two main factors can explain these ambiguities: 1) it is very 
difficult to reach an agreement on the nature of the performance of any public organisation, and 
2) it is very difficult to actually measure performance in an unequivocal way. 
1.1. The ambiguity of the performance of public organisations 
One of the biggest problems linked to the use of PMAS in the public sector is the difficulty of 
defining the main goal(s) of any public organisation. Performance is the result of constant political 
negotiations; it is always changing, and is a ‘soft’ notion rather than a ‘hard’ one. The nature of 
public service is multi-dimensional, and integrates abstract notions of performance such as equity, 
universality of access and representativeness: “*w+hile some of our ways of appraising private 
sector performance find expression in public sector contexts (for example, productivity, 
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innovations and others), we may characterize an organisation's implementation of public policies 
as just or unjust, equitable or non-equitable, coercive or non-coercive, or representative or non-
representative. Performance of the same service along these dimensions will necessarily vary” 
(Dalton and Dalton, 1988). These elements of performance exist alongside the standard 
understanding of performance as efficiency or effectiveness derived from the private sector, 
making the notion of performance of public services more elusive. 
This multi-dimensional aspect of public service performance partly comes from the fact 
that public services, by nature, serve many stakeholders, who are likely to have different 
expectations of how public organisations should perform. These expectations largely depend on 
the perspective of the interested party – the government, employees or the consumers of public 
services, for example (Carrol, 2000; Behn, 2001:63, 107; Behn, 2003; Townley, 2005). In addition, 
the choice of the indicators selected to represent performance (proxy definition as mentioned in 
chapter III) is itself not a neutral act (Carrol, 2000:45) and will support the interests of some 
groups over others. For instance, in 1980s the performance of secondary schools in the UK was 
assessed through success rates in exams, yet many actors maintained that the principal function 
of schools was to equip pupils with social skills and to contribute to a pupil’s self-confidence – 
elements that cannot be assessed through exam success rates and would require completely 
different measures (Jowett and Rothwell, 1988:39). As a consequence, “what is an appropriate 
performance indicator can itself be a legitimate subject for political argument, and often is—as 
when there is argument about the extent to which social factors should be taken into account in 
assessing (…) performance” (Stewart and Walsh, 1994: 47). The political dimension of 
performance measurement and indicators is therefore of prime importance. 
Another limitation to defining the performance of a particular public service or 
organisation stems from the fact that public services are provided via a complex network of more 
or less independent organisations. It is therefore very difficult to determine precisely and 
unambiguously what each organisation should produce and actually produces. It is therefore hard 
to interpret good or poor performance and to identify which organisation(s) is (or are) responsible 
for it (attribution problem - Radin, 1998; Rondinelli, 1994; Newman, 2001: 90-91). The poor 
performance of a given public organisation could be caused by another organisation, which is 
supposed to cooperate but does not. One of the reasons could be that cooperation is not one of 
the key goals of the partner organisation and is therefore not measured, or because the goals of 
each of these two organisations are not compatible and do not derive from or contribute to their 
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overall objectives (problem of suboptimisation – see for example Smith, 1995:286-287). More 
generally, suboptimisation occurs when several agencies or organisations, contributing jointly to 
an overall objective, pursue individual and local objectives at the expense of this overall objective. 
The phenomenon of suboptimisation exists because it is extremely difficult to divide an overall 
objective into clear and totally complementary sub-objectives: the whole is often more than the 
simple sum of the parts. As a consequence, even if one could measure an element of production 
or output for public services, it might be impossible to link it to the activity or effort of a particular 
agency. 
1.2. The problem of measuring performance39 
Even if organizational performance could be defined, it can be difficult to measure it in practice. 
Translating performance into a quantity is not as straightforward as it first appears, and 
performance measures might not perfectly reflect performance. Some important objectives or 
dimensions of performance cannot be represented by a quantity, and therefore cannot be 
measured. Abstract dimensions of performance such as fairness, quality or equity are not easily 
quantified. It can be argued that some public services, by the nature of their production, are more 
suitable to performance measurement than others. Wilson (2000: 158-75) suggests that public 
agencies differ in two main aspects, and that therefore four categories of public agencies exist. 
These two aspects are 1) the possibility of observing and measuring the outputs, and 2) the 
possibility of observing the outcomes of these agencies. The four different types of agencies are 
therefore: productions agencies (with observable outputs and outcomes), procedural agencies 
(with observable outputs but non observable outcomes), craft organisations (with non-observable 
outputs but observable outcomes) and coping organisations (where neither outputs nor 
outcomes can be observed). In order to ensure employee compliance in each of these 
organisations, managers have to resort to different management techniques and, in coping or 
procedural organisations, they cannot use performance (outputs) measurement: 
 “In production organisations managers are able to observe both the work and its results and so will be 
in a position to evaluate workers on the basis of their contribution to efficiency. (…) In procedural 
organisations the general bureaucratic tendency to manage on the basis of process rather than 
outcomes is much magnified because processes can be observed and outcomes cannot. (…) In craft 
organisations, managers can evaluate and reward operators on the basis of the result they achieve even 
                                                            
39 In addition to the arguments presented in this section, Van Thiel and Leeuw (2002) suggest that PMAS can, with time, 
lose their ability to discriminate good from bad performers, as performance improves or as a process of selection 
operates (poor performers are replaced by better performers). 
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if the former do not know how the latter are achieving it. But they will have to worry that the freedom 
of action enjoyed by unobserved worker will permit a few of them to act improperly or even illegally. (…) 
In coping organisations effective management is almost impossible.” (Wilson, 2000:174-75) 
In addition, even if performance can be measured in theory, it can be difficult to measure 
all of its aspects in practice. It is often unrealistic to measure more than a few dimensions of 
performance without setting up an overly complex measurement scheme, whose cost would 
largely exceed its benefits and which would be impossible to operationalize and manage. 
Finally, performance measurement and assessment often requires some degree of 
professional judgement on the part of those whose performance is measured, which can lead to 
misrepresentation. In the health sector, for example, measuring the performance of a health unit 
may require some sort of categorisation of the patients. However, some patients may fit into 
several categories, in such a way that the health worker is allowed some discretion in assigning a 
patient to one category or another. He or she can then choose the category which better suits his 
or her interests or those of the health unit, thus shaping the reality conveyed by the performance 
measures. Similarly, categorisation errors may occur if the person in charge of assigning patients 
to categories and the users of performance data have different understandings of what each 
category should contain. 
As a consequence of all these shortcomings, performance measures most often provide 
an incomplete and approximate representation of performance. As the CBMES case study will 
later show, local communities in Uganda focus first on non-easily-quantified aspects of the quality 
of the public service they receive, such as corruption and friendliness. Aspects of the service 
which can easily be quantified do not make much sense to them, and what is usually quantified in 
the mainstream approach to performance measurement in public services is not relevant for 
them. 
2. Reflection on the use and effects of performance measures 
2.1. The complexity of interpreting and using performance data 
Another set of criticisms of PMAS relates to the use of performance data to make decisions, and 
to the consequences and effects of performance measures. According to the dominant approach 
to performance-based management, “*t+he main objective of performance measurement in public 
organisations is to support better decision-making, leading to improved outcomes for the 
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community” (OECD, 1994:13). However, using performance data to make informed managerial 
decisions is not as straightforward as it seems. 
As Smith (1995: 297) puts it, “Perhaps the most important requirement is to seek to 
understand the reasons for variations in performance” (emphasis in the original). However, data 
users may face the attribution problem already mentioned, making it difficult to understand 
which actors are responsible for the performance achieved and what reward / sanction decisions 
to make. No organisation works independently from other organisations or independently from 
its working environment. When assessing performance and interpreting performance data, it is 
therefore necessary to take into account the entire environment in order to identify the events or 
external causes which may have influenced performance. In addition, even though the entire 
environment could be taken into account, bounded rationality or the lack of proper knowledge to 
interpret performance data can lead to erroneous decisions. The theory of change or the cause-
consequence relationship which links the action or decision of an actor to long-term outcomes 
might be very complex. Therefore, interpreting public sector performance data is often beyond 
the scope of the lay person and may require expert analysis, with diverging opinions even among 
these experts. Using performance measures for social accountability is therefore not as 
straightforward as it may seem, since it is unlikely that the lay person will be able to understand 
all the details and pitfalls of the performance production process. 
In addition, March (1978, 1984) has shown that managerial choices often introduce 
elements of common sense which are not recognised in theories of rational choice. There are 
elements of ambiguity in choices which are not resolved by factual information like performance 
data, making the link between information and decisions more complex than suggested by the 
rational choice theories on which managerialism rests. Along the same lines, Stewart and Walsh 
(1994) suggest that values are of prime importance in the process of using performance data on 
public sector organisation, just as they are important in the definition of performance itself. 
Therefore, they consider that making decisions based on performance measures is “more like a 
judicial activity than engineering measurement” (p. 45). Performance measurement cannot be 
used straightforwardly for decision making, but instead should be used for supporting politically 
informed judgements: “performance assessment in the public domain is a judgement that has to 
be made politically. The political nature of performance assessment involves recognition that 
modes of discussion and determination of factors that are relevant and irrelevant must be 
discovered through political debate. The criteria will shift as values change and in the light of 
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experience. Performance assessment is an exercise in practical wisdom not measurement” 
(Stewart and Walsh, 1994:49). 
Moynihan (2005b, 2008) adopts a similar perspective. Based on an experiment40 
consisting of interpreting performance reports published according to US legislation (the 
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993), the author shows that the interpretation of 
performance data to inform decision-making is essentially discursive and linked to political 
interests, far from the idealized and rational model of the usage of performance data for decision-
making. Since performance is ‘interest-related’, it is unlikely that a unique and consensual 
interpretation of performance can be provided. 
2.2. Unexpected consequences of PMAS 
Measuring performance is often seen as central to organizations, for it provides important data 
for policymakers and managers; as the saying goes, “what cannot be measured cannot be 
managed.” However, introducing PMAS in an organisation can have far-reaching consequences, 
some of them difficult to identify. It has become clear, after several decades of design and use of 
PMAS both in private and public organisations, that the “scientific management idea of a 
thermometer-like” measure was unrealistic and approximates more the “interactive, manipulable 
and intrusive heat of the sauna” than “the ‘neutrality’ of the thermometer” (Bouckaert, 1993:11). 
PMAS are neither neutral nor objective and, as a consequence, actors in the organisations in 
which PMAS are introduced react to these practices and adapt to them. Far from being neutral 
and objective, PMAS are social and political and have pervasive effects, unrelated to allowing 
better decision-making based on performance data. For example, in a recent piece of research 
based on an HIV prevention programme for sex workers in South India, Biradavolu et al. (2015) 
show that quantified monitoring activities of the programme have had clear adverse effects on 
the behaviour of the programme staff. Monitoring activities became the priority, and strategic 
decisions within the programme were made based on monitoring requirements and not on the 
objectives of the programme itself. They show that the quantification required in the monitoring 
process ended up undermining community ownership and discrediting existing and locally-
informed practices, and was used to discipline and judge the educators. This section provides a 
                                                            
40 Moynihan analyses how performance data yielded by the Program Assessment Rating Tool of the Office of 
Management and Budget in the US are used. 
81 
 
review of the main unexpected consequences of PMAS as identified and conceptualized in the 
literature. 
The fact that the representation of performance is wrongly assumed to comprehensively 
represent all aspects of performance, as mentioned in sub-section 1.2, can lead managers to 
unduly focus only on the quantified aspects of performance (synechdoche, or “taking the part to 
stand for a whole”, Bevan and Hood, 2006), to the detriment of other un-quantified aspects of 
performance which are then involuntarily ignored (tunnel vision). In addition, if a measure does 
not fully capture all the dimensions of the associated objective, managers may be encouraged to 
voluntarily make decisions that improve the reported measure to the detriment of the associated 
objective (measure fixation).41 In the health or unemployment services, for example, this can lead 
managers to select the patients who are easiest to treat or the unemployed who are the easiest 
to place (creaming), thus completely distorting the purpose of these public services. In the health 
sector, it would be seen as fair practice in a hospital to give priority to patients who are the most 
severely ill or injured, before attending to less severe cases. However, giving more importance to 
measurable aspects of performance (such as the number of patients treated) could lead to 
neglecting the more needy patients to focus on easy-to-treat patients in order to increase the 
number of patients treated. Another form of measure fixation may appear when performance 
measurement becomes more important than programme outcomes. In such a case, as 
documented by Biradavolu et al., (2015), strategic decisions are made to fit the requirements or 
to ease the measurement process to the detriment of the main programme goals. 
Similarly, PMAS can induce a so-called managerial myopia, when managers focus on 
measurable short terms objectives rather than legitimate long-term objectives. This is made more 
acute because PMAS, in order to function, require that measures be done shortly after actions 
have taken place so as to be used as feedback on these actions. Myopia is particularly problematic 
in the public sector, where numerous agencies implement policies or provide services that only 
have an impact several years down the line. The most immediate unexpected consequence of 
PMAS is therefore to focus the attention of the managers on potentially non-essential or aspects 
of the work of their organisations. 
                                                            
41 Measure fixation and tunnel vision are very similar and often confused. However, they differ in the sense that tunnel 
vision refers to a tendency to focus involuntarily on the objectives which are quantified in the PMAS to the detriment of 
other non-quantified objectives, whereas measure fixation refers to a voluntary tendency to focus on the measure, as 
opposed to the underlying objective that the measure is supposed to represent. 
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Van Thiel and Leeuw (2002) also suggest that a phenomenon of perverse learning can 
occur once organisations or individuals have learned which aspects of performance are measured 
and have adapted to it. Managers can arrange to minimize their apparent scope for productivity 
improvements, in order to make it easier for them to reach their performance targets (gaming – 
see Smith, 1995: 297-298).42  
Proper performance measurement also requires honesty. Individuals in charge of 
providing data for performance measurement can engage in fraud or ‘creative reporting’, leading 
to misrepresenting the actual performance of the organisation (misrepresentation through fraud - 
see Smith, 1995: 292-293). Misrepresentation has the potential to lead to serious dysfunction as it 
can mislead the manager or controller about the results of different activities of the organisation, 
causing him or her to take misinformed decisions. 
Finally, it has been argued that the information produced by PMAS also contributes to 
creating meaning and influencing values, which in turn impact the actors’ behaviours. Recent 
studies of different fields (Power, 2005:335) including academia, the health sector, 
psychotherapy, social work and counselling show that auditing and the introduction of PMAS in 
the UK have profound and often perverse consequences on the behaviour of the personnel 
exposed to performance measurement. In addition to gaming and the excessive attention to 
measurement compliance at the  expense of professional attention already mentioned, these 
management practices have led, in a few cases, to a decline in organizational trust, the 
appearance of defensive strategies or ‘blamism’ and lower employee morale. Similarly, based on 
findings from a malnutrition programme in Bolivia, Hoey (2015) shows that M&E systems can 
lower staff morale, create burdensome paperwork, blind managers to operational problems and 
innovation and lead to self-censorship, therefore contributing to the very problems that M&E 
should solve. This is one of the very few existing studies of the unintended consequences of 
monitoring and evaluation systems in development projects. 
3. Understanding and modelling PMAS effects 
As the two previous sections have shown, defining and measuring organizational performance are 
challenging tasks. In addition, interpreting performance data to inform decision making is not as 
straightforward as it may seem. Finally, introducing PMAS into an organisation triggers complex 
                                                            
42 For more information about gaming, see Bevan and Hood (2006), Hood (2006) and Kelman and Friedman (2009). 
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phenomena and can lead to many ‘unintended consequences.’ Whether personal judgement and 
interpretation is required, or whether vested interests interfere with the story told by 
performance measures, these management practices have far-reaching consequences that make 
it very difficult – if not impossible – to comprehensively assess their effects on organizational and 
individual behaviour, and consequently on organizational effectiveness. This section provides a 
set of tools to better understand PMAS and how they operate. Section 3.1 describes two ideal-
typical approaches to PMAS aimed at giving a better understanding of the epistemological 
assumptions underpinning the debate surrounding these systems. Section 3.2 provides a 
framework to analyse and understand what happens ‘outside’ systems of performance-based 
management and accountability. This framework is then used in the last part of this research to 
make sense of the data collected during the study of the CBMES initiative. 
3.1. Two ideal-typical approaches to PMAS 
All in all, the debate on the actual contribution of PMAS to organizational performance in the 
public sector is not settled yet. It is very difficult to ascertain that PMAS’s perverse consequences 
and costs do not outweigh their benefits in terms of management and productivity (Smith, 1995; 
Noordegraaf and Abma, 2003; Talbot, 2005:503; Moynihan, 2009). Introducing PMAS in an 
organisation can lead to overly-complex management systems, and it is often suggested that the 
limitations to PMAS should be compensated by the introduction of additional performance 
indicators, or by the replacement of existing indicators by more complex ones which risk making 
the situation even worse. However, the potential contribution of PMAS to management and 
productivity in the public sector should not be rejected outright. Performance data can provide 
interesting information about an organisation and can prove useful if used to complement other 
qualitative accounts. Moreover, performance indicators can serve as a basis for discussion, 
negotiation and accountability, and thus appear to be indispensable mediums of organizational 
life. 
Based on the two previous sections, Table 5 below summarises the two main 
understandings or approaches to PMAS: the positivist approach (PMAS understood as simple 
technical tools providing objective and neutral representations of the organizational reality as it 
stands), and the constructivist approach (PMAS understood as a social construct loaded with 
vested interests and political tensions). These two understandings should not be presented in 
opposition to one another, with one ‘right’ and the other ‘wrong’. Considering PMAS only in a 
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rational way leads to overestimating their contribution to organizational effectiveness, and to 
ignoring their limitations. Similarly, considering PMAS only as a social construct would lead to 
discarding any potentially interesting data produced by PMAS as unreliable or even fallacious. 
There are arguably interesting elements in these two archetypal approaches. As 
previously mentioned, the public sector engages in very different types of activities. Some of 
them might be more easily subject to quantified performance measurement than others. As a 
consequence, ‘reality’ should probably be modelled using a combination of the two extremes 
depicted below, which should then be considered to be two ends of a continuum on which any 
system of performance measurement and management could be located. The next step (outside 
the scope of this paper) would then be to identify which parameters or contextual variables 
contribute to pulling any system of performance measurement and management closer to one or 
the other end of the spectrum. 
 
 ‘Mainstream’ understanding of PMAS 
(positivist approach) 
Alternative understanding of PMAS 
(constructivist approach) 
Performance 
measurement... 
...is objective and gives a clear account of 
reality. The basic idea is that “a snapshot is 
enough to understand the whole movie.” 
...is subjective and relative to the social 
context, to the common history of the different 
stakeholders, and to the debates that animate 
the community of actors involved. The idea is 
that “to understand the movie we have to see 
it.” 
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Value and unit 
of the measure 
It is easy to determine what the mission of 
an agency/ministry is and therefore what is 
to be measured is relatively 
straightforward.  
The unit of the measure is universal, 
objective and not contested, much like the 
metre.43 
A negotiation is necessary to define what is to 
be measured and what is the ‘unit’ of measure. 
Therefore, the performance measured will be 
significant only among the stakeholders 
involved in the negotiation. 
Consensus of subjectivity: the unit of the 
measure as well as the measurement process 
have been agreed upon by the different parties 
involved. 
It can be argued that there will never be such a 
consensus, and that performance measures will 
always be the subject of political struggle. 
Use of 
performance 
data… 
...is hard, contractual and explicit. 
Ideally, sanctions and rewards should be 
clearly specified in a contract linking a 
principal to its agents, together with the 
definition of performance indicators and 
targets. Little discussion is necessary if the 
contract is well written.  
...soft, dialogic and implicit. 
Performance targets and performance 
indicators are only mediums for discussion, 
explanation, negotiation and justification. This 
dialogic part is the most important. 
Control... 
...is distant. 
The control can be exacted even if the 
principal and the agent do not meet. 
...is interactional. 
The control is social, in the group where 
performance indicators and targets have been 
discussed and negotiated. Reputation is 
important, as well as values and social codes. 
Asymmetry of... 
...information between an agent and the 
principal. 
What matters is the value of the measure, 
not the unit of the measure, which is 
universal, objective and not contested. 
...concepts, interests and meanings between 
the different stakeholders. The negotiation of 
what is to be measured and what will be the 
unit of the measure allow the different 
stakeholders to understand what the others 
mean and want. 
Source: author 
Table 5 – Two ideal-typical understandings of PMAS 
                                                            
43 It took mankind about 200 years to overcome vested interests and to agree, in 1960, on an International System of 
Units (the ISU – only Liberia, Myanmar, and the United States of America are not signatories of this treaty) and on a 
universal definition of the metre. It is only since 1983 that the metre has been physically defined as the distance 
travelled by light in a vacuum in 1/299792458 of a second. Unfortunately, the ‘objectivity’ of the length is sometimes 
disturbed by interesting anecdotes, such as the loss of the space probe, the Mars Climate Orbiter, due to a 
misunderstanding on the unit of the length: one of the subcontractors used the English metric system (inch) whilst the 
others had adopted the metric system (as defined in the ISU). Both groups had exchanged technical specifications 
involving measures without paying attention to the units. This incident is a reminder that even the most apparently 
objective measures have been, at some point, socially defined. 
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3.2. Modeling PMAS within organisations: human actions and meaning, power 
and norms 
The previous sections have made it explicit that PMAS have far reaching consequences. When 
introduced in an organisation, PMAS will very likely modify the existing relationships between the 
agents as well as the structure of the organisation itself. In addition, as mentioned in chapter III, 
the effects of PMAS on the performance and accountability of organisations are likely to be 
undermined by ignored implicit assumptions regarding how these systems operate. 
When PMAS are introduced, the particular routines, norms and power structures enabling 
and constraining individual action and interaction within an organisation are likely to be 
challenged and modified, leading to the emergence of different routines, norms and power 
structures. To analyse this phenomenon, Vakurri and Meklin (2006) introduce a model, referred 
to as the Structurational model of Performance Measurement, which rests on organizational 
structure or institutional properties on the one hand and agents on the other. In this model, 
agents’ actions are limited and constrained by existing structures within their organisation, 
structures which are in turn progressively modified by the actions of the agents. Vakurri and 
Meklin’s model aims at accounting for the interactions between performance-based management 
systems, actors within the organisation (agents) and the institutional properties of the 
organisation. 
This framework suggests that the ambiguities linked to performance measurement 
(ambiguity of what performance measurement is and ambiguity about how actors use 
performance data) could be better explained in relation to the institutional properties that 
constrain or allow certain behaviours, such as gaming or misrepresentation through fraud. Within 
this framework, “organizational actors employ performance measurement by assigning shared 
meanings to it” (2006:239). Repeated interaction of human agents with these management 
devices shapes institutional properties which, in turn, constrain social practices and set the 
conditions for interactions with performance measurement systems: 
“When the members of an organisation act upon performance measurement information, they do so 
within the institutional setting of that organisation. When people design performance measurement 
systems, adopt or implement them, modify them, resist them or politicise with them they are influenced 
by the institutional conditions of their working environments. These are the conditions for interaction 
with performance measurement.” (Vakkuri and Meklin, 2006:239) 
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While institutional properties are not defined in this article, references to Orlikowski 
(1992) suggest that they refer to a set of rules and resources – meaning, power and norms – that 
human agents use in their everyday interactions. Orlikowski (1992, 2000) studies technology 
based essentially on the theory of structuration developed by A. Giddens (1979, 1984). Giddens 
defines structuration as a social process of reciprocal interactions between structural 
characteristics of organisations and human actors, suggesting that human actions are enabled and 
constrained by structures, which are themselves the result of previous actions. These structures 
constitute the set of rules and resources which mediate human action, while they are, at the 
same time, reaffirmed and modified by their use by human actors. They are made up of three 
fundamental elements of social interaction: meaning, power and norms, which are progressively 
created, perpetuated or modified when agents act within an organisation. These three 
fundamental elements, while difficult to separate in practice, are nevertheless important from an 
analytical point of view to better account for the social mechanisms underpinning actions and 
interactions within organisations and society at large. Let’s now turn to each of these three 
elements. 
The constitution and communication of meaning is necessary in any type of human 
interaction. It is made possible through shared interpretative schemes and extensive reference to 
the accumulated knowledge that individuals gain from their interaction with the world. Shared 
interpretative schemes are what constitute structures of signification, which are the 
“organizational rules that inform and define interaction” (Orlikowsky, 1992:404). Interactions 
between individuals are made possible by these structures of signification, which give meaning to 
human actions and reactions. In return, human actions and reactions contribute to shaping these 
structures of signification, which are therefore subject to change. 
Power is what characterizes the “transformative capacity” of human interactions, the 
ability of human action to transform the social and material world. Two types of power can be 
distinguished: power over people (authoritative resources) and power over objects and material 
elements (allocative resources). The power extended over people is institutionalized through 
structures of domination, “which reflect the fact that all social systems are marked by an 
asymmetry of authoritative and allocative resources” even though “there always remains the 
potential for agents to act to change a particular structure of domination” (Orlikowsky, 1992: 
405). This means that even though a particular structure of domination constrains human actions 
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and interactions at any given time, the particular actions of individuals in turn shape these 
structures of domination. 
Finally, norms refer to rules or organizational conventions that determine legitimate or 
appropriate conduct. Norms are institutionalised as structures of legitimation, “whereby a moral 
order within an organisation is articulated and sustained through rituals, socialization practices, 
and tradition” (Orlikowski, 1992:405). 
Any type of technology, including PMAS, can be considered, according to Orlikowski’s 
reasoning, as partly constituting the structure of an organisation. In the particular case of PMAS, 
these management devices are the result of human intention and action; they are designed, 
developed, put into practice and used by individuals in order to achieve particular effects 
(informing and guiding decisions), and they contribute to convincing other people of the relevancy 
of such an action. Performance measurement can also be used to reward or sanction, making 
such tools part of the structure of domination prevailing in the organisation in which they are put 
into practice. They convey meaning by providing common references for judgment or decision 
making and are used to legitimate actions and decisions. Finally, they can give particular 
individuals power over other individuals. A schematic representation of the Structurational model 
of PMAS, adapted from the models of Vakkuri and Meklin (2006) and Orlikowski (1992), is 
presented in Figure 4 below. 
This framework will be used to analyse the data from the CBMES initiative, as presented 
in chapter VI. The introduction of the CBMES initiative at the local level in Uganda was aimed at 
empowering members of the local communities so as to allow them to ensure that civil servants 
and government representatives were accountable for their work and for the quality of the public 
services delivered. Proponent of the CBMES initiative therefore hoped that the introduction of 
such a system of accountability would change the structure of domination, signification and 
legitimation in such a way as to give local community members enough legitimacy and power to 
ensure that the two fundamental requirements of accountability, answerability and 
enforceability, were satisfied and that the empowerment of local communities, along with 
monitoring and evaluation activities, would help improve the quality of service delivery. 
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Arrow Type of influence Nature of influence 
a 
PMAS as a product of human 
action 
A given PMAS is the result of human 
action such as design, development, 
appropriation and modification. 
b 
PMAS as a medium of human 
action 
PMAS facilitates and constraints human 
action through interpretative schemes 
(meaning) and norms. 
c 
Institutional conditions of 
Interaction with PMAS 
Institutional properties influence human 
interaction with PMAS. 
d 
Institutional consequences of 
interaction with PMAS 
Interaction with PMAS influences the 
institutional properties of an 
organisation, through reinforcing or 
transforming structures of signification, 
domination, and legitimation. 
Source: adapted from Orlikowski (1992) and Vakkuri and Meklin (2006) 
Figure 4 – Structurational model of PMAS 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on underlining the limitations and complexities of PMAS in order to 
complete the analysis of the implicit assumptions linked to PMAS. The difficulty of identifying 
precisely what the performance of public organisations is has been highlighted, as has the 
difficulty in actually measuring this performance. The complexity of interpreting performance 
measurements to inform decision has also been underlined, together with the many unintended 
consequences of PMAS identified in the literature on public management and organisational 
science. 
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Two forms of implicit assumptions have therefore been identified. In chapter III, 
behavioural implicit assumptions linked to the various sub-functions of PMAS have been 
introduced. Additional structural implicit assumptions have been identified in this chapter. These 
are assumptions about the nature of the performance of public organisation, and the possibility of 
quantifying performance. Behavioural and structural implicit assumptions all contribute to justify 
unexpected consequences of PMAS. 
The last section of the chapter has provided a comparison between two ideal-typical 
approaches to PMAS, opposing a positivist approach which corresponds to the managerial 
understanding of performance measurement to a constructivist approach which is an attempt to 
move away from the reification process characteristic of the managerial approach. The space for 
understanding implicit assumptions and unexpected consequences can be found in the gap 
between these two ideal-typical approaches. 
Finally, a structurational model of PMAS has been introduced based on the development 
of previous work by Orlikowski (1992) and Vakkuri and Meklin (2006). This model accounts for the 
dynamics between agents and structures of domination (power over people), legitimation 
(norms) and signification (meanings) within organisations, which enable and at the same time 
constrain human actions. This model is used in chapter VI to analyse the dynamics underpinning 
the operationalization of the CBMES initiative in Uganda. 
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Chapter V - MANAGERIAL SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN PRACTICE: UGANDA 
The two previous chapters have shown to what extent the oversimplifications of the managerialist 
understanding of PMAS were likely to explain the disjuncture between the ‘order’ expected by the 
proponents of managerialist approaches and the actual results observed in the field. They have 
shown that PMAS are underpinned by complex social mechanisms; they are always challenged, 
negotiated and diverted from their initial purposes, and are thereby transformed. As has been 
underlined, introducing management techniques such as PMAS in organisations has far reaching 
consequences. An oversimplified understanding of how they operate leads to various unexpected 
consequences, such that the effects may significantly differ from what their designers and 
promoters were hoping to achieve. The notion of implicit assumptions has been introduced to 
underline that most of the goals and sub-functions of PMAS are justified by incomplete theories 
of change and simplistic behavioural expectations. Finally, the difficulties of unambiguously 
defining the performance of public organisations, measuring this performance and actually using 
performance data in the particular way devised by the promoters of PMAS have been underlined. 
 In order to answer the question on which this research is based – “What are the effects of 
the promotion and implementation by donors of performance-based management systems on the 
accountability of local government officials, and how can these be explained?” it is now necessary 
to focus on the study of the CBMES. If the introduction of implicit assumptions and unintended 
consequences are the first steps towards a better understanding of the effects of performance-
based management systems on the accountability of local officials, this paper argues that the 
detailed mechanisms through which such systems operate are largely unknown. It is therefore 
necessary to conduct more in-depth research to identify the complex social mechanisms 
constraining and determining the effects of PMAS. This is the purpose of chapters V and VI. 
The CBMES is a project of the NGO Uganda Debt Network (UDN), which aims at recruiting 
members of local communities and training them to monitor and evaluate the quality of the 
services delivered by government agencies at the local level (the sub-county and district levels). 
Chapters VI investigates how community monitors of the CBMES initiative in the Iganga District of 
Uganda hold civil servants and politicians accountable for the quality of the service provided. To 
do so, the structurational model of PMAS introduced in chapter IV section 3 is used to identify the 
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mechanisms underpinning the CBMES in terms of the modification of structures of domination, 
meanings and legitimation. 
Since it is in part through formal horizontal and vertical accountability institutions that 
initiatives such as the CBMES project can contribute to enforcing accountability, it is important to 
understand the nature and roles of all these institutions in the Ugandan context. The first section 
of chapter V therefore depicts the existing accountability mechanisms which have emerged in 
Uganda in the last fifteen years as the result of donor pressure. It then shows how the managerial 
approach to accountability has gradually prevailed. This part of the research is based on 
interviews with public officials and aid workers, and on the analysis of official documents from 
these different accountability organisations and from NGOs. It is within the framework of these 
different institutions that a social accountability initiative like the CBMES can carve out a space; it 
remains to be seen, however, how much space this is, and how it is actually used in practice. 
The second section of chapter V presents and describes the CBMES initiative per se, along 
with its history, its goals and how it is designed to operate at the local and national levels. 
The third section then details how the structurational model of PMAS is operationalized 
to help understand the social mechanisms behind the CBMES, through successive focus on two 
aspects of the work of community monitors. The first aspect is the selection of activities to 
monitor and the justifications behind these choices. The second aspect is the definition, 
interpretation and use of performance indicators by the community monitors during the 
monitoring process, as well as the way community monitors use performance data in their 
interactions and discussions with local government officials. 
1. Context: the managerialisation of accountability in Uganda 
As part of its efforts to benefit from the debt reduction programmes of the World Bank and the 
IMF, Uganda engaged, towards the end of the 1990s, in the “performance movement.” For over 
two decades the country has attempted to implement various monitoring and evaluation systems 
and performance management arrangements. As a result, Uganda’s accountability and 
performance management systems are often considered to be among the most mature in Africa, 
presenting “significant lessons to learn from and experience to share” (Taylor-Powell, 2006:6). 
According to the World Bank’s 2007 study on Result-based National Development Strategies 
(World Bank, 2007: A40-A41), Uganda was one of three countries out of the 62 reviewed to have 
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ranked “B” in result-oriented frameworks44 and one of eight countries to have ranked B in 
“operational national development strategies.” Uganda therefore appears to be a perfect example 
to illustrate and study the development of the ‘performance movement’ in developing countries. 
The purpose of this section is to provide an overview of this process and of the organisations 
which compose the Ugandan accountability and performance management framework. 
1.1. The emergence of the ‘performance movement’ 
Since the end of the ‘90s, the Government of Uganda (GoU) has been developing its monitoring 
and evaluation and performance management structures. In order to be eligible for the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative of the World Bank and IMF, developing countries are 
required to develop a comprehensive national development strategy to be presented in a Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). A PRSP should be produced following five core principles, as 
described by the IMF: 
“Country-driven, promoting national ownership of strategies through broad-based participation of civil 
society; result-oriented and focused on outcomes that will benefit the poor; comprehensive in 
recognizing the multidimensional nature of poverty; partnership-oriented, involving coordinated 
participation of development partners (government, domestic stakeholders, and external donors); and 
based on a long-term perspective for poverty reduction.”45 
Data production and management – generally referred to as ‘Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) 
frameworks’ – started to invade the official discourse of Ugandan government officials and 
documents during the launch of the first Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP – the Ugandan 
PRSP) between 1997 and 2000. In the late ‘90s the government introduced, at least on paper, a 
Result-Oriented Management (ROM) process in the public service.46 Similarly, the MoFPED 
progressively introduced reforms such as output-based budgeting to enable the various 
ministries, departments and agencies, as well as local governments, to plan and budget according 
to clear procedures and against the provision of clearly stated outputs. This process was supposed 
to encourage sectors such as transport and infrastructure, education, water and sanitation and 
health to set up indicators and output targets in order to review and monitor their performance. 
However, ROM principles were not seriously put into practice until the third phase of the reform 
                                                            
44 On a scale from A – Sustainable to E – Little action. 
45 http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prsp.htm Last access on March 2013. 
46 The public service reform has been, in theory, a continuous process since the early ‘90s. The first phase of the public 
service reform, from 1991 to 1997, focused on downsizing, ‘rightsizing’ and restructuring. The Result-Oriented 
Management process was introduced during the second phase, from 1997 to 2002, but did not have much impact until 
the third phase was launched, the Public Service Reform Programme of 2005-2010. 
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which took place much later, between 2005 and 2010. Since then references to data and 
statistics, as well as to monitoring and evaluation strategies and frameworks, have progressively 
gained prominence and are today a central element of the country’s official discourse. 
During the late ‘90s and early 2000s quantified data were primarily used to understand 
the causes and trends of poverty through periodic analysis, based on routine and survey data. In 
1998, a unit dedicated to poverty monitoring was created within the Ministry of Finance, Planning 
and Economic Development, with external funding from development agencies. This Poverty 
Monitoring Unit was in charge of providing biannual poverty status reports, informed by data 
compiled from different sources and tools such as household surveys, Participatory Poverty 
Assessments and routine data collected from the official Management Information Systems of line 
ministries. In 2000 the funding was renewed and the Unit, renamed the Poverty Monitoring and 
Analysis Unit, started undertaking more analytical work, the purpose of which was to provide 
qualitative and quantitative analyses of poverty patterns in urban and rural areas in Uganda, and 
to question the changes in poverty patterns following the implementation of poverty reduction 
policies. 
In the 2000s, successive corruption scandals have increased donor concern over the 
government’s ability to properly use aid monies. The expansion of public expenses and official 
development assistance, together with well-publicized corruption scandals (such as the Global 
Fund and Commonwealth Head of Governments Meeting (CHoGM) scandals in 2005-06 and 
2007), raised serious concerns about the GoU’s accountability on public spending. As a 
consequence, the official discourse as presented in official documents progressively shifted away 
from poverty monitoring and analysis towards budget and outcomes monitoring. In August 2010 
various donors engaged in budget support decided to trim their 360 million dollar contribution for 
the 2010-2011 fiscal year by at least 10%, based on a lack of result in the fight against corruption 
in Uganda following the Global Fund and CHOGM scandals; this created additional pressure on 
the Government of Uganda to stay on the path of public sector and public finance management 
and accountability reforms. 
In addition, in the early 2000s the selected outcomes featured in the monitoring and 
follow-up matrixes required by donors, and especially by the World Bank (in the Poverty-
Reduction Support Credit - PRSC), were difficult to monitor. They were considered to be useless in 
informing disbursement decisions. The production of the second PEAP in 2000, and the 
implementation of the first two World Bank Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSC 1 and 2) in 
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2001 and 2002, has made it necessary, in the eyes of the GoU and donors, to develop a result-
oriented framework based on output indicators linked to clearly defined actions, which would 
allow for better monitoring and control and serve as a plan for governmental action and support 
for disbursement decisions (Williamson, 2003; Booth and Nsabagasani, 2005; Smith et al., 2010). 
Following the PRSC 2 in 2003, the Government of Uganda launched a National Integrated 
Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy (NIMES) in line with the ROM process engaged in earlier; its 
purpose was to establish an overarching M&E framework for the performance of poverty 
reduction policies. This framework was expected to harmonize the different data sources and 
coordinate the different M&E frameworks established for numerous conditional grants and donor 
projects, with little coordination effort. Priority indicators linked to the main objectives of the 
PRSC were identified together with baselines and targets for each of them. Data produced by the 
different line ministries and by surveys carried out by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics were used 
to monitor progress according to this framework. This framework took on a growing importance 
in the official discourse as a central tool for coordination and monitoring as the number of 
development agencies providing budget support increased; in 2011, ten international partners47 
provided more than 350 million dollars per annum of general budget support. Subsequent efforts 
to harmonize M&E procedures among the different donors, together with pressure for tight 
monitoring of these resources, has led to the design of yet another tool, the Joint Assessment 
Framework, in order to regularly measure and review progress and actions according to agreed-
upon objectives. 
M&E systems are assumed to impact performance in sectors such as health and 
education, which have faced pressure and incentives from donors to identify performance 
measures and targets (Interviews; Smith et al., 2010). However, the very recent corruption 
scandal which hit the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), the office housing the National 
Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy supposed to provide an overarching M&E 
framework for all development aid, should encourage observers to take a sceptical and critical 
look at the efficiency of these recent reforms. In the second semester of 2012, an audit by the 
Auditor General allegedly showed that more than 10 million euros of development aid had been 
transferred to the personal account of a high-ranking civil servant of the OPM. As a result, four 
European countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Ireland) asked to be reimbursed for the 
                                                            
47 The World Bank, the European Commission, the African Development Bank and Governments of the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Ireland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands. 
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money they had given to Uganda,48 and DFID, the UK development agency, together with other 
development agencies, temporarily suspended their financial support following the scandal.49 
1.2. Horizontal accountability mechanisms in Uganda 
As previously mentioned, accountability can be separated into horizontal, vertical and diagonal 
accountability. Horizontal accountability usually refers to the systems of checks and balances 
within the framework of governmental institutions. These institutions are presented here. 
a) Legal framework and institutions 
Several institutions in Uganda have been charged, at least on paper, with the task of monitoring 
the performance of the government and the quality of service delivery. The functions and 
responsibilities of most of these institutions are defined in the Constitution of 1995 and in 
subsequent legislation (the Local Government Act of 1997, the Budget Act of 2001, the National 
Planning Authority Act of 2002 and the Public Financial and Accountability Act of 2003, among 
others). The main institutions which use and produce performance data are the National Planning 
Authority, the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic 
Development. 
The National Planning Authority (NAP) was established in 2002 by the National Planning 
Authority Act. It is the main statutory institution in charge of coordinating national and 
decentralized development planning, and is mandated to put in place, coordinate, manage and 
evaluate the frameworks and strategies for national development planning. Its primary function is 
to produce comprehensive development plans for the country (National Development Plans 
(NDPs), which are the successors of the PEAP), together with the result framework for the NDP. 
The NPA has to ensure that the relevant government institutions contribute to M&E through the 
development of performance indicators coherent with the National Development Plan. 
The Office of the Prime Minister has an M&E department (the Directorate of Policy 
Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation), whose purpose is, by law, to coordinate national 
evaluation activities. The National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy previously 
mentioned falls under the responsibility of this department. Basing its conclusions on the 
                                                            
48 http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2013/01/28/corruption-les-pays-scandinaves-reclament-le-remboursement-
d-aides-a-l-ouganda_1823655_3212.htmlFor an interesting list and description of the latest corruption scandals in 
Uganda go to : http://allafrica.com/stories/201211120092.html?viewall=1  
49 http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2012/nov/16/uk-suspends-aid-uganda-misuse  
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quarterly submission of strategic performance reports by every Sector Working Group made up of 
donors and government officials, the OPM is responsible for monitoring government 
performance; it has to report to the Cabinet every six months, and annually to the Parliament. 
These performance reports are supposed to summarise the key expenditures, actions and outputs 
of the sector, as well as planned actions and targets. 
The Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) is responsible for 
resource mobilization, the formulation of national budgets, financial accountability (which falls 
under the responsibility of the Office of the Accountant General), the disbursement of resources, 
and budget monitoring and reporting. In July 2008, the GoU established the Budget Monitoring 
and Accountability Unit (BMAU) within the MoFPED. The role of the BMAU is to enhance 
monitoring efforts geared towards effective implementation of government programmes, 
according to budget performance. By law, all ministries, departments, agencies and local 
governments have to report quarterly on their budget performance (outputs and expenditures) to 
the BMAU. Based on these reports, the BMAU conducts field visits and audits to verify the 
veracity of the reported performance. 
In addition to the institutions aforementioned, other complementary institutions – 
including the Office of the Auditor General, inspection departments in the line ministries, MoPS, 
MoLG and the Inspector General of Government – are in charge of ensuring that the different 
governmental organisations obey the law and administrative rules. 
The Auditor General is appointed by the President with the approval of the Parliament. 
His or her role is defined in the Constitution of 1995. The Auditor General’s official functions are 
to “a) audit and report on the public accounts of Uganda and all public institutions” and “b) to 
conduct financial and value for money audits in respect of any project involving public funds” 
(Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995, article 163). The Auditor General has to submit an 
annual report to the Parliament on the accounts he has audited. However, the actual ability of the 
office of the Auditor General to fulfil its mandate is compromised by its lack of independence (the 
Auditor General can be dismissed by the President) and limited control over its own financial 
resources. Moreover, the sheer volume and variety of transfers to local governments, and the 
flood of details reported to the centre, make it very difficult for the Office of the Auditor General 
to efficiently track public expenditures (Wyatt, 2008). 
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As far as Parliament is concerned, the opposition has been chairing (by law) the Public 
Account Committee since the introduction of multi-party politics in Uganda in 2006. The role of 
the Public Account Committee is to audit reports from the Auditor General and other institutions 
and hold government officials accountable for their expenses. This committee is complemented 
by the Local Government Public Account Committee, which is in charge of holding local 
government officials accountable. 
The need to clearly define the role of each of these accountability institutions to ensure 
that there is no duplication of work nor contradictory competing interests, is an issue which is 
regularly raised in evaluation reports (Booth and Nsabagasani, 2005; Hauge and Mackay, 2004) 
and has been further emphasized in the National Development Plan (NDP) of 2010. From an 
operational standpoint, the performance targets and indicators featured in national development 
strategies (PEAP / NDP) are supposed to be the central monitoring and evaluation systems of the 
government. However, in practice the various functions that the management system of PEAP/ 
NDP is supposed to fulfil are often performed by different control systems, which are distinct and 
non-complementary. Any attempt to unify these functions within one M&E framework risks the 
creation of an additional system that, instead of replacing the older ones, creates an extra 
challenge that the already resource-constrained public sector has to face (for the case of Uganda 
see Booth and Nsabagasani, 2005). 
This coordination problem is made worse by Uganda’s decentralization process. In 1992, 
Uganda embarked on an extensive decentralisation process in order to reform its local 
government (LG) system (LG are composed of districts, Municipal Councils and City Divisions). This 
reform was intended to promote democratization, improve service provision and reduce poverty. 
District LGs are, by law, in charge of providing budget and development plans for the districts and 
monitoring frontline service delivery. They are also in charge of reporting on their expenses and 
achievements. Districts must ensure that the minimum standards of quality and procedures 
established by the line ministries are respected. However, the low capacity of many LGs threatens 
the overall budget production process. 
b) Official data production and collection 
Following the introduction of performance-based management in Uganda’s public sector, tools 
and devices to produce and collect performance data were developed. The performance data 
used in management and accountability consist of two types: data produced by the Uganda 
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Bureau of Statistics, and data produced by various management information systems of the 
different line ministries.50 
The Uganda Bureau of Statistics produce data based on periodic surveys and censuses – 
such as Demographic Health Surveys, National Service Delivery Surveys, National Household 
Surveys and National Panel Surveys – which, by nature, are not annual (apart from the National 
Panel Surveys, which are supposed to be conducted every year). Although these data are useful in 
providing a snapshot of the state of the country on a periodic basis (every four to five years), this 
periodicity make them unsuitable for annual or bi-annual monitoring. 
They are therefore complemented by data produced on a continuous basis by the 
different management information systems of line ministries, which are supposed to provide data 
for monitoring, evaluation and performance management. These systems, however, face several 
important challenges (Interviews; Hauge et al., 2002, 2003, 2004; Booth and Nsabagasani, 2005; 
MoLG, 2009), and the data they provide are considered to be of poor quality. The funding 
required to actually collect the data is usually lacking, which means that even if the ministers and 
local governments are equipped with the computers and internet connections needed to collect 
and send the data to the database, there is no one to actually enter the data into the computers. 
In addition, the level of education and specific technical training of the people using these 
systems, especially at the local level, is weak at best and often non-existent. The attention to 
detail required to collect and produce accurate data from the field is therefore often lacking, 
which in turn negatively affect the quality of the data available for the monitoring process. This is 
made worse by the very hazy definition of the data to collect, which also varies from one system 
to another, meaning that aggregation of data is often difficult if not impossible.  
Better coordination and harmonization between the different systems is often called for, 
according to many observers and actors within these systems. In Uganda, the administration has 
to face up to 14 different types of monitoring and evaluation systems (Hauge and Mackay, 
2004:2). Hauge (2003:29) estimates that, in the sectors of primary education, health and water, 
district-level civil-servants have to collect an average of 300,000 data entries per year. 
Consequently, the human resources required to efficiently operate such a huge network of data 
collection, production and distribution are considerable, challenging already ill-equipped and 
                                                            
50 HMIS (Health Management Information System) for the health sector, EMIS (Education Management Information 
System) for the education sector, DWD to monitor water points and sources, CIS (Community Information System) to 
collect household-oriented information, and several other complementary systems from other ministries, agencies and 
donor projects. 
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rather disorganised institutions. Finally, although some data are collected, they are rarely diffused 
among the different actors who could make good use of them. Ministries, ministerial departments 
and local governments usually do not have easy access to these data. 
c) Performance-based contracting and management 
In an attempt to more tightly link the work of civil servants to the performance of the public 
sector, the GoU has recently, in its official discourse on accountability and performance 
management, pushed its ROM programme one step further. The ROM approach rests on a ‘results 
framework’ for every organisation, which should include a mission statement, clear objectives, 
key outputs and performance indicators. Budget Framework Papers for all sectors are supposed 
to be ‘ROM-compliant’ (Wyatt, 2008: 29). This means that the expenditures planned in the budget 
should be directly linked to performance targets, which can then be broken down into ministerial, 
organizational and individual performance. In the wake of this reform, on July 2010, performance 
contracts were introduced for the first time between accounting officers and the Permanent 
Secretaries of the Ministries of Local Government (MoLG) and Public Service. Performance 
contracts have needed to be signed every year since July 2010 (Republic of Uganda, 2010b): 
 Between Permanent Secretaries of all the ministries and the Head of the Public Service 
 Between the Permanent Secretary of the MoLG and the municipal Town Clerk or district 
Chief Administrative Officer. Chief Administrative Officers and Town Clerks have to 
choose two performance indicators from the development plans of their local 
governments, on which their performance is assessed. 
Sanctions and rewards should accompany these performance contracts (Republic of 
Uganda, 2010b), which are meant to be progressively extended throughout the whole public 
service (Republic of Uganda, 2010a).  
Another form of performance-based management exists in the Ministry of Local 
Government. The Inspection Department of the MoLG annually assesses the performance of LGs 
and provides a classification of the different districts according to three categories: ‘reward’, 
‘static’ ‘penalty.’ The measured performance and ability of the LGs to meet a set of minimal 
requirements is considered representative of their ability to manage financial grants from the 
central government. Based on this assessment, financial rewards or sanctions are applied to the 
different LGs. 
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However, the limits of both systems soon became clear. As far as performance contracts 
are concerned, the actual motivation of the public servants is very low. There is little room for 
upward mobility – which is, in any case, not determined by the performance of the employees – 
and the salaries being low, it is very common to see civil servants doing several jobs at once and 
therefore dedicating little time to their work in the public service. Overall the sanctions and 
rewards linked to good or poor performance represent a very limited part of a public servant’s 
income, and therefore they do very little to actually motivate them. 
As far as the performance of the districts is concerned, the result is to some extend 
counter-productive. . Indeed, the same districts tend to be regularly rewarded or punished. It 
seems that the well-performing districts are already the richest, and their employees tend to be 
the best educated. Conversely, in the poorest districts the level of education of the civil servants is 
very low, making it more challenging for the district to meet the performance targets since most 
are process-oriented and aimed at determining whether the districts have the capacity to manage 
the funds they receive (ACODE, 2010).51 It is therefore the poorest districts, and the ones least 
likely to attract educated civil servants, which are penalized while the most attractive are 
rewarded, although the former are more in need of capacity building and additional funding. 
1.3. Vertical and diagonal accountability mechanisms 
As previously mentioned, accountability can be separated into horizontal, vertical and diagonal 
accountability. Horizontal accountability is essentially enforced by the organisations and agencies 
mentioned in the previous section. As a reminder, vertical accountability designates mechanisms 
such as elections, by which citizens control governments, and diagonal accountability (see chapter 
II, section 3.2) refers to situations in which civil society representatives perform horizontal 
accountability functions instead of or together with dedicated agencies. This section addresses 
vertical and diagonal mechanisms of accountability.  
Together with the auditing function of the Office of the Auditor General, the national 
auditing process in Uganda provides potentially powerful tools for vertical and diagonal 
                                                            
51 The performance indicators used are as follows: Quality of the Development Plan; Staff Functional Capacity; 
Monitoring and Mentoring (LGTPC Performance); Capacity Building Performance; Communication and Accountability 
Performance; Budget Allocation Performance; Procurement Capacity and Performance; Local Revenue Performance; 
Gender Mainstreaming Performance; Operation and Maintenance; Council, Executive and Committee; Council Sector 
Committees; Functionality of Education Dept.; Functionality of Health Directorate; Functionality of Water Dept.; 
Functionality of Works Dept.; Functionality of Production Dept.; Functionality of Environment Dept.; HIV/AIDS 
Mainstreaming; and LOGICS Monitoring system (MoLG, 2010). 
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accountability. The keen interest of the media in reports from the Office of the Auditor General 
and Public Account Committee, as well as in corruption scandals, helps increase the pressure on 
accounting officers (Wyatt, 2008: 28). It is through this channel that the most recent scandal 
involving high-ranking civil servants from the Office of the Prime Minister became public, 
triggering an international outcry. The discovery, by the Auditor General, of illicit bank transfers 
into the private bank accounts of senior officials is tangible proof of the contribution of this 
institution to accountability. However, as mentioned in chapter II (section 3), two aspects of 
accountability must be distinguished: answerability and enforceability. Asking civil servants to 
account for their behaviour is one thing (answerability), but being able to actually sanction 
wrongdoing is another (enforceability). As in previous corruption scandals, the final decision rests 
in the hands of the judges in charge of investigating the case. It is the judiciary system which will, 
in the end, make the accountability system succeed or fail. 
However, publicising corruption or the performance results of public institutions is useless 
if it cannot be relayed by civil society and the press. As far as freedom of information and 
transparency is concerned, Article 41 of the Constitution, reinforced by the Access to Information 
Act of 2005, guarantees to every citizen the right to access any information in the possession of 
the state. This should, in theory, make room for public pressure on government officials to 
provide efficient services and carefully monitor public expenses. However, in practice, access to 
information is difficult and costly, and can require a lot of patience.52 
In addition, the NGO Freedom House, which publishes reports on press freedom, classifies 
Uganda as having a ‘partly free’ press. Although the Constitution provides for freedom of 
expression, several laws enacted in the name of national security have, in practice, constrained 
press freedom. Moreover, the NGO reports that “the government regularly uses security agents to 
harass, intimidate, and detain journalists who are critical of the government or the President.” 
However, it also acknowledges that the “state-run print media have gained a reputation for 
editorial independence despite the fact that many of their top editors are selected by government 
officials. In fact, the state-owned New Vision has reported critically about the government so 
regularly that the President has on occasion threatened to fire the paper’s editors.”53 
Consequently, it is likely that data on government performance and effectiveness could be used 
                                                            
52 Global Integrity Report for Uganda, 2009 assessment. http://report.globalintegrity.org/Uganda/2009/scorecard/15 
(last access on September 10th, 2010). 
53 Both citations from Freedom House, Press Freedom 2009 edition. 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2009 (last access on September 10th, 2010). 
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to feed critical opinions on government actions and could spark public debate on government 
policies. 
Finally, the Constitution of 1995 and related legislation provide ample room – in theory - 
for civil society participation in decision making and monitoring of government activity.54 The 
Local Government Act of 1997 and its subsequent amendments affirm democratic participation in 
decision-making, planning and budgeting. Several NGOs, including the Uganda Debt Network, 
which is presented and studied next, strive to foster local participation. The Uganda Debt Network 
runs a Community Based Monitoring and Evaluation System in several districts of Uganda, based 
on a network of community monitors. However, these initiatives depend largely on external 
funding from development agencies or international NGOs, and therefore lack autonomy and 
sustainability. A study carried out by the Operations Evaluation Department of the African 
Development Bank ranks ‘civil society participation’ sixth on its list of gaps identified in PRSP 
M&E, emphasizing the limited stakeholder engagement in accountability systems as well as the 
over-centralisation of decision making (Taylor-Powell, 2006). 
The budget process in Uganda is a good example, at least on paper, of how the different 
horizontal, vertical and diagonal accountability mechanisms are organized to lead to better 
accountability. The process is defined in the Budget Act of 2001 and the Public Finance and 
Accountability Act of 2003, both of which incorporate so-called ‘best practices’ in public sector 
budgeting and financial management. The MoFPED proposes the budget, which is then reviewed 
and endorsed by the Cabinet. The national budget is then approved by the National Parliament 
and the Office of the Auditor General, as well as the different parliamentary committees in charge 
of auditing the expenditures made under each national budget. In addition, the budget process is 
meant to be participative. Each annual budget cycle, which starts in October, involves different 
consultative workshops at various levels. These include a local government budget framework 
workshop at the local government level, where local communities, NGOs and CBOs are supposed 
to be consulted and to play an active role in the production of the Local Government and Sector 
Budget Framework Papers which are subsequently aggregated to produce the national budget.55 
                                                            
54 Article 17 (1)(i): “It is the duty of every citizen of Uganda to combat corruption and misuse or wastage of public 
property” 
Article 38 (1): “Every Ugandan has a right to participate in the affairs of government, individually or through his or her 
representatives in accordance with the law”. 
Article 38 (2): “Every Ugandan has a right to participate in peaceful activities to influence the policies of government 
through civic organisations”. 
55 See Annex 1 for a diagram of the entire budget cycle. 
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In theory, there is space for citizens to engage in accountability mechanisms. However, 
the question remains whether citizens or CSOs actually use this space. To what extent do they 
take part in the budgeting and budget-monitoring process? To what extent do they use the 
publicly available performance data produced by the government? What type of performance 
data do they used in the course of their monitoring process? The study of the CBMES initiative, 
presented next, provides answers to these questions. 
2. The CBMES initiative: history and principles 
2.1. From Poverty Action Fund Monitoring Committees to the CBMES 
In 2002, UDN changed its strategy and renamed its monitoring committees ‘Community-Based 
Monitoring and Evaluation Systems.’ The reasons for this change are twofold. Firstly, the PAF 
Monitoring Committees operated at the district level; for the actual monitoring activities they 
relied on individual volunteers at the local level, who monitored public services within their 
communities on a punctual basis. These individual volunteers operated without any institutional 
back-up and with very little legitimacy, and were often considered to be ‘trouble-makers’ rather 
than legitimate representatives of civil society. As a result most stopped volunteering with UDN 
for fear of being ostracised. Secondly, monitoring activities did not take place on a continuous 
basis and were not deemed very efficient. The problems identified by the PAF Monitoring 
Committees were very local in nature and therefore not very relevant at the district level, and 
even less so at the national level. 
Consequently, the CBMES initiative was designed to operate on a continuous basis at the 
local level, through a large group of community monitors who could gain acceptability and 
legitimacy through prolonged work and interaction with local government officials and civil 
servants. Today the CBMES managed by UDN is operational in 20 districts in Uganda (see Annex 2 
for a map of Uganda showing the districts in which UDN operates). In each of these districts, the 
CBMES depends on Community Based Organisations (CBOs) legally independent from UDN, which 
recruit the community monitors from the district. In each district where UDN operates, the 
CBMES is present in a few sub-counties. In order to make each monitoring group independent 
there is one CBO per district in most districts where UDN operates, except in Amuria and Katakwi 
districts. In these districts CBOs have been created at the sub-county level. In a few other districts, 
which have been split following the official creation of new districts in July 2010, community 
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monitors still belong to the CBO which existed before the division, and several districts therefore 
depend on a single CBO (for the detailed list of CBOs and districts where UDN operates see Annex 
5). 
On paper monitoring activities within the CBMES are supposed to be conducted on a 
continuous basis, all year round. Monitors, as members of the local community, are expected to 
constantly observe the delivery of services (in terms of health, education, roads and infrastructure 
or the NAADS programme56) in their areas and to regularly collect data about public service 
quality. Each of the monitors receives training on how to collect the data required to monitor the 
quality of local service delivery. 
Based on this continuous monitoring, two phases of feedback are planned every year. The 
first phase is supposed to take place around May / June and the second around November / 
December. The results of each phase are presented in a hand-written report which is transmitted 
from the sub-county to the headquarters of the community monitors’ CBO. In addition, the 
findings of the monitoring activities are presented to sub-county officials and the public during a 
so-called ‘sub-county dialogue’, giving the opportunity to members of the local communities to 
ask questions and share their views with the monitors and government officials, and allowing the 
sub-county officials to justify and defend themselves should they be accused of mistakes or 
wrongdoing. Community monitors operate on a voluntary basis, which means that they do not 
receive a salary for their monitoring activities. However, they receive allowances for the travel 
expenses they incur during each of these two rounds of monitoring. 
Once the monitoring reports written at the sub-county level are received at the CBO 
headquarters, the findings they contain are analysed, sorted, verified if required and compiled 
into a typed report which is then sent to UDN in Kampala and the district officials. The findings are 
then supposed to be presented to the public through what is called a ‘district dialogue’ during 
which, as with sub-county dialogues, members of the public and local officials can express 
themselves. 
Finally, a national dialogue is held in Kampala. Community monitors from all over the 
country gather in Kampala to produce a ‘policy statement’ in which are presented the policy-
related problems encountered by community monitors during their monitoring activities. The 
policy statement is then presented to the relevant parliamentary committees. 
                                                            
56 National Agricultural Advisory Services – NAADS – is a programme of the Government of Uganda aiming at 
modernising agriculture through the provision of advisory services to subsistence farmers in Uganda. 
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2.2. Creation of a CBO, selection and training of community monitors 
The first step in establishing a group of community monitors consists of identifying the district and 
sub-counties in which to put it. First, a Community Based Organisation has to be officially created 
and recognised by the local government. This CBO, legally independent from UDN, can be created 
by members of the local community who want to engage in monitoring activities or by members 
of the local government who want to have a group of monitors in their district.57 As the person in 
charge of the CBMES initiative at UDN headquarters in Kampala puts it, “it’s a pull factor and not 
push”, implying that it’s not UDN which decides where to start a community monitoring group, 
but rather the local community itself. This “pull factor” is seen as being of prime importance for 
the success of the project, as it guarantees the ownership of the CBMES and therefore the 
motivation of its members. 
Following the creation of the local CBO, UDN is invited to the district. UDN officials start 
by introducing their work and their project of community monitoring to the district officials (the 
Resident District Commissioner (the representative of the President), the District Internal Security 
Officer and the Chief Administrative Officer). It is important that community monitors be 
accepted and known by the highest ranking officials or it may be difficult for them to access the 
data required for effective monitoring, such as sub-county budgets and plans, or the stage of 
development and implementation of different government-sponsored programmes. 
Following the introduction of UDN and the community monitoring programme to the 
district officials, a public presentation takes place introducing to the public what community 
monitoring consists of and what community monitors can do to improve the quality of service 
delivery in their communities. Particular emphasis is put on the constitutional rights of community 
monitors to operate and engage in monitoring activities. The presentation is followed by a call for 
volunteers, and UDN representatives subsequently proceed to the selection of community 
monitors at the sub-county level. This selection is based essentially on the reputation of the 
volunteers as well as on their current involvement in the local community. The selected 
community monitors must “command respect in the community”, as well as demonstrating high 
levels of integrity. In addition, the selected community monitors must be able to read, write and 
speak English, mainly because the government policies are written in English and because during 
the course of their monitoring activities they might have to interact with civil servants who do not 
                                                            
57 This was the case in the Amuria District. 
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speak the local language. The final list of community monitors is then submitted to the elected 
sub-county chief for his approval. 
Once the community monitors have been selected, they are trained for a week. During 
this training they are introduced to different government programmes such as universal primary 
education, universal secondary education, primary health care, the NAADS programme, waste 
and sanitation, and rural feeder roads. They are also taught what citizens of Uganda have the right 
to expect from the government in terms of public services, as well as what their constitutional 
rights are. They are then trained to collect data during field visits and use performance indicators, 
as well as other sources of information they can access (local officials, public displays, attendance 
books and the like). They are finally taught about how to write monitoring reports and organise 
them according to objectives, sectors, findings and recommendations. After this formal and 
theoretical training, community monitors undertake their first monitoring session under the 
supervision and guidance of the more experienced UDN trainers. At the end of this week-long 
training the first sub-county dialogue is organized, gathering together community monitors, 
members of the local community and sub-county officials. From then on the new CBO is ready to 
start its activities of community monitoring, submit its monitoring reports and organise its sub-
county and district dialogues. 
2.3. Managerial content in UDN’s approach to community monitoring 
The very mission of UDN, “*t+o promote and advocate for pro-poor policies and full participation of 
poor people in influencing poverty-focused policies, monitoring the utilization of public resources 
and ensuring that borrowed and national resources are prudently managed in an open, 
accountable and transparent manner so as to benefit the Ugandan people”, is expressed in terms 
in line with the managerial model of social accountability introduced in chapter II. ‘Popular 
participation’, ‘management’, ‘monitoring’, ‘accountability’ and ‘transparency’ are at the core of 
the organisation’s mission, as they are for the managerial approach. 
The CBMES initiative has, on paper (see UDN, 2009a; UDN, 2009b), adopted most of the 
main elements of the managerialist vocabulary and approach to social accountability. The CBMES, 
as introduced by a UDN representative in an international workshop in Porto Alegre, is “an 
approach for engaging communities in continuous monitoring and evaluation of government 
programmes. It is a process aimed at mobilising communities to participate fully and effectively in 
identifying and monitoring the quality of delivery of public services. It involves people at the 
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grassroots to measure the performance of government programmes, their relevance and impact 
on the community” (Lukwago, 2004:10). The elements of ‘continuous monitoring’, ‘evaluation’, 
‘programmes’, ‘quality of public services’, ‘performance measures’ and ‘impact’ are central to this 
description of the CBMES initiative. 
Similar language is used in UDN’s sourcebook, “A Sourcebook for Community-Based 
Monitoring and Evaluation System”: “the CBMES process is a joint effort between insiders (the 
community) and the outsiders (CSOs – that usually play the role of facilitator, and local 
governments) that work together to ensure that the programmes, projects and activities planned 
by the central government and the local governments are relevant, transparent and accountable 
and reflect value for money in meeting the desired set goals and objectives” (my emphasis) (UDN, 
2009a: 4). In this approach performance measurement and indicators are considered to be 
powerful tools for community monitoring. In UDN’s sourcebook, several pages are dedicated to 
performance indicators (UDN, 2009a: 56-62). Input, output, outcome and impact indicators are 
defined, as well as direct and indirect indicators.  
The activity of community monitors is defined using the following definitions of 
‘monitoring’ and ‘evaluation’: “[m]onitoring is the systematic collection of information about the 
progress a social, economic or political activity to determine whether it is on or off course. 
Monitoring is used to determine whether a project, programme or activity is meeting its set 
objectives, aims or intended outcomes”; “[e]valuation is an assessment of whether an activity 
meant to produce certain results has met its intended objectives, i.e. whether it has achieved the 
expected results or impact.” These activities of monitoring and evaluation are to rely on a 
“Community Monitoring Tool” which should match “the general framework within which a more 
defined Community Monitoring Tool should be designed”, presented below (UDN, 2009a:59): 
Stage of 
monitoring 
Purpose for 
monitoring 
Key 
indicators 
Who to 
monitor? 
When to 
monitor? 
How to 
monitor? 
When to submit 
reports? 
Submit to 
whom? 
The Community Monitoring Tool allows for “data collection”, and later on “data analysis”, 
defined as “a process of organizing, modelling, and interpreting collected data with the aim of 
highlighting useful information based on evidence. Data analysis is carried out to answer the 
objectives of data collection. Data analysis helps one to come up with evidence on the topic of 
concern, suggestions, conclusions and supporting decision making” (UDN, 2009a:61). 
This approach to community monitoring is further emphasised during workshops and 
trainings where, again, performance indicators are introduced and explained, the Community 
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Monitoring Tool is further detailed and the importance of collecting unambiguous pieces of 
evidence underlined. UDN’s approach to community monitoring therefore appears to be strongly 
influenced by managerialist semantics, and the CBMES initiative is a good case study for 
understanding how the managerialist approach to social accountability is operationalized in 
developing countries. 
3. Framework for investigating the CBMES initiative 
3.1. Operationalising the structurational model: two lines of inquiry 
The main idea behind managerial models of social accountability is that making performance data 
available to civil society (principle of transparency) allows citizens to hold organisations in the 
public sector accountable for the quality of the service they provide (principles of participation, 
quantification and transparency). Performance data, to be reliable and useful, should consist 
essentially of quantified performance data which can be linked to performance targets and 
expenses informed by the national and, when applicable, local budget (principle of 
quantification). This constitutes the ‘ideal world’ as depicted or expected by donors and 
international development institutions. The study of the CBMES aims at assessing to what extent 
the observer can identify a disjuncture between this ‘ideal world’ and the actual effects of the 
CBMES initiative. 
To do so, the CBMES is analysed using the structurational model of PMAS introduced in 
chapter IV and its related concepts, structures of domination, legitimation and signification. 
Within the framework of the structurational model of PMAS the ‘ideal world’ of managerial social 
accountability can be represented by two major assumptions. Firstly, it is indirectly expected that 
such social accountability systems will help overcome the normal hierarchical differences 
(structures of domination) between potentially powerful and educated civil servants on the one 
hand, and the lay person from the local community on the other, the latter being very often a 
subsistence farmer with little education or social standing in his community; social accountability 
systems are expected to make the former accountable to the latter. Secondly, it is considered that 
the use of objective and quantified performance data will play an active role in this process, 
thanks to the fact that measures “cannot lie” and are considered to be reliable evidence of the 
quality of the public services provided. It is therefore expected that objective and quantified 
performance measures will modify the existing structures of legitimation and signification, placing 
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at the core of local-level power relationships the notion of performance and quality of service 
delivery. 
Based on these two assumptions, two lines of inquiry are followed in order to empirically 
reveal the modification of the structures of domination, legitimation and signification following 
the introduction of the CBMES. 
3.2. 1st line of inquiry: Producing performance data 
The first line of inquiry focuses on the production of performance data. It will analyse the 
characteristics of the monitors and monitoring activities as well as the performance data 
produced by community monitors. These performance data are then compared to performance 
indicators used by local government officials. 
The study will examine what they are currently, but will also aim at identifying what changes have 
taken place throughout the years the CBMES has been operating since 2008. These changes will 
provide insights on how the managerial approach of the CBMES is progressively modified and 
adapted by community monitors to fit their own motivations and expectations, as well as the 
constraints of the context in which they operate. This first line of enquiry is driven by the 
assumption that who the community monitors are, as well as the choice of the activities to 
monitor and the nature of the monitoring activities, reflects the existing structures of domination 
which constrain community monitors. Changes over time since the creation of the CBMES 
initiative in the Iganga District will also provide valuable insight into the progressive modification 
of these structures of domination. The selection and nature of monitoring activities is therefore a 
good entry point for investigating the entire web of informal relationships and hierarchies in 
which the social actors involved in the CBMES are embedded. 
In theory, community monitors are supposed to monitor activities based on the 
correspondence between the performance achieved and the expenses planned in the budget 
(UDN, 2009:44-50). In practice, community monitors cannot monitor all the programmes and 
activities; they must select which they want to monitor. They have the choice to monitor either 
specific projects such as the construction of a new school or a new health centre, or to monitor 
the quality of public services in general (the quality of the education received by the pupils, the 
literacy rate within the local community, the birth rate in health centres, etc.). They could also 
chose to monitor any other element, such as the behaviour of civil servants, the corruption of 
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local policemen, the attendance of teachers in schools or the amount charged in health centres. 
Understanding what activities or types of projects are most frequently monitored and for what 
reasons is helpful in understanding the local context of power relationship between the different 
actors, and their motivation. 
Managerial social accountability proponents assume that community monitors should 
focus mainly on monitoring the quality of the services provided at the community level, with a 
particular focus on ‘quality’ as it is understood to be the outcomes of public organisations. 
However, two elements can attract community monitors’ interest in monitoring other aspects of 
the activities of public service: firstly, monitoring the quality of services may lead to the 
opposition of powerful civil servants, so that community monitors choose to monitor activities 
which do not lead to confrontation with them; secondly, it may appear that community monitors 
are not primarily interested in monitoring the quality of public service but prefer to use their 
position as community monitors to champion other causes, such as corruption or respect for 
individual rights, for example, which could give them more prominence within the local 
community. Even though corruption and respect for individual rights can be considered to be 
indirectly linked to the performance of public services, they are not at the core of the managerial 
approach. Therefore, the particular focus of community monitors on one of these two aspects 
would show that the local understanding of community monitoring significantly differs from the 
expectations of the managerial approach, and that community monitors understand the concept 
of ‘quality of public service’ in a different way. 
3.3. 2nd line of inquiry: Discussion and negotiation around performance data 
The second line of inquiry is motivated by the so-called ‘objective’ nature of performance 
measurement. Two different but complementary dimensions are investigated, both pertaining to 
the process of building sense and legitimacy. They are therefore related to the structures of 
legitimation and signification constraining the individuals involved in the process of community 
monitoring. The first dimension is linked to the idea that quantitative performance assessment 
provides an objective account of reality. Part of this line of inquiry consists of determining the 
power of persuasion and legitimation of quantified performance indicators as a particular type of 
evidence, particularly when it comes to judging the performance of a public organisation. The role 
that performance indicators play in mobilizing support for action and change within the public 
service is also of particular interest. It is also linked to the understanding of ‘performance 
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indicators’ that prevails among the different actors involved in the process of social 
accountability. This line of inquiry is directly justified by the central role played by quantified 
performance measurement in managerial approaches to social accountability. As mentioned 
previously, at the heart of these approaches rests the idea that quantified performance data are 
objective, and therefore more persuasive, convincing and accurate than qualitative accounts. It is 
necessary to understand why this is or is not the case, and to what extent this type of data is 
contested, on which grounds and by which actors. 
This leads to the second dimension of this second line of inquiry. Stewart and Walsh 
(1994) (see chapter IV, section 1.3) consider performance assessment as a judicial activity, in 
which light must be shed on possible wrongdoing or cases of mismanagement. Behind this 
particular understanding of performance assessment lies the idea that no “piece of evidence” 
stands as an objective fact per se. A piece of evidence is always located within a given context; it is 
the consequence of the acts of a particular individual with specific motivations and alliances 
within his social network. To be accepted in a court of justice, for example, a piece of evidence 
must have been collected according to very stringent requirements so as not to be tampered 
with. It is only if these requirements have been met that the piece of evidence can be examined 
and will be added to a chain of events which can eventually lead to the conviction of a suspect. 
Even when the piece of evidence is accepted, it is subsequently discussed by the different parties 
involved in the trial before being used, finally, to reach a verdict. 
It can be argued that when dealing with performance indicators, the process is very 
similar: performance indicators, to be accepted, must have been produced according to a method 
which is considered to produce reliable and valid data. Once the performance data is considered 
valid, then it is necessary to understand how it fits within the chain of cause-consequences linking 
the work of civil servants to the measured performance. This explanation is likely to be contested, 
each stakeholder bringing in arguments to back his or her point of view. For example, two types of 
performance indicators can be distinguished at the local level: indicators which are produced by 
the state apparatus (through the management systems of the different ministries), which are 
supposed to be public and could be used by community monitors to hold government officials 
accountable; and indicators that community monitors define themselves for their own monitoring 
activities. The way these different indicators are accessed and used in the monitoring process and 
the types of alliances which are made between community monitors and other actors – elected 
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councillors or members of school management committees, for example – are representative of 
the social mechanisms behind the operationalization of the CBMES initiative. 
Finally, the last stage of the monitoring process consists of advocacy and lobbying in order 
to induce change and hold government officials accountable. It is therefore important to 
understand how the advocacy and lobbying processes unfold, how local government officials 
receive the reports of community monitors and what decisions are subsequently taken based on 
the performance data reported. Furthermore, as mentioned above, enforcing accountability is of 
prime importance in accountability relationships. It is therefore also important to understand how 
the performance reports produced by community monitors allow them to use existing horizontal 
and vertical accountability mechanisms – direct access to members of Parliament, local elections, 
courts of justice, ombudsman, etc. – to ensure that community monitoring actually leads to 
sanctions or changes. The success or failure of community monitoring depends on the ability of 
community monitors to convince enough actors, or at least the most important ones, of the 
validity of their complaints, and build a web of support among the different stakeholders which is 
strong enough to overcome vested interests. This web of support is likely to be built progressively 
throughout the monitoring process through negotiation and discussion, in which some sort of 
quantified performance measurements can play a role. This research therefore needs to identify 
all the different elements which, linked together in a causal chain, provide a “thick interpretation” 
of the mechanisms underpinning community monitoring activities, how the process of gathering 
evidence unfolds, and how alliances between the different stakeholders are produced, modified 
and broken. 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the Ugandan context of the CBMES initiative. The first section 
described the process of managerialisation of accountability in Uganda, as the result of pressure 
applied by donors and international development agencies. The main horizontal and vertical 
accountability institutions operating in Uganda were then described. 
The second section introduced the CBMES initiative, its genesis and the way the system is 
supposed to unfold and operate according to its designers. The managerial content in the CBMES 
was then singled out in order to justify the use of this case study as a representative example of 
managerial social accountability. 
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Finally, the third section presented how the structurational model of PMAS will be 
applied, in the next chapter, to analyse the CBMES initiative. Two lines of inquiry were identified: 
first, the main characteristics of the community monitors and the nature of the monitoring 
activities will be analysed. Second, the processes of discussion and negotiation around 
performance data will be detailed. These two lines of enquiry will be used to reveal how the 
structures of domination, legitimation and signification constrain and enable the work of 
community monitors, and how they have evolved since the introduction of the CBMES initiative in 
the Iganga District of Uganda. 
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Chapter VI - THE CBMES IN IGANGA DISTRICT: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE FIELD 
This chapter now turns to the analysis of the CBMES initiative. The research focuses on 
one particular district, the district of Iganga. In the Iganga district, the researcher has closely 
followed the work of a selection of community monitors belonging to the community-based 
organisation Grassroot Action for Progress (GAP), which gathers together all the community 
monitors trained by UDN in the Iganga District. GAP operates in a total of eight sub-counties.58 
This chapter is organized as follows: the first section focuses on the characteristics of 
community monitors and monitoring activities. It provides insight into who the community 
monitors are and what their motivation is to get involved in the CBMES programme, before 
focusing on the monitoring activities per se. It corresponds to the first line of enquiry mentioned 
in the previous chapter. Two dimensions of community monitoring are introduced and discussed. 
Finally, the link between community monitoring and the wider framework of accountability 
institutions is discussed based on the findings from the fieldwork. 
The second section focuses on the processes of discussion and negotiation of 
performance data between community monitors and local government representatives. The 
different understandings of the notions of ‘performance’ and ‘indicators’ are discussed, as well as 
understandings of accountability, answerability and enforceability. This corresponds to the 
second line of enquiry mentioned in the previous chapter. 
The third section draws on the two lines of enquiry aforementioned to explain the 
dynamic behind the operationalization of the CBMES. Using the structurational model of PMAS, 
this last section offers an explanation for the disjuncture observed between the order of 
managerial social accountability and what is observed in the field.  
1. 1st line of inquiry: producing performance data 
1.1. Who are community monitors and why do they get involved? 
In these eight sub-counties UDN has trained around two hundred community monitors – about 
twenty-five per sub-county. At the time of the research, more than half these community 
                                                            
58 GAP operates in a total of eight sub-counties, six of which are in Iganga District and two of which are in the newly 
created Luuka District. Following the division in 2010 of some larger districts into smaller ones, two sub-counties 
formerly part of Iganga District in which GAP used to operate now belong to Luuka District.  
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monitors had stopped their monitoring activities, or had never really started them. Since 
community monitoring is voluntary work, community monitors do not receive any money and get 
only small allowances for their monitoring activities. Community monitors often feel that working 
under these conditions is discouraging, and most of them cannot find the time for community 
monitoring, the objectives of which are often not tangible enough for them to see the importance 
of the work. It is, however, UDN policy not to pay the community monitors for their work in order 
to ensure that the local communities really own the CBMES initiative. Among the remaining active 
community monitors, the actual involvement in monitoring activities varies widely, from constant 
involvement and strong motivation to occasional contribution to monitoring. It is estimated that 
there are no more than eighty regularly active community monitors in GAP. 
Most of the community monitors are subsistence farmers. They grow their own food to 
feed their families and engage in occasional business transactions59 to get the cash necessary to 
buy indispensable products such as cooking oil, sugar, salt and soap. A few of them describe 
themselves as “businessmen” when they have a commercial activity on the side – mainly buying 
and selling seeds or fertilizer in addition to their work as farmers, or selling products in a small 
booth or shop in the nearby trading centre. All community monitors have families with several 
children. Almost all of them have between 5 and 17 children; only one has 2 children. Community 
monitors are between 29 and 68 years of age60 (the average age varies a lot from sub-county to 
sub-county) and their level of education ranges from P7 (Primary 7)61 to S6 (Senior 6), except for 
one community monitor who went to university and earned a diploma in theology. Only three of 
them completed secondary education and reached S6 (A level); six reached S4 (O level) and 5 
reached S2. Most of them are able to hold a basic conversation in English. 
A large number of the community monitors interviewed decided to engage in community 
monitoring in order to fight corruption. Before being involved, they were all aware that a lot of 
money was supposedly given to the sub-counties by the central government, but they found it 
difficult to see how that money was actually used. Tibenkana John, 42, was a parish councillor 
before becoming a community monitor. As a parish councillor, he noticed that most of the funds 
sent to the sub-county by the central government were not properly used. He decided to “get 
                                                            
59 Based on a survey of 19 community monitors in 4 sub-counties of Iganga District. 
60 Below 30 years of age (included): 2; between 31 and 40: 5; between 41 to 49: 6 monitors; above 50: 6 monitors. 
61 In Uganda primary education lasts 7 years, from P1 to P7. It is then followed by secondary education, which ranges 
from S1 to S6. A nation-wide exam takes place at the end of P7, the PLE – Primary Leaving Examination. Secondary 
education is sanctioned by two exams: O level and A level, at the end of S4 and S6 respectively. 
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involved to secure some money for the local community” and prevent contractors from doing 
“shoddy work.” The expression “shoddy work” is very frequently used by community monitors, 
which attests to the frequent occurrence of this type of problem. Ivulabe Stephen, a 45 year-old 
community monitor and supporter of President Museveni from Bulamagi sub-county, decided to 
get involved in community monitoring as early as 2003 – even before the CBMES initiative was 
launched – because, he says, “I do not want some corruption in the government I support.” This 
support for the President is widespread among the community monitors, and often comes with a 
strong distrust and suspicion of public servants at the local level. The President is perceived to be 
someone who cares for his people, while local public servants are often considered to be corrupt 
and stealing the money the President has dedicated to them. When they do not directly mention 
corruption, monitors talk about the different services which, according to what they have heard, 
are offered to them by the government, such as free primary education for all, free primary 
health care for all and advisory services in agriculture. They “wanted to know if these things are 
real things” as Mukwaya Mohamed, a 42 year-old community monitor from Buyanga sub-county, 
puts it. If they are real, most of the community monitors hope to help their government reach the 
intended beneficiaries of these services. 
1.2. Various aspects of community monitoring 
a) What is monitored? 
Community monitors are involved in the main development sectors, such as health (through the 
monitoring of health facilities at the county and sub-county levels (Health Centres II, III and IV)62 , 
education (primary schools), rural feeder roads, agriculture (especially the NAADS programme) 
and water and sanitation. The monitoring activities in which community monitors engage can be 
divided into the following categories of intervention: 1) controlling the “shoddy work” done by 
                                                            
62 The health system in Uganda works on a referral basis, as defined in the Ugandan government’s health policy. If a 
health facility cannot handle a case, the patient is referred to the health unit the next level up. 
At the village level are Village Health Teams, which refer to Health Centre II (HC) at the parish level. Each HC II serves a 
few thousand people and should have basic drugs, be able to treat common disease like malaria and provide antenatal 
care. An HC II is supposed to be led by a nurse assisted by a midwife, two nursing assistants and a health assistant. Every 
parish should have an HC II. HC II refers to HC III at the sub-county level. 
Every sub-county in Uganda should have an HC III with a general outpatient clinic, a maternity ward and a laboratory. 
HC III should have around 18 staff, led by a senior clinical officer. HC III at the sub-county level refers to HC IV at the 
county level. HC IV are mini-hospitals and should have a doctor, be able to admit patients and carry out emergency 
operations. 
Finally, each district should have a hospital, which refers to the national referral hospital in the capital city, Kampala. 
Community monitors in Iganga essentially monitor HC II, HC III and HC IV. 
In Iganga District there are 53 Health Units (1 hospital, 2 HC IV, 16 HC III and 34 HC II). 
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contractors in roads, schools and health centres; 2) important issues in health centres and 
schools, such as collapsed pit latrine, boreholes, walls and roofs of buildings and missing books; 3) 
the lack of respect for procedures and processes in the delivery of public services, such as 
attendance of the civil servants working in schools and health centres and the fees asked of 
patients or pupils when primary education and primary health care should be free; and finally 3) 
the lack of consideration or respect for students, parents or patients. 
Very few of these monitoring activities actually consist of controlling the work done by 
local government representatives, whether administrative staff or elected politicians. The 
procurement process and the detailed budget of the local government are beyond the reach of 
the community monitors, for reasons which will be introduced in section 3. Only on rare occasions 
are local government representatives held accountable for their actions, when a clear link 
between the shoddy work of a contractor and a mistake made by a local government 
representative can be established. In Iganga District such a situation occurred once, when 
community monitors reported that a new classroom built in a school was not finished. Windows, 
doors and wall plaster, among other things, were missing. However, the contractor had been paid 
in full, including the last payment, which is normally given only when the finished work has been 
checked. The District Engineer, Paul W., who is normally in charge of checking the work, had 
authorized the last payment. After a complaint was made to community monitors an investigation 
started and the results were brought to the local government. The District Engineer was 
considered responsible for not having checked that the work was finished, and had to pay for the 
plaster and the missing doors and windows. 
The different sectors in which community monitors are involved are also the sectors 
which local government officials – such as the Health District Officer and the Education District 
Officer – are in charge of. Other types of public services such as secondary education and main 
roads fall under the responsibility of the central government (for example most secondary schools 
are managed by the Ministry of Education and not by the district government) and are therefore 
not monitored by community monitors since communication and dialogue with government 
officials in Kampala is too complex, if not impossible. 
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b) Two dimensions of community monitoring 
 Continuous vs. punctual monitoring 
According to the initial idea of community monitoring promoted by UDN, community monitoring 
is supposed to be a continuous, steady task (Lukwago, 2004:4; interviews). Continuous monitoring 
activities of the different government services are to be punctuated by semi-annual reports 
submitted to UDN headquarters in Kampala, to be followed by sub-county and district dialogues 
which should take place every six months. However, in most cases monitoring activities are 
conducted on a punctual basis, whenever community monitors have enough money to pay for 
transport to reach the facility they want to monitor. 
The cost of transport is indeed very high. It is not uncommon for community monitors to 
have to pay 6000 Ugx63 to get to the facility they want to monitor, more or less the price of a meal 
with fish in a local restaurant64 (see Annex 9 for a map showing the places where monitors live 
and the location of the different places where monitoring activities take place). Moreover, even 
when a place to monitor is close to the residence of a monitor, community monitors may have to 
do the monitoring in groups in order to obtain the data they want or to be taken seriously. In 
addition, community monitors have to visit the headquarters regularly, and need to call other 
monitors on the phone to make appointments and organise meetings. It is difficult for community 
monitors who are, for the large part, subsistence farmers to pay for these expenses with their 
own money. Their farming generates very little of the cash that they need to cater for the daily 
needs of their families, and most often it goes into buying soap, flour, sugar, salt and oil. 
Consequently, in practice community monitors have to wait for the transport allowance 
paid by UDN headquarters a few weeks before the next community monitoring report is due so 
that they can actually visit the facilities they want to monitor. It is only when this money arrives at 
the local CBO that monitors can actually start their monitoring activities. 
 Complaint-driven vs. systematic monitoring 
Based on the monitoring activities conducted by the monitors, two different forms of community 
monitoring can be distinguished: complaint-driven monitoring and systematic monitoring.  
Complaint-driven monitoring corresponds to the monitoring of government services 
following complaints expressed by community members. As part of the local community, a 
                                                            
63 A little less than 2 euros. 
64 See Annex 6 for a list of the prices of some commodities. 
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monitor’s position is well known. NAADS advisors (the civil servants in charge of managing the 
local support to farmers under the NAADS project) sometimes refer to them to learn more about 
the needs of the local farmers and how the different groups supported are faring. A problem with 
the management of the local borehole might occur when some users do not pay the fees they 
should pay for the maintenance of the borehole or the person in charge of collecting the fees and 
maintaining the borehole is not using the money as he or she should. A teacher, head teacher or 
health worker might not show up for work or always arrives late. Perhaps parents are asked to 
pay for school fees or health care when teaching and primary health care should be free, and they 
are charged for drugs which should be given freely to them. Or a school management committee 
might have asked pupils’ parents for money to buy a new saucepan, but after a few months the 
saucepan is nowhere to be seen and neither is the money; or the pit latrines of a school have 
suddenly collapsed. It could be a newly-built classroom lacking chairs, tables or blackboards, or 
whose roof leaks.  
In all these cases community monitors are somehow informed about what is going on. 
Through their friends or families, or through unhappy villagers who happen to stop by GAP 
headquarters in Iganga – which they know about thanks to the weekly radio programme on 
community monitoring – word of these problems reaches them. When an opportunity arises for 
community monitors to inquire on-site about what is going on they collect evidence of the 
problem, often in the form of testimonies, photographs or data from attendance and accounting 
books, before reporting it and attempting to solve the issue at hand. This is done either directly 
with the local community or in partnership with local district and sub-county officials. 
Systematic monitoring corresponds to the systematic monitoring of government services, 
whether there are complaints or not. This type of monitoring is more in line with the spirit of 
community monitoring as conceived by UDN. In this type of monitoring, community monitors 
would randomly go to the schools or health centres within their community, and check various 
dimensions of their activities. For schools, they are usually instructed, during their training by 
UDN, to check the attendance of children, teachers and head teachers, the amount of money 
received from the government under the Universal Primary Education Programme, the presence 
of a school management committee and accountability book, the availability of text books, 
accommodation for teachers and meals for children. In health centres, they would check the 
availability of drugs, the number of patients coming to the centre, the attendance of health care 
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workers, and the state of the facility, which means whether access to clean water and electricity is 
available, or if the yard is properly fenced. 
The overall performance of a health centre or a school is better monitored through 
systematic monitoring, as it provides a general understanding of how the school or the centre 
performs in the long run according to various complementary aspects of its operating process. 
This is also the type of monitoring which could more easily use and rely on performance 
indicators, as opposed to complaint-driven monitoring which looks only at one problematic 
aspect. 
c) Explaining the shift from systematic monitoring towards complain-driven 
monitoring 
There has been an observable move from systematic monitoring to complaint-driven 
monitoring. In the first year of the CBMES in Iganga District, monitoring reports covered most of 
the schools and health centres within the different sub-counties and provided regular statistics 
about the different public services, the best informed being the ones on local schools (see for 
example extracts from monitoring reports for the years 2008 and 2009 in Buyanga Sub-County 
provided in Annex 7). In these first monitoring reports, quantified data such as results from the 
Primary Leaving Examination, the attendance of teachers and pupils, grants received within the 
UPE scheme, availability of text books and the status of the pit latrines and the nearest boreholes 
were all indicated. With time, however, systematic monitoring has been replaced with complaint-
driven monitoring. The 2010 monitoring report in Buyanga Sub-County (see Annex 7) clearly 
shows a distinct movement in this direction. No table is used in the 2010 report, and performance 
indicators become peripheral. The report becomes a list of challenges identified by the staff of the 
school and parents, such as “Most schools are reported to be understaffed”, “Teachers have 
shown their academic weaknesses (…)” or “The UPE funds are received but late.” This is all the 
more surprising because all the reports mentioned here for the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 were 
produced by the same team of monitors, in the same sub-county. If in 2008 and 2009 community 
monitors followed rather strictly the requirement of the CBMES initiative in terms of performance 
monitoring, the 2010 report shows clearly that the priority becomes punctual complains which 
should be addressed. 
Another report produced in 2010 from Ibulanku Sub-County, on Bunyantole Primary 
School shows a similar phenomenon: 
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BUNYANTOLE PRIMARY SCHOOL 
No of teachers 14 (9 men and 5 women) 
Enerrollment last term 424 but actial 362 so difference is 
60 only. Turn up is not bad. 
H. Teacher was absentee when he had gone to collect 
examination from Iganga. 
PLE 2010: D1 00; D2 02; D3 11; D4 16; Du 29; Dx 07 so 
performance was poor due to Du, D4 and Dx. They got a 
large number why?. 
UPE funds were not seen because the Hm was absentee. 
They have a cook and a night Asikari. There was a 
contribution of 5kg of maize and 500 for the cook from 
parents for feeding. 
CHALLENGES: accommodation is not available. 
Long distance travalled by teachers. Some are from 
Iganga, Idudi without transport allowance. 
No monitoring teachers who are absentee due to lack of 
accommodation. 
Changing of silibus, with out text books soon. 
Table 6 – Monitoring report for Bunyantole Primary School, Ibulanku Sub-County, 2010 
In this report, some sort of performance is mentioned, such as the number of teachers or 
the results at PLE 2010. However, when it comes to identifying challenges, what is mentioned is 
the lack of accommodation which forces teachers to travel long distances, sometimes from 
Iganga, and as a result teachers cannot be present. The second challenge identified here is the 
impending change in syllabus, for which no textbooks are available. These two challenges are 
perfectly legitimate and important, and correspond well to what local communities made up of 
teachers, parents and community monitors would most care about since they are directly 
concerned and their daily lives are directly impacted by these challenges. More abstract 
performance indicators are not considered as relevant, and therefore progressively assume 
secondary importance in the monitoring process; if they are included at all, it is only because the 
monitors have been taught to use them. 
This is confirmed by testimonies from community monitors, who clearly state that the 
information mentioned in the monitoring tables from the 2008 and 2009 report were of little use 
in their discussion with local government officials. In addition, producing these tables takes a lot 
of time, which is considered wasted as they do not allow for any particular action which could not 
be triggered by a simpler, complaint-driven monitoring report. Monitors still go to schools, but 
they rely more on the complaints of parents, and they focus on solving the particular issues 
brought to their attention. When they do so, they have the support of the parents or health 
centre patients who are complaining, and the issue got substance. Meetings can be organized that 
people actually attend because they are concerned, and government officials are encouraged to 
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act because there are actual people behind the complaints waiting for a solution to be found, who 
will persevere if no action is taken. This is not the case with performance indicators and targets. 
Parents do not complain based on these indicators, nor do the health centre patients. In no 
instance have parents complained because the pupil to teacher ratio was higher that the 
requirement of the official education policy. However, they will complain if, as a result of 
understaffing, their children are not looked after carefully, or if there is no teacher in a class. 
1.3. Linking community monitoring to wider accountability mechanisms 
The apparent commitment of the Ugandan government to transparency, output-based budgeting 
and performance-oriented public sector reform should, in theory, provide additional room for the 
civil society to monitor the performance of the public sector. For example, all the money received 
by schools under the Universal Primary Education scheme must be, by law, displayed in public 
(see picture below). Every district officer is given annual performance targets to achieve by the 
Chief Administrative Officer. In addition, the budgeting process should be, for the most part, 
participatory; the national budget is supposed to be composed of local budgets agreed upon at 
the sub-county level with the local community, each line of the budget being, in theory, linked to 
quantified performance outputs. This should allow, in theory, for transparent monitoring of the 
efficiency of district officials in implementing the local budget and reaching the relating targets. 
Finally, every line ministry – the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, etc. – has set up 
computer-based Management Information Systems, the purpose of which are to gather 
performance data at the local level in order to make them available to the central government for 
decision-making purposes (see for example the data collected by the LoGICS65 system, Annex 8). 
In practice however community monitors have found it challenging to occupy this space 
and organise their monitoring activities within the framework of governmental arrangements. 
Two main aspects have emerged from the research. First, it is difficult for community monitors to 
be involved in the process of planning and budgeting at the local level, and second it is difficult to 
link the performance data produced by community monitors to performance indicators and 
targets used by local government officials. 
 
 
                                                            
65 Local Government Information and Communication System. 
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Figure 5 – The main office of a school in Iganga, with UPE grants displayed on the wall. 
a) Participatory planning and budgeting: the missing link? 
Participatory budgeting and planning has been introduced in Uganda at the local level, and 
therefore community monitors should have the possibility of being involved in the yearly 
production of the local development plan and budget (see chapter V, section 1.3). 
Participatory budgeting rests on the idea that consultation meetings should be organised 
at the sub-county level with members of the local communities. The Parish Development 
Committee, for example, should invite community members to a meeting to design the budget 
and select priorities. But such consultative meetings rarely occur. According to Pauline A., who is 
in charge of the CBMES programme at UDN, “they only invite the LC166 and a few other leaders. 
Community members are not informed when the meeting takes place. By the time the budget 
proposal reaches the sub-county level they are already consolidated and sent to the district for 
aggregation. (…) At that level there is not much to be done, not much influence possible.” 
Similarly, community monitors report having never attended such meetings, and have rarely been 
invited. 
Several reasons can explain why they do not happen as planned. First, sub-county and 
parish officials often do not have the budget to organise these meetings, which would require 
local government officials to offer the participants facilitation for transport, food and drinks 
                                                            
66 The LC1 is the lowest elected political leader at the Parish level. 
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(without transport allowance, food and drinks nobody would attend these meetings). Second, 
how to organise these meetings is not well known by local government officials. They often argue 
that they do not know whom to invite to the meeting, where to send the invitation letters and 
how to advertise for the meeting in order to ensure the largest possible participation. Thirdly, it is 
often said by local officials that local communities are not eager to participate in these meetings 
and, when they do so, they do not fully grasp what is at stake during participatory budget 
meetings. Therefore they fail to provide any input likely to contribute actively to the budgeting 
process. Finally, sub-county officials sometimes fail to submit their input for the budget process 
on time, and therefore district officials have to come up with their own proposals for the deficient 
sub-counties before sending the proposed district budget to the Ministry of Finance. 
Similar challenges are faced by whomever wants to monitor the expenses incurred at the 
district level. Little data is actually available on how the money is supposed to be spent and what 
the targeted development objectives are. Only on rare occasions are expenses published for 
development programmes such as UPE, the Local Government Development Plan, Community 
Driven Development and NAADS. However, even in such cases it is particularly difficult for 
community monitors to ensure that no money has been embezzled, since it is impossible for them 
to consolidate the data from one government level to the next – to aggregate, for example, 
expenses at the sub-county level to ensure that the total expenses correspond to what has been 
allocated for the district to which the sub-counties belong. 
b) Linking Local Government performance indicators to CBMES performance data 
In addition, it is particularly difficult for community monitors to coordinate their work and the 
performance data they produce with the work of local government officials and performance 
indicators used and produced by the local government. If the local government officials in charge 
of the various sectors of education (the District Education Officer), civil works (the District 
Engineer) and health (the District Health Officer) appears to be comfortable with terms such as 
‘performance’ and ‘performance indicators’ and seems to be using them regularly in their work, it 
is easy to link them with the data produced by community monitors. 
David M., the District Health Officer, has certain performance indicators and performance 
targets for his department, as mentioned in the Health Sector Strategic Plan. There are twenty of 
them, but they have pitched and used only four of them for decision making: out-patient 
attendance, which represents the number of people visiting the health centres without staying 
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overnight (they expect that everyone should go for a check-up to the closest health centre at least 
once a year); the number of new cases treated; the immunisation coverage (how many children 
have been immunised); and finally the number of women who are delivering in health centres 
(currently only 35% of women deliver in health centres, and many women die giving birth at 
home). When asked if community monitors could use these types of indicators, he says: “monitors 
don’t go for the technical stuffs, they don’t know these indicators and they don’t report on them”. 
These indicators are mainly for internal use, and performance targets are agreed upon on a yearly 
basis. Community monitors do not report on these indicators, they report, to his knowledge, 
cases “where patients were not attended to because the health worker did not show at work for 
several days” or, as in Makutu sub-county, health centres which sell drugs which should be given 
away for free. 
Beker K., the District Education Officer, says about community monitors: “they have been 
very helpful. Very pertinent issues have been brought to us (…) mainly about teacher attendance, 
enrolment.” After receiving reports of overestimated enrolment figures, for example, he can send 
his inspectors to the schools to get more realistic figures to estimate how much money the 
schools should receive in terms of a capitation grant. In his department they also have 
performance indicators, which are used to make important decisions. These indicators are largely 
ratios, such as teacher-to-pupil or pupil-to-textbook ratios. When asked if community monitors 
could use these types of indicators, he says “community monitors report on these indicators 
somehow.” Indeed, when checking for teacher and pupil attendance, they do report figures which 
make their way into the composition of the performance ratios that he is following and using for 
decision making (for example, to recruit new staff for the schools). However, they do not provide 
the ratios themselves, nor do they focus their monitoring activities on measuring these ratios, of 
which they have only a vague knowledge. Finally, when they do report that a new teacher should 
be recruited in a particular school, they do so following a complaint from the head teacher of the 
school. It is the head teacher who, knowing that the maximum number of pupils per teacher in his 
school has been reached, tries to have a new teacher recruited and mentions the problem to 
monitors who bring the issue back at the district level. 
When asked about community monitoring, Paul W, who has been Iganga District Engineer 
since 1995, mentions that he has known the monitors and their work since 2000. He defines the 
work of community monitors as follows: “according to me they go around, monitor the work we 
do and see if there is value for money (…) if things have been properly done.” He has been in 
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regular contact with community monitors, as they usually come to see him whenever they need 
details about what contractors are supposed to have done. He is, however, not aware of any 
performance indicators that community monitors could be using. He has performance indicators 
of his own, for his department. These indicators are, for example, how many kilometres of road 
he has to build during the year, how many kilometres of road he has to maintain a year and how 
many water sources he has to build. These performance indicators are agreed upon with his 
superior, the Chief Administrative Officer of the district. Together they agree on the targets to 
achieve for the next year and at the end of the year they go back to the targets for their 
assessment. 
For all three of these high ranking local government officials, community monitors are 
seen as some sort of informal or unofficial assistants who can go to the field, where they 
themselves cannot go or where they cannot send their inspectors (or where their inspectors do 
not want to go). If they are bringing back to the district level interesting and important 
information from the field, this type of information is different in nature from the performance 
data that they use and process internally to decide whether to recruit teachers or health workers, 
for example. All three of them mention that they would like the community monitors to be 
bringing back more issues from the field. However, when asked about the potential involvement 
of community monitors in their own internal evaluation process, they say either that community 
monitors do not have the required technical knowledge to manipulate these performance 
indicators, or that it is not their role to take decisions. It is the role of district officers to make sure 
that new staff is recruited when required by the health or education strategy, or to decide to build 
a new school, a new road or a new health centre based on the targets which have been set with 
the Chief Administrative Officer. 
2. 2nd line of inquiry: Discussion and negotiation around performance data 
Performance data are supposed to play a significant part in the managerial approach to social 
accountability. The CBMES initiative has, at least in theory, attempted to put performance 
indicators at the core of its monitoring activities. The previous section has focused on the nature 
of the monitoring activities carried out by community monitors. The nature of the performance 
data produced by community monitors has been briefly mentioned to show why it was difficult to 
link it to the performance data used by local government officials. The present section explores 
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this further and investigates the role of performance indicators – or their lack of a role – in social 
accountability mechanisms at the local level. 
2.1. Understanding the notions of ‘performance’ and ‘indicators’ 
Two different but equally important concepts are at the core of managerial social accountability: 
‘performance’ and ‘indicators.’ According to this approach, ‘performance’ refers to the outcome 
of the activities carried out by public services, and ‘performance indicators’ refers to quantified 
measures considered to be accurate representations of the ‘performance’ to which they refer. 
However, when asked about these two notions community monitors do not tend to refer 
to any abstract dimensions or quantities. Only rarely do they mention, for example, the success 
rate of schools at the Primary Leaving Examination (PLE).67 When asked to give examples of 
‘performance’ of schools or health centres, they usual answer: the attendance of children and 
teachers, the existence of pit latrines in schools, the presence of a fence around the school, the 
availability of drugs in health centres, the actual opening times of health centres, the size of the 
culverts used in the road construction, the quantity of murram used to repair a road, etc. This 
section aims at providing a better understanding of the local signification of the two concepts. 
a) Understanding ‘performance’ 
The local understanding of the notion of ‘performance’ makes a lot of sense when related to the 
motivations of community monitors to monitor. As underlined previously, the motivation of 
community monitors often rests on the promises made by the President and the central 
government about all the services local communities should receive, which they often do not see 
in practice. As a consequence one of the first motivations of community monitors is to make 
these promises real. 
These promises are often expressed by tangible elements that make sense in the lives of 
the local communities, and not by abstract notions such as higher performance rates at national 
exams. These tangible elements are, for example, more teachers per school or more school 
rooms, more beds, free lunch for children, new pit-latrines and so on. The expectations of local 
community members (and therefore of community monitors) follow these promises, and 
‘performance’ is then naturally expressed and translated into tangible, non-abstract terms. In 
addition, there is a shared understanding of what a good school or a good health centre should 
                                                            
67 The PLE is a nation-wide exam that pupils sit at the end of P7. 
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be. In the mind of the lay person, a good school is a school where the teachers are actually 
present and do the teaching, where pit latrines are clean and are not about to collapse, where the 
children can easily access clean and safe water and are protected from outside threats such as 
animals or cars, and where the basic teaching equipment is available. Therefore community 
monitors are interested in verifying whether these basic elements are present or not, if the new 
school promised has actually been built and if the quality of the building is good, or if the 
renovation of the pit latrines of a health centre has been properly carried out. They are very 
unlikely to ‘measure’ the performance of the new school in terms of success rate at the PLE. 
Complementary element of understanding can be found in the local language, in the way 
‘performance’ is translated in Lusoga (the local language). ‘Performance’ is translated by ‘enkola’, 
which means “to work, the way you work”. It essentially refers to the methodology used to 
achieve a particular aim, and not to the result or the aim in itself. It conveys the idea that 
choosing and following the proper methodology will guarantee the good quality of the outcomes 
of any action. It also implies that by assessing the method which has been used one can tell if the 
aim will be reached or not. What gives the monitors an idea of the good performance of a public 
service is whether the proper methodology has been followed, that is if there are enough 
classrooms, enough textbooks, enough teachers or the likes. It is implicitly assumed that if a 
school follows these methodological requirements, then it will be performing well. In this context, 
it is not surprising that abstract dimensions such as ‘success rates’ are barely mentioned as 
elements of performance, and that it is concrete elements such as the number and states of 
teaching rooms, the number of text books and desk and the number and presence of teachers 
which are considered important. 
b) Understanding ‘indicators’ 
This particular understanding of ‘performance’ has a direct impact on the understanding of the 
notion of ‘indicator’. As the idea of performance is linked to the process or the method rather 
than to the end result, ‘performance indicators’ refer to any visible element which can give the 
observer information about whether or not the proper methodology has been followed. This is 
further reinforced by the translation of the word ‘indicator’ in the local language. In Lusoga, 
‘indicator’ is translated as ‘byobonaku’, which comes from two words: ‘byo’ (what) + ‘bonaku’ 
(see, look). It literally means “something that you can physically see, something you can touch, 
you can feel”. When a road is constructed there is something that people can actually see: the 
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distance covered by the road for example. It is an indicator that something has been done. The 
same goes for the number of culvert used on that road. In the cases of schools it is, once again, 
the availability of teaching rooms, blackboards, textbooks or pit-latrines. These elements are 
clearly seen, and are therefore clear indicators. 
In the case of less clearly-seen elements, such as the presence of teachers and the 
attendance of pupils, the notion of ‘indicators’ refers to what can be seen by the community 
monitors; for example, the attendance book signed whenever the teachers are present in the 
school. It is therefore common to see the attendance book of a school considered by community 
monitors as an ‘indicator.’ Similarly, to assess whether a school has received the UPE grants, 
account books are checked and become, naturally, an ‘indicator.’ What is understood as an 
‘indicator’ by community monitors is what shows monitors that a particular methodological 
requirement is met. For example, to answer the methodological requirement that ‘the school has 
water so that pupils can drink and wash their hands’, the best solution is to see if the school has a 
borehole. Therefore the borehole itself becomes an ‘indicator.’ Below is presented an excerpt 
from a monitoring report, which further exemplifies this particular understanding of the notion of 
‘indicator.’ 
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Figure 6 – Excerpts from monitoring notes, Buyanga sub-county. 
In the document introduced above (Fig. 6), the performance of the school is decomposed 
according to ‘objectives’ which are the methodological requirements for a well performing school. 
These requirements are the following: 
1) The number of pupils declared as registered in the school should match the actual number of 
pupils attending classes. This is important since the UPE grants are calculated for each school 
based on the number of pupils in the school. It is well known to community monitors that 
most school inflate the number of their pupils in order to get higher UPE grants. Indicator: 
attendance book for the pupils. 
2) The school management committee, where parents and teachers are supposed to meet to 
discuss the management of the school and of its finances, must be held on a regular basis. 
Indicator: minutes of the meeting. 
3) The staff of the school must be present and have the required minimal qualifications to teach, 
as mentioned on the guidelines issued by the Ministry of Education and Sport. Indicators: staff 
attendance book and copy of the diploma of the teachers. 
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4) The school should be properly fenced and children should have easy access to clean pit 
latrines and a borehole so that the pupils’ health and safety is ensured. Indicators: presence 
of a fence, existence of pit latrines and of a borehole. 
5) The support required for teaching must be present and well maintained. Indicators: quantity 
of books, desks and teaching tools. 
6) The pupils should not have to pay school fees, should be able to sit for exams for free and 
should ideally receive a meal at school. Indicators: interviews with the children and the 
parents to assess if meals are served and if fees to sit exams registered at school have to be 
paid for. 
Finally, if at the end of most of the interviews with community monitors they agree that 
one of the most important aims of universal primary education is to give the students a good level 
of education – which can be assessed by the success rate at the Primary Leaving Examination – 
almost none of them mention UPE grades as one of the most important performance indicators 
(only one in 20 came close to mentioning it, without explicitly mentioning it) when in fact, this 
success rate is what comes closest to a ‘performance indicator’ according to the managerial 
approach. 
Government officials have a very similar approach. When asked about what the qualities 
of a good education system are, an education officer at the district level answers: “Performance is 
big, broad. Here I am referring to academic performance whereby achieving good performance 
academically. (…) An indicator of good academic performance is clear, it's the result we have 
produced: how many first grades do you have (…) how many have failed to pass.” However, when 
asked “What are your performance indicators?” his answer is surprisingly similar to the answer 
that community monitors give: “every item gets performance indicators. For effectiveness for 
example, the performance indicators are: are teaching schemes available? Are they approved? Are 
lessons planned and plans followed? Is teaching material available? Is it used for teaching?” He 
mentions as well, much like community monitors, elements relating to the process of teaching, 
and to an “ideal” method which is implicitly assumed to lead to good performance. 
Consequently, the best way to report on the good or poor performance of schools 
consists most of the time in reporting on the various elements which are supposed to compose 
“good methodology”, such as taking pictures, collecting testimonies and gathering other pieces of 
hard evidence of the method used. In this case numbers hold very little legitimacy, if any. As often 
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as possible community monitors want to bring back with them the proof which will substantiate 
their claims, and for that purpose there is no better solution than to bring back a picture taken 
with their camera or a set of testimonies from community members about an almost-collapsing 
wall, poorly maintained boreholes or dirty pit-latrines. Photos and testimonies are considered, 
very naturally, as the most legitimate and irrefutable proof that there is something amiss. 
2.2. Towards an implicit agreement? 
Generally speaking, in the district of Iganga the work done by community monitors is perceived 
positively by most of the government officials interviewed. However, this positive perception 
hides several important nuances. It has emerged gradually, and has come at a cost: community 
monitors are forced to enter into an implicit agreement with local government officials which 
gives them space to operate and provides them with some legitimacy within local communities, 
but at the same time prevents them from addressing corruption issues at the district level and 
monitoring the work of district officials. 
As Kisaame A., Iganga’s district speaker mentions, community monitors are useful in 
bringing the problems of the field to the attention of political leaders and district managers: “we 
as leader don’t go to the ground. Us local leaders tend to be in office and we wait for our voters to 
report on us.” It is an opinion which is shared by all the heads of department in the district of 
Iganga. The District Education Officer, when questioned about community monitors, said that 
“they have been very helpful (…) very pertinent issues have been brought to us (…) mainly about 
teacher attendance, enrolment”; this view is similar to that of the District Health Officer, for 
whom community monitors “are competent in what they are doing (…) and are helpful for all 
people down there, us the leaders and the community”, or of the District Engineer who says that 
“they have assisted me because the district is big (…) they bring information from far away where I 
cannot go.” The District Engineer has only one assistant in charge of roads, another in charge of 
buildings and two road inspectors he can send to the field to do monitoring work. This is too small 
a team to control all the civil works done in the district, and community monitors provide 
welcome support. 
However, as helpful as the work of community monitors can be to district officials, 
community monitors generally find it extremely difficult to get access to data which can help 
them in their work, especially budget data. The only types of data they can easily access are the 
contracts which are signed between the district authorities and local contractors to build or 
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maintain roads and buildings. Very often community monitors do not know the exact scope of the 
work for which the contractors are paid, and they need access to these pieces of information in 
order to know what a contractor had really been asked to do. Not knowing the exact scope of the 
work asked of sub-contractors can lead to misunderstandings and overly high expectations from 
local communities and community monitors, who sometimes consider that a contractor has not 
fulfil his or her assignment when, in fact, his assignment was limited and did not include what the 
community monitors expected. For example, due to financial limitations repair contracts 
frequently include only a limited number of items – for example the walls and roof of a building 
but not the windows – when local communities and community monitors expect all of the 
building to be renovated, leading to a misunderstanding which only the contents of the contract 
between the district authorities and the contractors can clear up. In addition, whenever an issue 
is identified at the parish level, district officials need to get involved so that a solution can be 
found and a decision taken. For example, in instances when drugs are sold instead of distributed 
for free, district officials often need to intervene to confirm that drugs should be distributed for 
free and that if the health centre comes under scrutiny the person in charge of the health centre 
risks facing charges or being transferred to another location. Therefore, in order to operate 
community monitors need the collaboration of district officials. If they do not find a way to 
initiate this collaboration, then their work is simply impossible. 
It is notable that community monitors are rarely seen as threatening by district officials. 
Monitors tend to focus their attention on actors who are not members of the sub-county or 
district administration. As a community monitor puts it during a workshop on strengthening the 
CBMES: “officials should be free with us because we are not watchdogs.” This sentence 
summarizes what the CBMES is about: monitoring the executants rather than the ones really in 
charge – the District Education Officer, the District Health Officer and the District Engineer or their 
counterparts at the sub-county level. In order to get the collaboration of district officials, 
community monitors do not oppose them; rather, they work with them to bring to their attention 
problems they should know about in order to solve them. Very often, district officials thus rely on 
the reports from community monitors to control, at the local level, the civil servants they have 
within their department. They ask for pictures when shoddy work is reported, and testimony 
when a head teacher or nurse in a health centre does not fulfil his or her mission. As a general 
rule, it appears that community monitors progressively becomes auxiliaries of the district and 
sub-county administration, rather than real monitors of the public service as a whole. 
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In a way, they replace poorly motivated civil servants who do not do a thorough 
monitoring job themselves. According to Mr B., the Secretary of GAP, government inspectors “just 
go there to get their money”, implying that the only reason why inspectors go to the field is to 
collect their per diem and transport allowance. They have strong incentives not to go to remote 
locations as the cost of transport is high, and would use up all of their allowance. If they go to 
nearby locations only, it takes less time (so they can dedicate the extra time they have saved to 
personal occupations) and costs less (which allows them to keep part of their allowance for their 
personal use). If this is true, it implicitly means that the CBMES initiative replaces unmotivated 
district inspectors by motivated community monitors. They dare to face head teachers and the 
managers of health centres, but will only rarely challenge the District Health Officer, the District 
Engineer or the Chief Administrative Officer. Only once to our knowledge has the work of 
community monitors in Iganga district led to the punishment of a district official – the District 
Engineer – who had signed the official document required for a contractor to receive the last 
payment due for his job when the contractor had not actually finished the work he was paid to do 
(the roof of a building was missing). The District Engineer had been given the option to pay for the 
final work on the building in order not to lose his job. 
Finally, an anecdote strongly confirms this implicit agreement between district officials 
and community monitors. It is expected that community monitors would act in favour of local 
community members, and would act in such a way as to improve the quality of  services delivered 
by governmental institutions. However, this is not always the case. Within the UPE system, every 
school receives grants depending on the number of pupils enrolled in the school. A practice has 
developed of declaring ‘ghost pupils’68: schools create pupils who do not exist in order to increase 
the amount of grant money they receive. This practice is understandable given the fact that on 
the one hand, schools are – by law – free of charge, but on the other hand the amount of money 
they receive from the UPE grant is not enough to allow them to operate properly. Consequently 
some headmasters have no other solution than to resort to cheating on the number of pupils they 
declare. So far there is nothing really surprising here. But what is intriguing is the commitment of 
community monitors to checking that the number of pupils declared as registered in a school 
matches the number of pupils actually at the school. This is contrary to the interests of the local 
communities, since the more money is available for their school, the better the service quality can 
                                                            
68 See the newspaper article: http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/637176-upe-staggering-71-drop-out-rate-so-far.html 
(last access 30th of May, 2013). 
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be. It can therefore be seen as favourable to local communities that headmasters inflate the 
number of pupils registered. However, community monitors insist that the schools declare the 
proper number of pupils. Why? This behaviour makes sense if one accepts that community 
monitors have progressively been transformed into assistants of district officials. 
There are therefore no proper accountability relationships between district officials and 
the local community through the CBMES initiative. Rather, the CBMES initiative reinforces the 
accountability relationship between district officials (accountee) and civil servants at the local 
level in schools and health centres (accountor) by offering free controlling and auditing services, 
done by the community monitors. When a teacher, a nurse, or any worker in health centres or 
schools clearly misbehaves, he is sanctioned according to the official procedures, through 
disciplinary action taken at the district level. Most often, the result is the transfer of the civil 
servant to another district. Since the salary of these civil servants is low, there is little room for 
financial sanctions and there is no legal provision for such sanctions anyway. Similarly, the 
prospect of career advancement is mostly non-existent, leaving very little space for any sanction 
other than transfer. However, it is a punishment which can be effective since it is not unusual for 
civil servants to have other income generating activities in addition to their jobs in the public 
service, and a transfer would mean having to recreate these activities from scratch in their new 
social environment. 
2.3. Communicating monitoring results 
a) Sub-county and district dialogues 
In theory, an important part of community monitoring consists of “going public”, communicating 
the result of the monitoring process to government officials, policy makers and the general public 
in order to trigger changes and corrective actions. 
 District dialogues, in an ideal situation, should be organised twice a year. However, these 
events can be difficult to organise for two main reasons: difficulties in gathering all the relevant 
stakeholders from the district at the same place and at the same time, and financial constraints. In 
some cases district officials can be reluctant to agree on such a public meeting, especially when 
they are not accustomed to the work of community monitors. The district dialogue of December 
2011 is a case in point (see Annex 10 for the details of how the district dialogue unfolded). The 
dialogue was planned for the 22nd of November, but because of President Musseveni’s visit to the 
district planned for the 8th of December the dialogue was postponed by the CAO, new in his 
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position, until the 12th of December. There is no doubt, in Mr B’s mind, that the CAO postponed 
the meeting for fear that criticism of how the district operates would reach the President’s ears. B 
further suggests that, as usually happens when the President visits a district, some of his 
“operatives” come in advance to prepare the visit, and they would have necessarily attended the 
dialogue had it been held as scheduled. As B. says, “we are very dangerous. The President is 
sending a lot of money, he is not aware *that the money is misused+.” There is no doubt, in B.’s 
mind, that the new CAO wanted to prevent at all cost an exchange with the community monitors. 
District dialogues, however, are not always as challenging to organise. Before the new 
CAO of Iganga District took his position, community monitors from the district had no problem 
organising district dialogues and ensuring the presence of the CAO. According to community 
monitors, a good relationship between community monitors and the CAO is of prime importance 
for a district dialogue to be successful. It is not surprising that a new CAO would be reluctant to 
welcome community monitors if he thinks that they will try to challenge him and his 
administration. Conversely, it is easily understandable that a CAO who had already worked with 
community monitors and had realised that community monitors operate more like assistants than 
controllers would more readily accept to hold and facilitate a public district dialogue. 
b) Going national: lobbying the Parliament 
The work done by community monitors does not stop at the district level, and the CBMES 
initiative is also supposed to have an impact at the national level and to influence policy making. 
Following the last session of monitoring activities at the end of 2011, a National Lobby 
Meeting was organised (February 2012). The purpose of this four-day workshop was to compile 
and summarize the findings from the different districts where UDN operates. Once summarized 
and compiled in a convincing way, these findings were to be presented in front of the 
Parliamentary Committees on Agriculture, Health and Education in order to lobby for change and 
influence future national policies. A few selected representatives of the different CBOs were 
invited to this workshop, for a total of nineteen people. After a general discussion about the 
findings of all the different CBOs the participants were divided into three groups – one group 
dedicated to agriculture, another one to education and the last one to health – to come up with 
the final document to be presented to the relevant parliamentary committees. 
This final step of the process of integrating UDN’s work into the official accountability 
institutions has proved particularly challenging. During the presentation by UDN to the 
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Parliamentary Committee on Agriculture, it was made clear by the chairman of the Committee 
that the Committee was not supposed nor obliged to take any action following their meeting, 
since no petition had been officially submitted. It was said to UDN that the proper procedure for 
presenting complaints or lobbying the Parliament was submitting a petition and waiting for an 
invitation from the Parliament to present the case in front of the relevant Parliamentary 
Committee. Outside of this procedure no action should be expected. 
However, since UDN lobby various institutions and political leaders and not only the 
Parliament and its members, the work done by community monitors can have an indirect impact 
at the national level. For example, UDN is regularly invited to the different workshops organised 
by the government in preparation for the national development plan, and it can relay feedback 
from community monitors during these events. In addition, UDN regularly published notes, 
newsletters and other publications which are distributed to other NGOs and development 
agencies, helping to further disseminate the findings from the CBMES at the central level. There 
are therefore no direct links between the CBMES and political leaders at the national level. The 
accountability process only works through indirect contacts via different civil society 
organisations. 
3. Explaining the social mechanisms underpinning the CBMES initiative 
The structural model of PMAS introduced in chapter IV section 3 models the effects of PMAS in an 
organisation as the interplay between institutional properties, human agents and PMAS, in the 
present case the CBMES. This model is used in this research to account for how (that is, through 
which social mechanisms) the CBMES has triggered social change in Iganga district.  
Institutional properties – or structures of power, meanings and legitimation – refer to a 
set of rules and resources that human agents use in their everyday interactions. This set of rules 
and resources is not set once and for all but is changed by the very actions that it structures, 
through a social process of reciprocal interactions between structural characteristics of 
organisations and human actors. The central idea here is that when individuals act within an 
organisation, they create, perpetuate and modify three constitutive elements of social 
interaction: meaning, power and norms. 
The constitution and communication of meaning is necessary in any type of human 
interaction. Producing and communicating meanings is made possible through extensive 
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reference to the accumulated knowledge individuals gain from their interaction with the world 
and shared interpretative schemes. Introducing the CBMES and the related concepts and 
providing training to community monitors therefore contributes to shaping the already existing 
common knowledge of all community monitors and, more generally, community members. In 
turn, the introduction of the CBMES initiative and all its related activities has been made possible 
by the shared meanings already existing within local communities. 
Power is what characterizes the “transformative capacity” of human interactions – the 
ability of human action to transform the social and material world. This means that even though a 
particular structure of domination constrains human actions and interactions at any time and 
tends to deprive individuals of any agency, the particular actions of individuals in turn shape these 
structures of domination. Introducing the CBMES initiative in local communities is likely to have 
been allowed by these structures of domination, as much as it has changed them. What needs to 
be better understood is to what extent these structures have been modified, and what reasons 
can be given to explain these changes. 
Finally, norms refer to rules or organizational conventions that determine what legitimate 
or appropriate conduct is. Norms are also likely to have been impacted by the introduction of the 
CBMES initiative. It can be envisioned that a behaviour which was deemed acceptable in the past 
has become morally unacceptable in the wake of the activities linked to the CBMES. 
Consequently, three different aspects of the structurational model will be studied: how 
the CBMES has contributed to building legitimacy for community monitors, how it has contributed 
to modifying meanings and particularly the shared understanding of ‘performance’ and 
‘indicators’ and lastly how it has contributed to modifying the existing structures of power. 
3.1. Building legitimacy for community monitoring 
The question of legitimacy is central to the CBMES initiative. If many provisions exist within 
Ugandan law to allow community monitors to operate, these laws are not always implemented 
and are not enough to guarantee that, in practice, the exercise of community monitoring is 
possible. When community monitors started operating in the early 2000s through the PAF 
Monitoring Committees, they were received with considerable contempt and hostility, and were 
largely despised by local civil servants. As Pauline A., the supervisor of the CBMES initiative at 
UDN, mentions, “when UDN was doing poverty monitoring in its early days we realised that 
schools in Katakwe were built in a very shoddy manner. UDN went on the ground and filmed. They 
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brought the video to the ministry but were welcomed with contempt and asked ‘Who are you? 
How can you evaluate the structure and say they are sub-standard?’” 
The problem of legitimacy is regularly mentioned as one of the main concerns of 
community monitors. During interviews or focus groups and meetings, the question of legitimacy 
is raised very often. Most of the community monitors repetitively ask for ID cards or t-shirts 
showing their affiliation with UDN, in order to prove to their interlocutors the legitimacy of their 
action and their identity as community monitors. In addition, in order to gain more legitimacy, 
community monitors sometimes resort to doing their monitoring activities in groups. Indeed, it is 
often mentioned that when people from local communities want to get something from a socially 
higher-up individual, it is best if they move and express themselves as a group. It is widely 
accepted that requests of groups are considered more legitimate than requests of individuals and 
are therefore more often satisfied. This is the case, for example, when community monitors want 
to visit a school whose head teacher is opposed to their visit. If only one monitors shows up, he 
will be denied access to the school buildings and documents. However, if a group of four or five 
monitors visits the school, it is considered very unlikely that the head teacher would deny them 
access to the school. Generally speaking, community monitors are welcome in the health centres 
or schools where there is no on-going problem or conflict with the local community. However, 
when tensions exist between a civil servant and the local community, for example following a 
complaint made by the local community, it is more difficult for monitors to gain access to 
potentially incriminating material. In such a case, they are often denied access to the premises if 
they do not come in a group. The same is true when a school or a health centre welcomes a newly 
appointed head teacher or nurse. In this situation, community monitors do their first visit in a 
group in order to more easily establish their identity, activity and legitimacy. 
However, the shift towards a more community-oriented monitoring system, and several 
years of interaction and collaboration between community monitors, local communities, civil 
servants and district officials, have allowed community monitors to gain legitimacy, and the role 
and function of community monitors has gained in recognition. As Iganga’s district speaker 
mentions, community monitors are useful in bringing the problems from the field to the attention 
of political leaders and district managers. For the District Education Officer, community monitors 
“have been very helpful (…) very pertinent issues have been brought to us.” For the District Health 
Officer, community monitors “are competent in what they are doing (…) and are helpful for all 
people down there, us the leaders and the community”, and the District Engineer says community 
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monitors “have assisted me because the district is big (…) they bring information from far away 
where I cannot go.” 
In addition, people involved in the CBMES are increasingly known for their social 
involvement within the local community. The move towards a community-oriented monitoring 
system, and notably the creation of community-based organisations to regroup all the community 
monitors and give a legal framework to their work, has been part of the process. Complaint-
driven monitoring also gives the community monitors more legitimacy, as explained in section 1.2. 
It is easier for community monitors to challenge the head teacher of a school when the local 
community actively complains about him or her rather than challenging him on the basis of his 
attendance at school alone; it is also easier to do so when the local community is mobilized 
behind a meaningful cause, and will stay mobilized behind community monitors until the issue is 
resolved. Consequently, repeated actions on the part of community monitors in favour of local 
communities have progressively given them a pivotal role within these communities. They have 
emerged as indispensable intermediaries between local communities and civil servants and 
government officials, and are regularly consulted when issues emerge. As a resident close to 
Buyenga Primary School mentions, “they are very helpful, when we see a problem we can bring it 
to them and they help us find a solution.” As another one says, “they are good because they know 
where to go and who to see when there is a problem.” 
Between the early days of PAF monitoring and the testimonies of district officers, officials 
and residents collected in Iganga district, a progressive shift towards more recognition can be 
observed. Running radio broadcasts that operate publicly and are largely accessible to everyone 
by phone has also contributed to building the legitimacy of community monitors. Similarly, the 
somewhat successful organisation of sub-county and district dialogues is also an important 
element contributing to building legitimacy; community monitors are seen as being on the side of 
district officials, addressing them on issues relevant for the entire community. Community 
monitors have attained a status which gives them the back-up of the local community, and makes 
them important interlocutors for civil servants. The NAADS coordinator in the Buyenga sub-
county, for example, is regularly asking community monitors for information about the 
subsistence farmers they are working with, and as has been show earlier through quotes from 
government officials, the work done by community monitors is highly appreciated by district 
officials who see them as assistants. Civil servants have learnt to work with community monitors 
and have learnt to rely on them as their auxiliaries to control the quality of public services in areas 
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where civil servants cannot afford to go or do not have the time to go. Progressively, the early 
suspicion of community monitors vanished as they gradually found their identity and function. 
This early suspicion, though, can quickly return, as shown by the difficulties in organizing 
the district dialogue in Iganga in 2011. The CAO, who had just arrived in his new position, did not 
know the work of community monitors, and did not know how they operate. He was not aware of 
the implicit agreement which exists between them and district officials. Because of that, his 
suspicion remained, and the dialogue could not be organised under ideal conditions even though 
in past years organising the dialogues was not as difficult. Such a situation is likely to occur every 
time a new official moves to the district and does not know how the community monitors 
operate. 
However, creating space for community monitors to operate has come at a cost. First, as 
has been mentioned in section 1.2, it has required a shift from systematic monitoring towards 
complaint-driven monitoring. This shift has moved the CBMES initiative further away from its 
original managerial model. Second, rarely have community monitors been able to actively 
challenge district officials, or even sub-county officials. They easily and regularly challenge civil 
servants working in schools and health centres as well as contractors of civil works, but the 
problem of inefficiency and corruption at the district level is largely left unaddressed. In exchange 
for their acceptance by district officials, which has largely contributed to giving community 
monitors their legitimacy in the eyes of local communities, there is the implicit agreement that 
little will be done against district officials. This status quo is regularly challenged when new high-
ranking district officials are appointed, and the fragile equilibrium reached with the previous 
administration has to be gradually rebuilt. Similarly, the need for legitimacy has encouraged the 
shift from systematic monitoring towards complaint-driven monitoring. Since community 
monitors need to create and maintain their legitimacy, they need to work closely with local 
community members and have to appear as resourceful contacts for members of the local 
communities. This is made possible by addressing the issues raised by these communities, to the 
detriment of other activities of systematic monitoring. 
3.2. Production of meaning: performance indicators and pieces of evidence 
One of the main characteristics of managerial approaches to social accountability is their 
overreliance on technical tools – in the present case performance indicators – as the central 
vehicle of social accountability. It is expected that a project such as the CBMES initiative would 
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encourage community monitors to build performance indicators and use them in their reports, 
and ask civil servants to account for their actions and results. As mentioned in the previous 
section, community monitors understand ‘performance’ as the respect of a particular 
methodology to reach a specific goal, methodology which is implicitly deemed adequate to reach 
this goal. A school with a high level of ‘performance’ would therefore be a school where a specific 
set of requirements are met, and ‘performance indicators’ are understood to be what shows that 
these requirements are followed. The local understanding of ‘performance indicators’ is therefore 
substantially different from the understanding of performance indicator as a quantified data 
representing such performance. The degree of abstraction usually associated with the managerial 
meaning of the term is absent from the local understanding, which focuses mainly on physical and 
tangible dimensions; an indicator can be seen, it is what shows the performance and not what 
represents or translates this performance in an abstract world. 
Several reasons can account for this particular interpretation. As mentioned in the 
previous section, the translation in the local language of ‘performance indicators’ leaves little 
room for any alternative understanding. However, this can be seen as a consequence rather than 
a cause: ‘performance indicator’ is probably translated in such a way because it is initially 
understood differently. The root of this understanding can probably be found in the original 
motivation of community monitors to participate in the CBMES. The widespread corruption at the 
local level is well known to all community members, and this corruption directly translates into 
shoddy civil work and civil servants not doing their jobs as they are supposed to (being absent 
from work, diverting drugs or teaching materials for their own use and benefit, etc.). It is 
therefore very natural that, once offered the possibility to control the work done by civil servants, 
community monitors focus on the issues they are familiar with and do not pay attention to more 
abstract performance indicators such as the success rate of schools at the Primary Leaving 
Examination. In addition, community monitors have had little exposure to abstract concepts and 
to the exercise of representing or measuring reality through numbers, since almost none of them 
have finished secondary school. To illustrate this point further, an analogy can be made here: 
every tourist who decides to drive outside Kampala for the first time will probably need, at some 
point, to ask for directions, and is very likely to do so with the help of a road map, at least if he or 
she is well organised. This person will quickly realise that this accessory, so convenient back in 
Europe, is of little use in Uganda as he or she is very unlikely to meet someone able to read and 
interpret a road map. After reflexion, though, it becomes clear that reading a road map or any 
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similar type of drawing representing reality in an abstract way requires preliminary training. The 
same goes for numbers, rates and other quantified data used to represent or ‘quantify’ reality. 
Without proper preliminary training and regular exposure to such data, it is simply impossible to 
understand and interpret.69 
The CBMES has therefore failed to create a culture of evaluation and monitoring based on 
quantified performance indicators. However, the work of community monitors requires 
nevertheless that some type of evidence is produced and used to substantiate their claims. 
Community monitors have quickly learnt that any claim which is not backed up by proper 
evidence is likely to be denied. To prevent this from happening, they tend to use photos and 
testimony from community members. Both of these allow community monitors to refer to a third 
party who is deemed ‘impartial.’ A picture represents what is photographed and therefore cannot 
lie; collapsed latrines are collapsed latrines, and nothing can be said to oppose this type of 
evidence. Similarly, if enough accounts from different witnesses can be gathered about a specific 
problem, this problem is unlikely to be discarded as irrelevant or non-existent. Discussions are 
likely to follow afterwards about who is responsible for the problems identified and what can be 
done or should have been done, but no discussion will surround the existence of the problem 
itself. The function of evidence that the managerial approach to social accountability usually 
attributes to performance indicators is fulfilled in practice by less abstract elements, such as 
pictures and testimonies.  
Based on the work on performance and indicators which has been done so far, a typology 
can be suggested which could help better understand and conceptualise the problem at hand. For 
any type of indicator, different levels of abstraction exist (see Figure 7 below).  
Level 0 indicator: no abstraction, the indicator is what is indicated. For example, a borehole is a 
level 0 indicator. Teachers are level 0 indicators, as well as attendance books that each teacher has 
to sign when he or she arrives at school in the morning. To some extent level 0 indicators are 
reality itself. 
                                                            
69 Jean Piaget, the famous Swiss developmental psychologist and philosopher well known for his epistemological studies 
with children, has suggested that the last phase of cognitive development, from age eleven to above, consists of 
developing the capacity of abstract reasoning. However, this capacity can only be developed, according to Piaget, 
through the dialectic of exposure to abstract concepts and manipulation / reflection on these concepts. Without this 
succession of exposure, manipulation and reflection, the capacity of abstract reasoning does not develop fully. In the 
case of the CBMES initiative, most community monitors had already left school when they turned 16, and had been only 
marginally exposed to abstract reasoning. This contributes towards explaining why highly abstract performance 
indicators are not commonly used and why, more generally, it is difficult for community monitors to apply abstract 
concepts to real-world problems. 
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Level 1 indicator: a level 1 indicator is a level 0 indicator transformed into a question. For example: 
is the teacher named Jack present or not? The answer, yes or no, indicates if this particular 
methodological requirement is fulfilled. This can be done for all the teachers of the school. The 
answer to the question can be obtained by direct reference to level 0 indicators: the teacher 
himself or the attendance book with his name on it (if he is present). A check list to estimate if 
methodological requirements are met would be a list of level 1 indicators. Community monitors 
could go to a school with a check list made up of level 1 indicators and tick a box when a 
methodological requirement is met and leave the box blank when it is not. 
Level 2 indicator: a level 2 indicator involves a level of counting, and would consist of counting 
level 1 indicators. For example, a level 2 indicator can be the result of the process of counting the 
number of teachers present.70 
Level 3 indicator: a level 3 indicator involves a degree of comparison of a level 2 indicator with 
other quantified data (for example, the total number of teachers employed in a particular school). 
Rates are level 3 indicators since they involve counting and comparing. 
In addition to this typology, two different types of performance indicators exist: process 
indicators and end-result indicators. Process indicators, as has been mentioned, are indicators 
which describe a particular method, which is implicitly deemed adequate or good to reach a 
particular goal. For example, a good school should follow a particular method and its performance 
will be deemed good if it does so. Process indicators, as figure 4 has shown, can present different 
levels of abstraction, the two first levels being those favoured by community monitors. End-result 
indicators qualify the particular goal in question, with no attention given to the method used to 
reach that goal. In the field of education, such an end-result indicator would be the literacy rate at 
the end of primary education. In the field of health it could be the rate of mothers delivering in 
health centres, or the infant mortality rate. These end-result indicators are all level 3 indicators, 
because they necessarily imply counting and comparing with the total population, knowing that 
                                                            
70 It could be argued that level 2 indicators could be obtained directly from counting level 0 indicators, and that 
therefore level 1 indicators do not correspond to a particular level of abstraction per se. However, this would amount to 
neglecting two important elements of logic: that counting level 0 indicators implicitly requires that each entity be 
considered as 1 before summing up the 1’s and that 1 compared to 0 (that is considered as a Boolean variable 
corresponding to “yes” or “no”) conveys much less information than 1 as a whole number (that is, of the same nature as 
2, 3,…,100). Indeed, information theory considers that the amount of information conveyed by a symbol (understood as 
an element of an alphabet of X symbols) is inversely correlated to the likelihood of having this particular symbol 
communicated (that is 1/X). Consequently, the higher the number of symbols in the alphabet, the higher the quantity of 
information conveyed by any symbol of this alphabet. Therefore, transmitting 1 as part of the alphabet made of the two 
symbols “0” and “1” conveys much less information than transmitting 1 as part of the alphabet made up of the numbers 
(0, 1, 2,…,100). It can be considered that the more abstract an indicator is, the more information this indicator gives 
about reality. In more basic terms, knowing that the answer to the question “is teacher John present” is “yes” brings 
less information to an observer than knowing that only one teacher is present in the school. 
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only counting is of little relevance if one does not know how big the entire population is. It 
appears that community monitors use almost no level 3 indicators and resort mostly to level 0 
and 1 indicators, which has been justified previously by the level of education of community 
monitors (not higher than secondary education for the most educated) and by their strong focus 
on what can be seen and on what is tangible, such as teacher absenteeism, shoddy work, 
availability of drugs in health centres and the respect of the aforementioned set of 
methodological requirements. 
 
Figure 7 - Level of abstraction of performance indicators. 
At first sight it is therefore easy to argue that the CBMES initiative has produced little 
meaning as far as performance indicators are concerned. If one looks closer, however, this is not 
so obvious. When the manager of the CBMES initiative at UDN is asked about the role and 
function of quantified performance indicators, she mentions that numbers bring accuracy to 
monitoring reports, and prevent the use of imprecise statements such as “a few”, “not a lot” or “a 
lot”, which can be interpreted differently by different individuals. More generally speaking, the 
simple fact of decomposing what makes the quality of a school into different level 1 indicators 
already greatly improves the accuracy of the statement of community monitors. The check list 
that community monitors have in mind when they start their monitoring exercise makes it easier 
for them to communicate later on about the quality of the schools or health centres, and helps 
them largely avoid statements such as “the quality of the school is poor” or “the quality of the 
school is good.” Once such a check list is built and used, the quality of the monitoring exercise 
Level 3 - Comparing in addition to counting 
(How many ‘yes’ or ‘no’ compared to a reference number) 
The ratio of number of teacher present divided by the total number of teachers employed by the school. 
The ratio of the number of school equiped with a borehole divided by the number of schools in the district. 
Level 2 - Counting the occurence of a level 1 indicator (how many yes or no) 
How many teachers are present? How many schools with boreholes in the district? How many 'Yes' 
Level 1 - Transforming a level 0 indicator into a bolean variable (yes or no) 
Is the teacher named X present? Is the school equiped with a borehole? Yes or No. Check-list. 
Level 0 - The indicator is what is indicated - No abstraction 
The teacher as a person - The attendance book. 
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greatly improves, as well as the quality of the information communicated to the district. It is clear, 
however, that such reports on performance only remotely fit managerial expectations. 
3.3. Challenging existing structures of power 
Finally, the most important assumption implicitly underlying managerial approaches to social 
accountability is the belief that transparency about performance will be decisive in challenging 
the traditional domination of civil servant and government officials over community members, 
who have usually very few means to challenge them. To some extent, part of the legitimation 
process aforementioned has consisted of challenging existing structures of power. It is only once 
high-ranking district officials accept community monitors and their work that they start being 
legitimate, both to the local community at large and to district civil servants. At this time, 
community monitors can use their legitimacy to monitor the work done by contractors, health 
workers and teachers. They have won enough legitimacy to gain influence over local civil servants 
and contractors. As mentioned before, there is a phase of challenge when community monitors 
have to introduce themselves and fight to be given attention in meetings – in a word, they have to 
create the necessary space for interaction between themselves and civil servants. 
This process becomes easier when district officials realize that they can actually work with 
community monitors without being threatened by their activity. The CBMES initiative has 
therefore largely contributed to challenging the traditional order according to which head 
teachers, teachers and, in health centres, nurses and other medical staff could be absent at will, 
sell the drugs which are supposed to be distributed for free or charge school fees for teaching 
which should be free. There are clear indications that wherever community monitors operate, this 
type of behaviour is much less frequent, and when it occurs it does not last as long as it used to. 
However, two of the main expectations of managerial thinking are not met. First, 
performance indicators – that is, level 3 performance indicators as stated in the typology above – 
have played no part is the advent of this new order. Only very basic and concrete performance 
indicators are used to structure the work of community monitors, and the issues at stake are not 
the overall, highly abstract performance of schools or health centres expressed in terms of 
literacy rates or infant mortality. They are, rather, the presence or absence of methodological 
requirements which are deemed important for community monitors. 
Secondly, the changes within the old order are very limited in scope. High-level civil 
servants at the district level are only marginally challenged by the work of community monitors, 
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and the impact of the CBMES initiative beyond the local (district) level remains to be proven. The 
work done at the local level by community monitors has little impact at the national level or in the 
budgeting process. Attempts to present to Parliament the results of the CBMES initiative have 
resulted in few changes, even though to some extent their feedback has served to inform UDN’s 
lobbying work during the various workshops and conferences organized by the Ugandan 
government to collect inputs from civil society. Whether this input has had any influence on 
governmental policies remain to be seen, but that is beyond the scope of this research. 
Furthermore, if the contribution of the CBMES in terms of answerability of local civil servants is 
rather positive, its contribution in terms of enforceability is lame, even non-existent. Community 
monitors have little to no say about what happens to civil servants who have been accused of 
wrongdoing. Once community monitors have done their monitoring, it is the state apparatus, with 
all its flaws, control institutions and mechanisms as introduced in chapter V, section 1, which 
takes over. 
The overall dominance of government officials over their ‘citizens’ is therefore only 
challenged at the base of the pyramid of power; only the employees of schools and health 
centres, at the local level, are really controlled by community monitors. Higher-up civil servants 
are left largely untouched, and their consent is required for the work of community monitors to 
be possible. This leads to an implicit status-quo: we (district officials) let you (community 
monitors) work as long as you do not look at us too closely. The reach of the CBMES is therefore 
limited at the local level, with very little impact at the national level on the budgeting process or 
enforceability mechanisms. 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter has provided in-depth insight on what the effects of the CBMES initiative in the field 
are, and what mechanisms can explain them. 
Focusing first on how performance data were produced by community monitors, two core 
dimensions of community monitoring have been identified. The first dimension refers to the 
temporality of monitoring activities (continuous vs. punctual monitoring). Continuous monitoring 
is what is expected by the original managerial idea of the CBMES initiative. According to this 
model, community monitors should monitor schools, health centres and other public services on a 
continuous basis, several times a year. Punctual monitoring refers to monitoring conducted once 
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in a while, when the community monitors can afford to do so and have the money required for 
transportation. The second dimension refers to the way the monitoring activities are initiated. 
Complaint-driven monitoring occurs when community monitors are asked to step in by patients, 
parents or inhabitants of the local community. It usually consists of investigating and solving a 
well-defined issue. Systematic monitoring, on the contrary, is motivated by the ideal that every 
aspects of the performance of a school or a health centre should be known and made public. It 
therefore consists of verifying different complementary aspects of the performance of local public 
services. This form of monitoring does not aim at solving a particular issue, but at identifying 
potential performance-related issues through regular and rational analysis, based on performance 
measures and performance targets. 
Continuous and systematic monitoring is the ideal model of community monitors which is 
promoted by the original managerial approach of CBMES proponents. However, the analysis of 
the CBMES initiative has identified a progressive shift from continuous and systematic monitoring 
to complaint-driven and punctual monitoring. This shift has been explained by the need for 
community monitors to build their legitimacy within local communities and in the eyes of local 
government officials, and by their lack of financial resources, which encourages them to focus on 
what contributes most effectively to building-up and maintaining their legitimacy: complaint-
driven punctual monitoring. The use of performance-indicators, in this type of monitoring, is 
peripheral at best. What matters most are testimonies and pictures. In addition, in the local 
language ‘indicators’ translates as ‘byobonaku’ which refers to “something that you can physically 
see, something you can touch, you can feel” and ‘performance’ is translated as ‘enkola’, which 
means “to work, the way you work”. ‘Performance indicators’ therefore refers to “visible aspects 
of the process which is supposed to lead to the expected outcomes” rather than to abstract 
dimensions of outcomes, reinforcing further the focus on visible problems the local communities 
can notice, and therefore on complaint-driven monitoring. 
 Furthermore, it has been shown that in order to be able to operate, community monitors 
needed the support of local government officials like the District Education Officer, the District 
Health Officer and the District Engineer. Gradually, community monitors manage to gain their 
support by showing that they do not constitute a direct threat to their work and position, but can, 
on the contrary, help them in their own work. Therefore, an implicit agreement progressively 
takes shape between community monitors on the one hand and high-ranking district officials in 
the other, which at the same time enables and constrains community monitoring activities. This 
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also means that these high-ranking district officials are most of the time out of reach of 
community monitors. 
Finally, the nature of the performance data collected by community monitors and the 
type of monitoring they focus on makes it difficult, if not impossible, to integrate the monitors 
into the wider accountability mechanisms which exist in Uganda. Linking performance data 
produced by community monitors to performance indicators used within the public sector has 
proved difficult because of the characteristics of community monitoring (complaint-driven and 
punctual). Similarly, despite all the provisions in the laws of Uganda for participatory budgeting 
and planning, community monitors are largely left out of the budget and planning cycle. This is 
explained mainly by the fact that government officials lack incentives and resources to actively 
involve local communities and their representatives. It is therefore shown that the bottom-up 
approach of community monitoring and the top-down approach of the state apparatus never 
really meet; they operate for the most part in parallel to one another, even though, surprisingly, 
community monitors have increasingly become de facto assistants to government officials. 
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Chapter VII - CONCLUSION 
The research presented in this paper answered the question “What are the effects of the 
promotion and implementation by donors of performance-based management systems on the 
accountability of local government officials, and how can these be explained?” Through the 
conceptualisation of PMAS and the study of the implementation of such a system, the CBMES, in 
the Iganga District in Uganda, the research has uncover the complexity of the social mechanisms 
underpinning these types of systems. It has been argued that the expectations which come with 
the promotion of performance-based management systems rest on an over-simplified 
understanding of how such systems affect the communities and organisations where they are 
introduced. It has been shown that underlying ‘implicit assumptions’ in the chain of cause-
consequences used to justify the expected effects of performance-based management systems 
can account for the disjuncture which exists between the expected and observed effects of such 
systems. 
This concluding chapter provides a review of the argumentation and contributions of the 
research, outlines its limitations together with possible directions for future research, and finally 
underlines the main implications of this work for aid practitioners and for the development field 
in general. 
1. Review of the argumentation and contributions of the research 
In the last fifteen years, development agencies have committed themselves to improving the 
living condition of the poorest, as exemplified by the adoption of the Millennium Development 
Goals. In practice, this commitment has, among other things, translated into continuous efforts to 
reform the public sectors of developing countries in order to make them more effective and 
accountable to the poor. 
Most of these reforms have been motived by what can be labelled a ‘managerialist’ 
approach to public management. At the heart of this approach lies the idea that management 
practices from the private sector should be applied to the public sector in order to increase its 
productivity. Such practices entail more power and leeway being given to public managers, and 
the public sector being made more customer-oriented and better versed with modern 
management ‘best practices’ such as performance-based management. This approach has driven 
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many of the public sector reforms of OECD countries such as New Zealand, the UK and the US, 
among others, and ‘aid reformers’ (including international financial institutions) have widely 
recommended using them in developing countries, where they have led to the decentralisation of 
public services so as to bring services closer to the people, the introduction of democratically 
elected local governments and the introduction – at least on paper – of modern performance 
management practices. 
Another complementary phenomenon has emerged during the last two decades: the 
growing involvement of CSOs, through social audits and social accountability mechanisms, in the 
monitoring of public activities, which had thus far been strictly reserved for public officials. These 
practices developed from the assumption that giving citizens the opportunity to express 
themselves directly (i.e. not only through the electoral processes) is a good way to prevent 
corruption, and provides incentives for the public sector to deliver more efficient and effective 
public services. It has been argued that this particular type of accountability has progressively 
been invaded by managerial practices, giving rise to what has been labelled and introduced in this 
paper as ‘managerial social accountability’. Central to this particular approach to social 
accountability is the idea that quantified performance indicators and measurements of the 
performance of public services constitute an essential medium for enabling civil society actors to 
hold government officials accountable for the quality of the public services provided. Therefore, 
performance indicators can and should be used to foster accountability in the public sector, and 
reforms of the public sectors in developing countries have mainly consisted of improving 
transparency through the production and publication of ever more financial and performance 
data. 
However, the achievements of these reforms have fallen short of the expectations of the 
managerial model of social accountability. Recent research on both social accountability and 
performance measurement in the public sector suggests that the contested nature of 
performance measurement and the complex and political nature of the public sector may 
constrain its operationalization, and lead to significant unintended consequences. 
The research introduced in this paper has contributed to the corpus of research in public 
management and development studies with a particular focus on one developing country, 
Uganda. Based on an in-depth analysis of a case study, the CBMES initiative, it has answered the 
research question “What are the effects of the promotion and implementation by donors of 
performance-based management systems on the accountability of local government officials, and 
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how can these be explained?” The descriptive part of the research consisted of providing a 
comprehensive account of the CBMES initiative in theory and in practice. The analytical part has 
aimed at unearthing and clarifying the social mechanisms which can explain the observed effects 
of the CBMES in the field. 
The data introduced in this research have shown that the CBMES has contributed towards 
creating space for local community members to challenge civil servants at the parish and sub-
county level. It has therefore contributed to the accountability of civil servants at the local level in 
health centres, in schools and in the supervision of contracted work. However, high-ranking 
government officials at the district level remain largely out of the reach of community monitors. 
This has been explained by the progressive emergence of an implicit agreement between high 
ranking government officials and community monitors. Since the collaboration of these high-
ranking officials is required in order for community monitors to be legitimate within the local 
community and for the CBMES to operate, they secure a level of impunity, and remain largely 
removed from the enquiries of community monitors. If community monitors were too critical of 
high-ranking officials, they would risk losing their support, which would therefore jeopardize their 
activity. In addition, the research has shown that the reach of the CBMES initiative is mainly local, 
with little linkage to the national level and to nation-wide processes such as budgeting. 
The second important empirical finding of this research is that there has been a gradual 
shift, in the three first years of the CBMES initiative in Iganga, from systematic and continuous 
monitoring based on a predefined set of performance indicators to complaint-driven, punctual 
monitoring based on pieces of evidence such as testimonies and photographs, in which 
performance indicators have little role to play. This shift has been explained by the high demand 
from local communities for complaint-driven monitoring. Community monitors therefore receive 
complaints from local communities at the village or parish level, go on-site to investigate, contact 
the relevant local government official to secure his or her support and then attempt to solve the 
issue brought to their attention. Through this process they gain legitimacy both in the eyes of the 
local communities and in the eyes of local government officials who, gradually, come to see them 
as informal assistants. 
The contributions of this research are therefore theoretical and empirical. Its theoretical 
contributions are the following: it has introduced the original concept of ‘managerial social 
accountability’, its definition and its genesis, by building on existing research on managerialism, 
managerial accountability and social accountability. It has subsequently identified and 
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conceptualized Performance Management and Accountability Systems, and has provided 
clarifications regarding the main goals of PMAS and the sub-functions through which these main 
goals are expected to be met. It has finally introduced the original notions of ‘behavioural’ and 
‘structural implicit assumptions’ as central elements accounting for the disjuncture between the 
expected and observed effects of PMAS. 
The empirical contributions have consisted of operationalizing the structurational model 
of performance measurement in order to understand the social dynamics underpinning the 
CBMES initiative. The analysis of this initiative has identified the two main findings 
aforementioned, together with the mechanisms which can explain them. Analysing the research 
data through the lenses of meanings, power, and norms has been fundamental in this research to 
make sense of what was observed in the field. Building legitimacy and producing meaning in order 
to gradually modify the existing structures of power was at the core of the dynamics behind 
community monitoring. 
2. Limitation of the research and directions for future research 
Two main limitations of this research can be underlined. First, this research, based on qualitative 
research methods, focused on the qualitative effects of the CBMES initiative. It has shown for 
example that community monitors contributed significantly to solving punctual issues occurring in 
health centres or schools at the village level. However, the overall effects of the CBMES at the 
sub-county level have not been estimated quantitatively. For example, the selected research 
method did not allow for estimating the aggregated effects of the CBMES in terms of quality of 
services at the sub-county level. It did not provide any information on whether sub-counties 
where the CBMES operates have better quality of services in terms of education or health care 
than in sub-counties where the CBMES does not operate. 
Complementary research could consist of filling this gap by measuring the difference in 
terms of quality of the public services between sub-counties where the CBMES operates and sub-
counties where it does not. Such research would first identify the different effects the CBMES can 
have, provide measurements of these effects, and finally compare the results between different 
sub-counties in Iganga District. It could also provide interesting insight into how the local 
communities at the village and parish level perceive the quality of service delivery, and show 
whether this perceived quality is improved by the CBMES. 
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Second, the research started with a general conceptualisation of PMAS and the 
identification of the main limitations of these systems, followed by a case study. It could therefore 
be argued that inferring general knowledge from this particular case study is not possible, as the 
research is only valid in this particular setting, at this particular time and in this particular place. 
This argument would be largely true. However, it does not invalidate the contribution of this 
research in terms of proving that simplistic and schematic views of the world do not work in 
designing performance-based management systems, if one wants the observed effects of such 
systems to match their expected effects. The research does not prove that such complex social 
mechanisms exist in each and every performance-based management system (since not all these 
systems have been reviewed), but it provides reasonable ground for practitioners to expect such 
complex social mechanisms to play an important part in determining what the observed effects of 
these management systems would be. It therefore calls for more studies of this type in order to 
identify the effects of such systems, as well as the social mechanisms underpinning them. 
This form of qualitative research, however, can usefully be complemented by quantitative 
research to assess the effects of PMAS based on large samples. It is the dialectic between the two 
forms of research which will progressively lead to a better understanding of performance-based 
management systems. This is particularly true for developing countries where, to our knowledge, 
very little research of this type has been conducted. 
3. Implications for reformers, aid practitioners and development 
The research presented here has several implications for reformers (whether in developed or 
developing countries), aid practitioners and international development in general. 
First, the findings of this research underline the importance of case studies for the 
production of knowledge on performance-based management systems in particular, and on 
development processes in general. Only case-based qualitative research allows for fine-grained 
analysis of the complex social mechanisms underpinning public sector reforms and development 
projects. If it is undoubtedly important to identify and measure the effects of development 
policies through statistical analysis based on a large sample, it is just as important to dedicate part 
of the research effort to in-depth case studies in order to understand how the complex social 
mechanisms which underpin development projects operate. As far as development is concerned, 
the variety of contexts and situations makes the need for more knowledge about social change 
very important. The complex mechanisms which are triggered by any attempt to modify the 
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fragile balance of social forces, as is the case with the CBMES initiative, require dedicated 
research to be identified, so as to gradually reduce the disjuncture between the ‘ideal world’ that 
development actors aim to bring about through development projects or policies and the social 
reality. 
Second, it is important to carefully take into consideration the social mechanisms 
underpinning management practices and, more generally, the so-called ‘good practices’ of 
development when designing development interventions. Instead of considering that what works 
in one place will work everywhere, more attention should be given to critically analysing why such 
a programme has worked well in its particular setting and what could make it fail in another 
context. Rather than considering that a programme which has worked somewhere will work 
somewhere else, the rule should be to consider that a programme which has worked somewhere 
will not work anywhere else, unless strong similarities between the two contexts can be 
identified. In other words, it is important to realise that the success of a programme relies mainly 
on its being particularly well adapted to its setting. This is particularly difficult for international 
development organisations, as they regularly face strong criticism and need to communicate 
about their successes. Therefore, development agencies need ‘good practices’ and success stories 
to put forward which, since they have worked somewhere, can justify attempts to transfer these 
good practices elsewhere. 
This brings us to the third implication: the danger of using oversimplified models of the 
social world to justify projects aiming to trigger social changes, whether in the form of 
development projects or reforms of the public sector. The World Bank’s justification of the 
potential contribution of social accountability systems to the performance of government 
organisations is a perfect example. The simplified model used is based on a principal-agent model 
in which the principal (the citizen) is supposed to need performance data to overcome 
information asymmetries and hold the agent accountable (government representatives and 
organisations). As the CBMES initiative has shown, this model fails to represent accurately what 
the social reality is. Therefore, expectations of such programmes are not likely to be met. This also 
means that the managerial belief in the existence of a management toolkit which can be 
transported and used everywhere by experts in management is proven ill-founded: anticipating 
the effects of performance-based management systems requires extensive knowledge and 
understanding of the local context.  
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Fourth, most expectations of development-oriented reforms are, we believe, out of 
proportion to the actual motivation, level of education and abilities of the people subjected to 
these reforms (whether civil servants or citizens). In the case of the CBMES, it is not realistic to ask 
individuals with little education to use complex tools and devices totally foreign to them. Bringing 
the expectations of development interventions more in line with what can realistically be done is 
important to ensuring the success of development projects. In the case of the CBMES initiative, 
community monitors have acquired interesting skills even though these skills are not sufficient to 
allow them to operate the CBMES in a managerial way. However, here again there are strong 
incentives for development agencies to show their impact. Revealing too low expectations might 
have an impact on their budget and threaten these agencies’ existence. 
Finally, using a case study based on a developing country like Uganda in reference to 
literature and knowledge produced mainly in Western countries (such as the literature on 
performance-based management systems) is a very useful way of questioning what is usually 
taken for granted, or considered obvious in this literature. As the CBMES study has shown, it is not 
obvious that the lay person in Uganda would care about the quality of the public service he or she 
receives, or that he or she would voice an opinion if given the opportunity to do so, or that he or 
she would understand performance indicators should they be made available. Contrasting 
developed and developing countries is a very useful means of investigating what is considered 
‘obvious’. It is therefore an invitation for researchers in management sciences or public 
management to adopt a critical stance towards the very principles on which their research is 
grounded. 
The findings of this research also provide interesting insight into development 
mechanisms and echoe the development theory – laid out, for example, in Joel Mokyr’s The Gifts 
of Athena – that growth and economic development are essentially a matter of knowledge. 
According to this approach to economic growth and development, the growth explosion seen in 
the modern West in the past two hundred years is explained in terms of an accumulation of 
‘useful knowledge’ and education following a knowledge revolution started with the European 
enlightenment. Growth and development are therefore not explained in terms of availability of 
new technologies, accumulation of capital or implementation of ‘good practices’, but essentially 
in terms of knowledge required for these technologies or practices to appear and thrive. In other 
terms, and to go back within the scope of this paper, modern management techniques and tools 
have emerged within a context of particular knowledge and ideas. Transplanting these 
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management techniques without the particular knowledge which has allowed them to develop is 
doomed to failure, since it will not mean that the underlying required knowledge is transferred 
with them. In other words, development does not come with the implementation of these good 
practices but rather with the accumulation of the knowledge which has made it possible for these 
practices to emerge. 
It can only be hoped, therefore, that even though the straightforward transfer of ‘good 
practices’ does not work as expected, it nevertheless contributes ever so slightly to transferring 
part of this “useful knowledge” and progressively contributing to development. As the research 
has shown, implementing new ideas and organising trainings around these new ideas (in the 
present case performance indicators and social accountability) have had positive results: 
community monitors have gained a level of rigor in exposing their findings and doing their 
monitoring work, and have developed a sense of their right to ask for better quality of services. 
Even though the management techniques themselves – that is, the use of quantified performance 
indicators – have not been adopted, are not used to challenge high-level civil servants and have 
not integrated local communities into the national budgeting process, they have nevertheless 
contributed to building knowledge and reinforcing the idea that civil servants should be and can 
be held accountable by the people they are supposed to serve. 
4. Conclusion 
The study of the CBMES initiative has provided interesting insights into how a management tool 
triggers social change within the local community in which it is inserted. It is hoped that these 
findings, in addition to contributing original knowledge to the existing literature on public 
management and development studies, will be of interest for development practitioners and 
reformers. Development studies or the science of development is a relatively new, diversified and 
fascinating field of study. It is, more or less, a fifty year-old science, the main purpose of which is 
to explain the mystery of between five to twelve thousand71 years of history. The extreme 
diversity of situations makes it particularly difficult to investigate. It is a field in which 
generalizations and transfers of knowledge are difficult, and it should be approached with great 
care and the utmost humility. It is hoped that this research is a step in this direction. 
                                                            
71 If it is agreed to consider that the social and economic development of contemporary societies started with the first 
appearance of writing in Mesopotamia some 5,200 years ago. Alternatively, one could prefer considering that social and 
economic development started with the first agricultural revolution which occurred some 12,000 years ago and marked 
the shift from hunting and gathering to settled agriculture. 
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ANNEX 1 – THE NATIONAL BUDGET PROCESS IN UGANDA 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Early October: Ministry of 
Finance prepares Poverty 
Eradication Action Plan 
(PEAP) priorities 
Mid October: National 
budget consultative 
workshop 
November: Local 
government budget 
workshop 
January: Local 
Governments and Sector 
Budget Framework Paper 
(BFP) submitted. 
January-February: Inter-
ministerial consultations. 
March 15th: Cabinet 
approves BFP and budget 
proposals 
April 1st: National BFP and 
draft Medium Term 
Expenditure Framework 
(MTEF) presented to 
Parliament 
May 15th: MFPED finalizes 
budget allocations and MTEF 
May: MFPED, line 
ministries and other 
agencies prepare 
detailed budget 
estimates. 
May: Budget estimates 
submitted to Cabinet for 
approval. 
June: MFPED presents 
budget speech to 
Parliament. 
June 15th: Parliament passes 
vote on Account. 
June: Parliament discusses 
and approve budget. 
July-August: MFPED 
finalizes monitoring of fund 
releases against expected 
outputs (previous year). 
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ANNEX 2 – MAP OF COMMUNITY MONITORING ACTIVITIES OF UDN IN UGANDA 
 
Districts of Uganda where UDN operates (as of March, 2011) 
 
Source: author 
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ANNEX 3 – ORGANISATION OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN UGANDA 
 
 
Source: Makara (2000)  
  
163 
 
ANNEX 4 – LIST OF DATA COLLECTED FOR THE CBMES CASE STUDY 
 
 UDN documents such as sourcebooks, newsletter, annual reports and other publications 
 Documents produced by the CBO of Iganga such as monitoring reports and archives from 
previous years 
 Interviews with aid workers from different aid agencies and institutions (Office of the Prime 
Minister, USAID, DFID, European Union, KfW, GTZ and GIZ) 
 Interviews with government officials at the national level (in the capital city Kampala, at the 
Ministry of Local Government, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Education and 
Sports) 
 Interviews with government officials at the district level (in Iganga District and Bushenyi 
District) and government officials at the sub-county level (Buyanga) 
 Interviews with UDN officials at UDN headquarters in Kampala 
 Interviews with Community Monitors from different districts (informal interviews during 
workshops and meetings in Kampala and Amuria District), with a special focus on Iganga 
District (formal interviews in Bulamagi, Ibulanku, Makuutu and Buyanga sub-counties) 
 Workshops and meetings in Kampala (National Dialogue, Community Monitors Capacity 
Building Workshop), Amuria District (training of farmers), Kumi District (training of UDN 
monitors) and Iganga District (district dialogue in Iganga); 
 Informal interviews with local residents in Bulamagi, Ibulanku, Makuutu and Buyanga Sub-
counties; 
 Reconstitution of the monitoring process with community monitors from the Buyanga Sub-
county 
 Regular interaction and discussion with selected community monitors from Iganga (city) and 
the Buyanga Sub-county 
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Annex 5 – List of the CBOs linked to the CBMES initiative 
 
 
Name of the CBO district 
Namutumba Community Based Monitoring and Evaluation System Namutumba 
Kaliro District Community Based Monitoring and Evaluation System Kaliro 
Kumi District Poverty Monitoring Association Kumi 
Grassroots Action for Progress Iganga and Luuka 
Bugiri Poverty Monitoring Network Bugiri and Namayingo 
Community Driven Action for Integrated Development - Uganda Kamuli and Buyende 
Kanungu Community Efforts for Rural Transformation Kanungu 
Bushenyi Poverty Monitoring Association 
Bushenyi, Rubirizi, Mitooma, Buhweju and 
Sheema 
Tororo Anti-Corruption Coalition Tororo 
Bukedea District Poverty Monitoring Association Bukedea 
Rakai Poverty Monitoring Group Rakai 
Obalanga Community Monitors Group Obalanga Sub-county, Amuria District 
Kapelebyong Community Based Monitors Association Kapelebyong Sub-county, Amuria District 
Asamuk Community Based Monitors Asamul Sub-county, Amuria District 
Kapujang Sub-county Monitoring Team Kapujang Sub-county, Katakwi District 
Omodoi Community Monitoring Team Omodoi Sub-county, Katakwi District 
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ANNEX 6 – NOTES COMPARING A FEW PRICES (TRANSPORTATION, FOOD) AND SALARIES 
Price of staple foods 
Beans: 
2500 per kg from May to Sept, 
1800 per kg Sept, 
600-800 per kg in Oct - Nov. 
  
Maize: 
1200 per kg from April to July, 
500-600 per kg in August-Sept. 
  
Posho (Maize flour): 
May-July: 2300 per kg, 
Aug-Sept: 1900 per kg, 
Oct-Nov: 1200 per kg, 
Further reduction during the harvest period: 700 per kg around December. 
  
Cassava flour: 
April-August: 700-800 per kg, 
Sept-Nov: 500-600 per kg, 
Rises in February. 
Before the disease: 300-400 per kg. 
  
A chicken older than 6 months: 10k to 15k since they are being exported to neighbouring 
countries. Before, it cost 6k to 8k. 
  
A cock: before it cost 8k to 10k, now it costs between 20k and 25k. 
  
A turkey: before it cost 20k to 30k, now it costs 70k to 100k. 
  
Cow meat: before 5k to 6k, now 8k to 10k. 
  
1 x 0.5l bottle of coke in a shop in Iganga: 1.5k. 
  
1 rollex (egg and chapatti): 1.2k in Iganga. 
  
1 meal (rice plus cow meat): 3k; rice plus fish: 5k 
Prices of transportation 
From Kiwanyi to Bwigule HC II, 6,000 A/R on a motorbike (MB); 
From Idudi to S/C headquarters, 1,500 A/R on a bicycle (B), 2,000 A/R (MB); 
From Kiwanyi to S/C headquarters, 3,000 A/R (MB); 
From Idudi to Lubira 4,000 A MB, 3,000 R (MB); 
From Idudi to Lanaluswa 1,500 A/R B, 2,000 A/R (MB). 
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ANNEX 7 – COMMUNITY MONITORING REPORTS 2008 TO 2010 – BUYANGA SUB-COUNTY. 
 
 
Monitoring tables, Community monitoring report, November 2008, Buyanga sub-county, Naluswa Primary School. 
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Monitoring tables, Community monitoring report, June 2009, Buyanga sub-county, Lubira Primary School. 
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Community monitoring report, 2010, Buyanga sub-county. 
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ANNEX 8 – DATA FOR PRIMARY SCHOOLS & HEALTH FACILITIES IN THE LOGICS PROJECT 
  Education - Primary school data 
EDU001 Total Enrolment P1 to P7 (Males) 
EDU002 Total Enrolment P1 to P7 (Females) 
EDU003 Females Enrolled (Ages 6-12) 
EDU004 Males Enrolled (Ages 6-12) 
EDU005 New Male Entrants into P1 (age 6) 
EDU006 New Female Entrants into P1 (age 6) 
EDU007 Total Number of Pupils Without Adequate Seating or Writing Space 
EDU008 Total Number of Repeaters (P1 to P7) 
EDU009 Total Number of Special Learning Needs Students (Male) 
EDU010 Total Number of Special Learning Needs Students (Female) 
EDU011 Total Number of Dropouts (Male) 
EDU012 Total Number of Dropouts (Female) 
EDU013 Total Number of Female Dropouts Due to Pregnancy 
EDU014 Number of Male Teachers 
EDU015 Number of Female Teachers 
EDU016 Number of Academically Qualified Teachers 
EDU017 Number of Professionally Qualified Teachers 
EDU018 Total Number of Professionally Qualified Teachers (Male) 
EDU019 Total Number of Professionally Qualified Teachers (Female) 
EDU020 Number of Permanent Classrooms 
EDU021 Number of Semi-permanent Classrooms 
EDU022 Number of Pit-Latrines (Stances) 
EDU023 Number of Textbooks 
EDU025 Total Income of the School 
EDU026 Income from Fees/Parents’ Contributions 
EDU027 Income from NGOs 
EDU028 Total Expenditures 
EDU031 Males getting Division 1 on PLE 
EDU032 Males getting Division 2 on PLE 
EDU033 Males getting Division 3 on PLE 
EDU034 Males getting Division 4 on PLE 
EDU035 Males getting U on PLE 
EDU036 Males getting X on PLE 
EDU037 Females getting Division 1 on PLE 
EDU038 Females getting Division 2 on PLE 
EDU039 Females getting Division 3 on PLE 
EDU040 Females getting Division 4 on PLE 
EDU041 Females getting U on PLE 
EDU042 Females getting X on PLE 
EDU050 Basic Requirements and Minimum Standards Met (Yes/No/Not Inspected) 
EDU426 Total Expenditures on Investment (Development) 
EDU451 Date of Inspection 
MLG001 No. Toilets 
    
  Health facility data 
HEA001 Total Outpatient Attendances (Ages 0-4) 
HEA002 Total Outpatient Attendances (Ages 5+) 
HEA003 Outpatient Diarrhoea Cases (All Types of Diarrhoea, All Ages) 
HEA004 Outpatient Cholera Cases (All Ages) 
HEA005 Outpatient Malaria Cases (All Ages) 
HEA006 Outpatient Malaria Cases (Ages 5+)  
HEA007 Outpatient Tuberculosis Cases (All Ages) 
HEA008 Outpatient STD Cases (All Ages) 
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HEA009 HIV Serology Tests Done 
HEA010 HIV Serology Tests which were Positive 
HEA011 New ANC Attendances 
HEA012 Deliveries in Unit 
HEA013 Live Births in Unit 
HEA014 New-born Deaths 
HEA015 Maternal Deaths 
HEA016 Deliveries with TBAs 
HEA017 Total Doses of TT Numbers 2-5 
HEA018 Number of BCG Vaccinations Given to Under 1's 
HEA019 Number of DPT1 Immunisations 
HEA020 Number of DPT3 Immunisations 
HEA021 Number of Measles Immunisations 
HEA022 Number of Children Weighed at Measles Vaccination 
HEA023 Number of Children Weighed at Measles Vaccination Below Weight for Age (WFA) 
HEA024 Number of Family Planning Users (new Users) 
HEA025 Number of Doctors at the Health Unit 
HEA026 Number of Nurses at the Health Unit 
HEA027 Total Expenditure 
HEA028 Expenditure on Salaries 
HEA029 Expenditure on Development/Investment 
HEA040 Number of Instances of Stock-out of 5 Key Drugs 
HEA050 Number of Beds at the Health Unit 
HEA051 Number of C-Sections Performed 
HEA053 Number of Patient Days (All Wards) 
HEA054 Number of Malaria Inpatient Admissions (All Ages) 
HEA055 Number of Malaria Deaths (All Ages) 
HEA056 Total Number of Admissions (All Ages) 
HEA057 Total Number of Deaths (All Ages) 
HEA080 Yellow Star Score 
HEA081 Date of the Health Inspection 
  
  Road data 
 Road condition 
 No road bottlenecks 
 No structural bottlenecks 
 Surface quality 
 Shoulder condition 
 Washout susceptibility 
 Drainage status 
 Number of culverts 
 Number of culverts broken 
 Length of culverts 
 Number of bridges 
 Number of bridges impassable 
    
  Water and sanitation data 
 Status of the source 
 Daily yield 
 HHs served 
 User group function 
 Test results 
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ANNEX 9 – MAP OF MONITORING ACTIVITIES AND PLACES OF RESIDENCE OF COMMUNITY MONITORS 
 
 
Location of the main places to monitor and of the houses of the main community monitors – Buyenga S/C  
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ANNEX 10 – IGANGA DISTRICT DIALOGUE, DECEMBER 2011 
The district dialogue of December 2011 was planned for Tuesday, 22nd of November. Everything 
was organized to receive community members, and food and drinks were ordered. The money 
required to organise the district dialogues as well as the sub-county dialogues is sent by UDN to 
the CBOs in advance of the events so that some catering can be organized. There is an implicit 
expectation from the local communities invited to the dialogues that food and drinks would be 
provided and failing to respect this rule will discourage members of the communities to attend to 
the dialogues, and would give them no incentive to attend future dialogues. These financial 
requirements are often challenging, and are the reason why, in the Buyanga sub-county, there 
were no sub-county dialogue in May / July 2011 because of a lack of funds. 
On Monday 21st, at 5 pm the Chief administrative officer, the highest ranking district 
official, called the representative of the community monitors to inform them that the dialogue 
will have to be cancelled because “we have some auditors coming from Kampala and all head of 
department will be attending” (as reported by Mr B., the Secretary of GAP). He refused to 
postpone the meeting to the afternoon, or even to the next day. According to B., everything was 
linked to the visit of the President Musseveni who was expected in the district on the 8th of 
December. The Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) of the district, new in his position, has yet to 
prove that he can do a good job. He insisted on having the monitoring report before the meeting 
so that he could be prepared to answer the questions which will be asked to him. The report was 
finally sent to him three days before the scheduled date for the dialogue, two days before he 
cancelled it. B. further suggests that, as usually when the President visits a district, some of his 
‘operatives’ come in advance to prepare the visit, and they would have necessarily attended the 
dialogue had it been maintained. As B. says “We are very dangerous. The President is sending a lot 
of money, he is not aware [that the money is misused]”. There is no doubt, in B.’s mind, that the 
new CAO want to prevent at all cost an exchange with the community monitors, for fear that all 
the problems they will mention would finally reach the ears of the President. 
After several days of uncertainty, the district Dialogue is finally held on the 12th of 
December, after the visit of the President. The confirmation is sent on the 11th of December, with 
very little prior notice and no public communication because neither food nor drinks were 
available, all the money having already been spent in preparation for the 22nd. When the dialogue 
finally takes place, only 18 people are in the room, and the CAO is absent, represented by his 
174 
 
deputy. P., the GAP coordinator, reads the monitoring report to the assistance. Once he is finished 
a few district officials speak, explaining that they are aware of most of the issues underlined, 
which can all be explained either by a lack of fund or by a discrepancy between the expectation of 
community monitors and the objectives of the concerned public service. Before closing the 
meeting, the Deputy CAO suggests that in the future community monitors should summarize their 
findings on a one-page document per sector in order to make communication and follow-up 
easier. In his final statement P., the GAP coordinator, wishes that more data from “the drawers of 
the public officials” be shared with community monitors because, as he says “we are doing 
complementary work”. When the meeting ends, 29 people are in the room. 
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ANNEX 11 - PERFORMANCE-BASED MANAGEMENT PRACTICES WITHIN DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS 
Towards the end of the ‘80s and beginning of the ‘90s, the impact of development aid on the 
economic growth of developing countries has been widely criticized (Mosley et al., 1987 et 1992; 
Boone, 1995, 1996). In the wake of the reforms undertaken by some OECD countries in the name 
of the NPM, national aid agencies, IFIs and multinational organisations have been under 
increasing pressure to be “productive” and show tangible proof of their effectiveness. This trend 
has led an increasing number of them to implement some sort of performance-based 
management practices at different organizational levels (the project level, country level or 
corporate level) for budget and activity planning and monitoring, thus generalising the use of 
logical frameworks in use at the project level since the ‘70s. This section aims to provide the 
reader with a few (necessarily limited) examples that exemplify this trend. 
USAID, the American aid agency, was the first national development agency to implement 
a result-based management framework in 1994, following the US Government Results and 
Performance Act of 1993. This act requires all U.S. agencies to focus their programmes on the 
achievement of intended results. These principles are still in application: “Performance 
management represents the Agency's commitment to managing for results in order to achieve the 
best possible development outcomes. USAID pioneered and promoted a culture of defining and 
organizing activities around the end result. Key elements of managing for results are the principles 
of transparency - providing the public with information about what the Agency is doing; and 
accountability - holding itself accountable to stakeholders by achieving results and maintaining 
the credibility of the Agency.”72 Subsequently, the USAID Centre for Development Information and 
Evaluation73, the primary mission of which was to improve the agency’s learning-from-experience 
process, has seen the scope of its activities enlarged with the additional mission of reporting to 
external stakeholders on USAID performance in managing for results (USAID, 2000). 
A similar approach has developed in North America. In the mid-2000s, the Canadian 
public sector underwent a series of legislative and structural changes. In 2005, the Government of 
Canada introduced a new Management, Resources and Results Structure (MRSS, 2005) aiming at 
developing a “government-wide approach to planning and managing the relationship between 
resource expenditures and results” as well as providing the Parliament with financial and non-
                                                            
72
 http://www.usaid.gov/policy/performance/ (last access in November 2010). 
73
 The USAID Center for Development Information and Evaluation was established at the beginning of the ‘80s following an external 
audit criticising the agency’s use and application of the lessons learnt from previous experience. 
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financial information.74 The following year the Federal Accountability Act was adopted by the 
Government of Canada in order to make the government more accountable. This act is supposed 
to “[bring] forward specific measures to help strengthen accountability and increase transparency 
and oversight in government operations.”75 As a direct result, the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA) introduced a revised Result-Based Management policy in 200876 in 
order to make CIDA more accountable to its different stakeholders. A dedicated division of the 
agency, the Performance Management Division, was charged with the task of supporting the 
Result-Based Management policy of the institution. 
In the United Kingdom, an extensive system of performance-based management in public 
services was introduced by the New Labour government in 1998 (Hood, 2006). Until October 2010 
all government agencies had to sign Public Service Agreements (PSAs) including targets and 
performance indicators relating to their respective missions. The Department for International 
Development (DFID) was responsible for PSA 29: “Reduce poverty in poorer countries through 
quicker progress towards the Millennium Development Goals” (MDGs), and indicators used to 
monitor DFID activities consisted of the eight MDGs77. PSAs were terminated by the new coalition 
government in 2010, but the new Development Secretary, Andrew Mitchell, announced the 
creation of a new independent aid control agency in June 2010, emphasizing the renewed 
necessity for DFID to focus on results and outcomes and to be more accountable worldwide: “We 
need a fundamental change of direction – we need to focus on results and outcomes, not just 
inputs.  Aid spending decisions should be made on the basis of evidence, not guesswork. That is 
why we have taken the first steps towards creating a new independent aid watchdog. The UK Aid 
Transparency Guarantee will also help to create a million independent aid watchdogs – people 
around the world who can see where aid money is supposed to be going – and shout if it doesn’t 
get there.”78 
The United Nations officially introduced Result-Based Management in 200179. However, a 
few agencies, such as United Nations Development Programme, introduced it as early as 1999. 
Earlier on, in 1974, the UN introduced programme budgeting, as opposed to line item budgeting. 
                                                            
74
 Website of the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat: http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rma/mrrs-sgrr_e.asp (last access March 2013). 
75
 Website of the FAA: http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/faa-lfi/default.asp (last access March 2013). 
76
 http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/acdi-cida.nsf/eng/ANN-102084042-GVJ (last access March 2013). 
77
 Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger (goal 1), achieve universal primary education (goal 2), promote gender equality and empower 
women (goal 3), reduce child mortality (goal 4), improve maternal health (goal 5), combat HIV/Aids, malaria and other diseases (goal 
6), ensure environmental sustainability (goal 7) and global partnership for development (goal 8). 
78 Speech on DFID’s website (November 2010). Part of the speech can now be found on The Guardian website: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/katine/katine-chronicles-blog/2010/jun/03/mitchell-aid-watchdog (last access on March 2013). 
79 Resolution 55/231 by the General Assembly. 
177 
 
In the wake of this reform, programme budgets have often included elements related to strategic 
planning and expected results. Result-Based Management can thus be seen as a generalization 
and systematization of a partially existing practice (United Nations, 1999). In 2010, the 64th 
General Assembly stressed again the importance of performance-based management and 
accountability, defined as “achieving objectives and high-quality results in a timely and cost-
effective manner [as approved] by United Nations intergovernmental bodies”, as well as 
conducting “truthful, objective, accurate and timely reporting on performance results.”80 
In the European Union, the Council invited EuropeAid – the European body in charge of 
implementing the Commission’s external aid instruments – to strengthen monitoring, evaluation 
and transparency in 1999. Following this recommendation, EuropeAid implemented a Results-
Oriented Monitoring system, which was officially launched in January 2002 after a preliminary 
test period.81 Commitment to result-oriented management has been reiterated since then (UE, 
2005, 2009).  
Performance indicators are also used in an alternative form to select which country will 
receive aid, the selected countries allegedly being the most likely to efficiently use aid flows (the 
principle of aid selectivity82). Such an approach was adopted by the World Bank in 1998 (Assessing 
Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t and Why, 1998), and forms the core of the allocation process of 
the Millennium Challenge Account established in 2004 by the United States. More generally, the 
World Bank has always been a strong proponent of Result-based management approaches, as 
shown by its commitment to Monitoring and Evaluation in developing countries and to the 
Management for Development Result of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. 
Many others development agencies, such as the Australian (AusAid), Danish (DANIDA), 
Swedish (SIDA) and Japanese development agencies (JICA), as well as GTZ and KfW (the German 
development agencies now merged into GIZ), also introduced performance-based management 
practices in the late ‘90s and early 2000s. This trend towards such management practices has not 
faded away in recent years, echoing the international commitment of the 2005 Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness to Managing for Development Results. In 2007 SIDA engaged in 
                                                            
80
 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/ga10931.doc.htm (last access March 2013). 
81
 Since 1993 the European Commission has required that EuropeAid use the logical framework approach, providing a logical 
framework matrix spelling out a hierarchy of inputs / outputs / outcomes represented by “Objectively Verifiable Indicators” which are 
directly used in the Result-Oriented Monitoring system (UE, 2009). 
82
 The search for aid effectiveness has led to the idea of the “selectivity of aid” (Burnside and Dollar, 1997, 2000; Collier and Dollar, 
2001, 2002). According to this approach, Official Development Assistance flows should be allocated to developing countries on the 
basis of “good governance” criteria, “good governance” being supposed to increase the ability of a country to reduce poverty and 
actually transform aid flows into economic growth. 
178 
 
strengthening management for development results (SIDA, 2007), and the same year the 
Australian agency launched its Performance Assessment and Evaluation Policy, which “marks the 
beginning of a systematic approach to improve how the aid program is managed to achieve 
results, and outlines how information and performance across the aid program will be collected 
and used” (AusAID, 2008a p. 52). GTZ, in 2009, introduced a renewed management model 
(Capacity WORKS). DANIDA, in its Priorities of the Danish government for Danish development 
assistance of 2010 reiterates its engagement in favour of result-oriented management so as to be 
more accountable and efficient83. 
  
                                                            
83
 “Aid effectiveness must be further increased and the results of development assistance documented, communicated and applied in 
new efforts. Clear targets will be set to measure progress in partner countries, and the measurement of results will be strengthened. (…) 
Efforts to communicate the results of Denmark’s development cooperation will be strengthened and the allocation of funds to 
information activities will be increased in 2011 and the years ahead.” (DANIDA, 2010:2-3 – bold text as in original). 
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